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This thesis report is a multidimensional analysis cf the
Federal budgeting process as it pertains to the United States
Army financial manager. Summarized information is presented
concerning the evolution and current state of the Federal
Budget System. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System is described both with respect to its origin and pre-
sent application. The concept, process, and Federal implemen-
tation of Zero Base Budgeting is discussed. The Training
Management Control System as a new budgeting tool to justify
Operation and Maintenance, Army Program 2 mission funds is
introduced. A methodology applying the interface of the
Training Management Control System and Zero Base Budgeting
is developed for utilization in the budgeting process. The
cruciality of program evaluation and budgetary performance
feedbacks are discussed. Recommendations are included de-
scribing ways improvements can be made in: the Training
Management Control System, the budgeting process for train-
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This thesis is concerned with a multidimensional analysis
of the Federal budgeting process as it pertains to the United
States Army. Since it appears that funds will continue to
be constrained within the Department of Defense, it is
imperative that any potential financial manager within the
DOD structure be well aware of both the budgeting process
in general and its specific current and potential "state
of the art" procedures.
It was therefore the contention of the authors that
this thesis report should serve the primary purpose of a
self-teaching vehicle for the financial management community
of the U. S. Army in three major ways. These are:
1. Firstly, this report is basically targeted toward
officers in the United States Army being schooled for
eventual assignments in Officer Personnel Management Systems
(OPMS) Code 45 (Comptroller) positions. This particular
group of officers needs to gain familiarity with the entire
budgetary spectrum and the need for such information is
intensified by the diverse backgrounds of the officers being
schooled for eventual comptroller-related positions. Due
to the dual-track nature of the Army's Officer Personnel
Management System (OPMS) it is often the case that an officer
12

being trained at a graduate school for a future comptroller
position may have had little or no exposure to Army financial
managment
.
2. In addition to providing these personnel with infor-
mation on the macro-budgeting process, this report will
also give some insight into the latest management tools
being utilized within the budgeting process. The concepts
behind the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
will be examined as well as the evolution and use of Zero
Base Budgeting (ZBB) within the Department of the Army.
3. To further enhance the target community's 'understanding
of the budgetary process, the authors give a practical per-
spective to this report by isolating a specific area of
budgetary concern and demonstrating the relationship of the
management budgeting tools with some present systems under
development. The report focuses on Operation and Mainte-
nance, Army (OMA) Program 2 (P2) mission funds as an excellent
vehicle to accomplish this practical application since it
represents the basic Army mission and allows the demonstra-
tion of potential use of the Training Management Control
System (TMCS) to facilitate the budgeting process for this
specific program. This focus also allowed the authors to
consider further sophistificaticns of the budgetary process
relating to effectiveness issues associated with training




The following text is initially oriented to provide
summarized background information that will serve as "both
a learning experience for any potential Army comptroller
as well as the framework for development of the central
objective of this endeavor: developing a zero base budgeting
methodology for OMA Program 2 mission dollars in active Army
divisions utilizing the Training Management Control System
(TMCS). To this end Chapter II provides an overview of the
budgeting cycle within the Federal government with emphasis
on the timing of the various events as well as the players
involved in the attainment of the finished product.
Chapter III will examine the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System (PPBS) of the Department of Defense/
Department of the Army with the analysis based on both
historical and current perspectives.
The recent emergence of Zero Base Budgeting (Z3B) within
the PPBS structure will be explored in Chapter IV looking
at the evolution of the overall concept as well as current
and potential application within the United States Army's
budgetary system.
Chapter V introduces the Training Management Control
System (TMCS) as a funds planning and control tool for OMA,
P2 Mission funds which are the focal point of the analysis
and application to follow in the subsequent chapters. The
evolution of the TMCS will be discussed as well as its





Chapter VT concerns the application of the information
presented in previous chapters to the Command Operating
Budget Estimate (COBE) and Budget Execution Review (BER)
phases of the Army budget process. Specifically, a possible
methodology for utilizing TMCS to support ZBB of P2 mission
dollars is explored.
Chapter VII explores the relationship of TMCS output as
the cost input to a cost/benefit approach and examines
potential benefit or effectiveness measures which might be
used to relate certain levels of OMA funding to cerxain
levels of readiness.
Chapter VIII will briefly summarize the entire thesis
report and allow the opportunity for the authors to make
some closing comments concerning some of the conclusions
drawn and recommendations made during the course of this
endeavor.
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II. THE FEDERAL BUDGET SYSTEM
A . GENERAL
The task of budgeting represents a complex, challenging
and ever-changing endeavor. While Federal Budgeting in
general sets forth specific actions proposed and the estimated
cost of thier implementation to accomplish the mission, the
Army Budget System must also enable our Government officials
to see the entire picture of our funding needs and at the
same time analyze and justify specific items of expenditure.
Due to the dynamic nature of the budgetary process, it is
considered imperative that any officer working within the
army financial management community possess a working know-
ledge of the entire budgetary spectrum. To gain such a per-
spective it is necessary to take a macro view of the entire
Federal Budget System to fully appreciate the interworkings
of the players involved in the formulation and execution of
the budgetary process.
This chapter provides the reader with an overview of the
budget system with respect to its evolution, an analysis of
the present system including the roles of the various players
invovled in the process, and the overall interrelationship




Since budgeting is an ever-changing process it is not
surprising that an analysis of the history of the Federal
Budget reflects some drastic changes in the procedures and
methodology associated with the budgetary process.
Budgetary procedures prior to 1921 were characterized
primarily by their lack of integration and coordination.
While the current budgetary environment has the President
as a prime factor in budget development, prior to 1921 the
President was completely eliminated from compiling or
considering budget estimates. The actual budget preparation
was done by the various executive departments with the
estimates being compiled by the Secretary of the Treasury
into a "Book of Estimates" which was eventually presented
to Congress.
For more than a century real Federal budgetary power
resided almost exclusively in Congress. The beginning of
the 1900' s, however, found an increasing dissatisfaction
with the established arrangements due to the rise in Federal
spending, apparent inefficiencies within the system as well
as the fiscal pressures not felt in the 19th century.
Perhaps the first absolute indicator of potential changes
within the system came about in March 1909- During this
timeframe the Congress gave the President the authority to
recommend in his State of the Union Address specific measures
to reduce estimates or increase taxes. The President was
not, however, given the authority to revise estimates
18

prepared by executive departments. Although this change
in perspective of Presidential involvement was significant,
it actually did little to eliminate the following major
1
disadvantages of the budget procedures prior to 1921:
1. No centralized agency to coordinate the various
departmental estimates.
2. No Presidential voice in the preparation of the
estimates
.
3- No agency to control the management of the funds
used by the various departments. (This resulted
in requests for supplemental appropriations year
after year)
.
In 1910, the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act created
the Taft Committee to look into the entire financial manage-
ment system within the Federal Government. Upon completion
2
of their analysis the Taft Committee recommended:
1. A comprehensive executive budget.
2. A budget in terms of programs or functions.
3- A comprehensive and improved accounting system.
The above proposals recommended by the Taft Committee
were never carried out however, due to the interference
of World War I. It was therefore not until 1921 that any
change in the budget procedures ensued.
Between the end of World War I and 1921, the Congress
drew together various recommendations of governmental and
civilian agencies and enacted the Budget and Accounting Act
og 10 June 1921. Although the Act failed to provide for
3dependable budgetary machinery, it:^
19

1. Placed full responsibility for preparation of
the budget on the President.
2. Established the Bureau of the Budget (the forerunner
of today's Office of Management and Budget) within
the Treasury Department to assemble, correlate,
revise, reduce, or increase estimates of the various
departments
.
3. Prohibited all Federal Agencies from going directly
to Congress unless requested by that body.
4. Directed each department to designate a budget
officer to serve as the connecting link between
departments and the former Bureau of the Budget.
5- Required the President to submit a plan for
raising revenue.
6. Established the General Accounting Office (GAO) and
the Comptroller General.
In the year since its passage, the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921 has proven to be a durable reform, and sub-
sequent changes in the Federal budget process have generally
built on its foundations. Such changes, however, have tended
to concentrate further authority in the Chief Executive,
while fragmenting it in Congress.
Almost twenty years after the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921, the Reorganization Act of 1939 gave The President
authority to present plans for reorganizing the Executive
Branch. This Reorganization Act allows the President the
20

ability to shape the Executive Branch to his specifications
with only a Congressional veto capable of preventing any
reorganization plan from becoming law.
Some of the results of the Reorganization Plan I are:
1. The creation of the Executive Office of the
President
.
2. The transfer of the Bureau of the Budget from the
Treasury Department to the Executive Office of
the President, with the following functions:
a. Assist the President in the preparation and
formulation of the Federal Budget.




Aid the President in bringing about more
efficient and economical conduct of Government
Service
.
d. Keep the President informed on fund utilization
in all Government agencies.
Following World War II, the Hoover Commission was formed
for the purpose of investigating the financial system of
the military. This Commission eventually recommended the
use of a performance budget and some major improvements in
budgeting and accounting systems and procedures. These
recommendations resulted in Title IV, Public Law 216, 19^9,
and the Budget and Accounting Act of 1950. Public Law 216
created comptroller positions in the Department of Defense
and military departments as well as specifically calling for
21

conversion to the performance type budget. The Budget and
Accounting Act of 1950 gave the authority for the use of the
performance -type presentation of the budget to Congress.
Perhaps the most significant event in the attempts to
sophisticate the Federal Budget System came about in the
passing of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 197^ (Public Law 93-3^) • The importance of this
Act derived from the fact that it provided Congress the
disciplined system needed to control the "purse strings" of
our government. Prior to PL 93-3^ the Congress had
considered the Federal Budget on a piecemeal basis. Little
attempt was made, as legislation was passed, to relate im-
pacts of the bills to the budget.
With respect to the budget reform aspects of PL 93-3^
the following key areas were acted upon:
1. The change which had the greatest impact on all
levels of the government was the establishment of
a new fiscal year. The old fiscal year (FY) of
1 July - 30 June did not provide Congress adequate
time to consider budgetary requests submitted in
President's Budget in January of each year. Effec-
tive with FY 1977 1 the fiscal year was redesignated
to run 1 October - 30 September.
2. To assist the Congress in staying on schedule,
budget committees were established in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate . The
primary responsibilities of the budget committees
22

include: formulating and reporting budget reso-
lutions, recommending appropriate levels of federal
revenues and expenditures and determining the
appropriate level of public debt. The House
committee has twenty-three members; the Senate
committee has fifteen.
3. A Congressional Budget Office was established. Its
primary function is to assist the budget committees
with data; information and staff analysis. It
also will assist other congressional committees
and members with budget related information upon
request.
In the area of impoundment control, PL 93-3^ was
designed to assure effective congressional control over the
budgetary process as provided by the Constitution of the
United States. It was believed essential to establish
better controls concerning the impoundment of congressionally
approved funds and PL 93-3^ makes it extremely difficult
for the President or any agent of the government to either
rescind or defer budget authority.
Under the provisions of PL 93-3^+ in order for budget
authority to be rescinded, the President must request
approval from Congress, making all facts available. If
Congress (both House and Senate) does not act within 45
days or if Congress disapproves the request, the funds must
be made available to be spent. Along the same lines, if
the President or another agent of the government desires to
23

defer budget authority, the President must request approval
from Congress, disclosing all available facts, or either
the House or the Senate may disapprove the request. If
neither take action, the deferral is considered approved.
If either one disapproves the deferral, the funds in
question must be made available to spend.
C. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ORGANIZATION
Just as an appreciation for the evolutionary nature of
the Federal Budget System is critical for any future
member of the financial management community, so too is an
understanding of the basic organization of the Congress
with respect to the budgetary process. It is imperative
that any potential player in the "budget game" has at
least a working knowledge of the interworkings of the
Congressional Committee System, the Congressional Budget
Office and those specific committees that have the greatest
relevance to the entire budget system.
Perhaps the best point of departure with respect to an
analysis of the basic congressional budget organization
is an understanding of the basic committee system utilized
by Congress. In general, the committee system is made up
of three specific types of committees: select and special
committees, joint committees, and standing committees. A
functional subdivision of any of these previously mentioned
committees is considered a subcommittee. The overall purpose
24

of this committee concept is not only to permit a division
of labor but also to afford Congress a measure of expertise
in policy review and oversight.
Analysis of the three basic types of committees, reveals
that the standing committees have the greatest relevance to
the Federal budget system. The Budget Committees of the
House and Senate function in the area of fiscal policy and
priority, setting and carrying out this function by:
1. Maintaining surveillance of the effect of existing
and proposed legislation on budget outlays.
2. Making continuing studies of tax expenditures and
coordinating tax expenditures with direct budget
outlays.
3. Setting levels for total spending, revenues, and
the national debt.
These budget committees can therefore be said to provide
overall management to synthesize a congressional budget
policy distinct from executive-branch initiatives.
Another critical segment of the overall Congressional
Budget organization is found within the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 197^ (PL 93-3^) and
serves the Congress as a prime source of information on
the budget and on taxing and spending legislation. As a
primary responsibility, the office furnishes the two budget
committees with information, data, and analyses needed to
discharge committee functions. On request, the office
develops comparable information for the appropriations
25

committee of either house, and also for the House Ways and
Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee. In addition,
again on request, the office provides any committee or
member with information already compiled and available. In
yet another duty, the office tracks the spending decisions
of Congress and relates them to established budget authority
7
and outlay targets.
Perhaps the last portion of clarification necessary
with respect to the overall Congressional budget organization
deals with the two step authorization and appropriations
process. Congress does not in reality approve funding but
rather makes appropriations. This process is accomplished
by first enacting specific authorizing legislation. The
legislation or authorizing committee in both Houses perform
this function by providing substantive review of executive
branch proposals and recommending legislation authorizing
agencies to pursue specific programs and activities. The
legislative committees that exercise primary cognizance of
defense authorizations are the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees. Sub -committees are utilized by both
Houses in the accomplishment of this taks.
Once a program receives authorization, the second step
of the authorization and appropriations process ensues.
This entails further review of agency proposals and the
House Appropriations Committee through its sub-committees
does the actual review of requests for proposals and
examines agency performance. When passed by the House,
26

the bill goes to the Senate where a similar process occurs.
The separate House and Senate versions of a specific bill
then go to a Committee of Conference composed of members
of both Houses and, at this point, differences are reconciled
and a single bill is recommended. Adoption of this single
bill by both Houses results in the passage of the bill.
D. A FEDERAL BUDGET OVERVIEW
The Federal Budgeting process is a massive and complex
endeavor. To make any attempt to fully analyze what goes
on in deatil with respect to the development and presentation
of the President's budget would be much too ambitious an
undertaking for this particular thesis. Equally overambitious
would be an in depth review of the entire Congressional
Budget Process. There are, however, some critical elements
in both the President's Budget and the Congressional Budget
Process that must be brought into play in order to have the
proper financial management perspective at the lower levels
ob budgetary responsibility, be it the Department of Defense,
Division, or even the Battalion levels.
1. The President's Budget
As stated previously, the President had little
control or influence over the Federal budget preparation
prior to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. This
act allowed for a single, unified executive budget. This
same act also established the Bureau of the Budget which
27

is now known as the Office of Management and Budget (0MB)
.
The evolution of the initial functions of the Bureau of
the Budget to the present sphere of influence of the
Office of Management and Budget is an excellent example
of the fiscal dynamics that have occurred during the
time frame of 1921 to the present. The Office of Manage-
ment and Budget has evolved into the principal staff arm
of the President and the current functions performed by
0MB includes:
a. Assisting the President in the executive
direction of the budget to include actual
budget preparation.
b. Supervises and controls budget execution.
c. Performs program evaluations.
d. Oversight of programs for defense and in
foreign policy area.
While the Office of Management and Budget is
perhaps the President's most utilized staff member with
respect to the development and presentation of the budget,
the President also receives budget related input from the
Treasury, the Council of Economic Advisors, as well as the
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.
The President is therefore well supported in his
attempt to develop the executive budget. It is however,
the Office of Management and Budget who virtually carries
the show by performing actual agency-by-agency examination
of proposed programs and ongoing activities. These re-
views by 0MB are critical aspects in the determination of
28

both the size of the Federal budget as well as the actual
funding levels for each specific agency.
2. The Congressional Budget Process
Due to the inherent complexities of the Congressional
budget process, Figure 1 is employed to help demonstrate
the flow of the entire system as well as the time frames
associated with the various specific activities within the
overall process. Table 1 is intended to supplement Figure 1




Department of Defense Interface With Budget Process
Although the actual Department of Defense interface
and scheduling constraints deriving from the Congressional
budget process exhibited in Figure 1 will be further ex-
plored in a subsequent chapter dealing with the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), it is important
to interject at this point that the Federal Budgeting process,
highlighted in this chapter, represents the critical budgetary
arena for DOD. While PPBS is the internal system used to
obtain and manage DOD resources, the manner in which defense
needs fare among all other competing resource claims even-
tually results from the priorities developed through the
interaction of executive-branch agencies, the President,























TABLE 1 - DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO FIGURE l 9
APPROPRIATION
An appropriation is an authorization by an act of
Congress to incur obligations for specified purposes and
to make subsequent payments out of the U.S. Treasury.
Appropriations are classified as being annual, multi-year,
or no-year, depending on the period of time that is
available for obligation purposes.
B. AUTHORIZATION
Authorization is the basic substantive legislation
enacted by Congress that sets up or continues the legal
operation of a Federal program or agency. Such legislation
is normally a prerequisite for subsequent appropriations,
but dies not usually provide budget authority.
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET
A resolution passed by both Houses of Congress, but
not requiring the signature of the President, setting forth,
reaffirming, or revising specified congressional budget
totals for the Federal government for a fiscal year.
D. THE BUDGET
"The Budget" usually refers to the President's budget
(for example, The Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 1980 ). Published and transmitted to Congress
by the Office of Management and Budget, the President's
budget includes the approved BOD budget. The Army portion
includes descriptive summaries and justification documents
prepared by appropriation directors.
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III. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPES)
A. GENERAL
As discussed in Chapter II, the art of budgeting is
dynamic in nature and has been subject to reform through-
out the history of the United States. The basic product
of the reform movement include: line item budgeting,
performance budgeting and Planning, Programming and Budget-
ing (PPB) . These products represent the basic evolution
of the present Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS). The purpose of this particular chapter is to take
a brief look at the above mentioned products of the reform
movement and then proceed into an in depth analysis of
the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS).
It is felt that such a discussion concerning both the
evolution and analysis of PPBS will create the proper
environment to explore subsequent areas of analysis to
be addressed throughout the remaining chapters of this
endeavor.
B. PRODUCTS OF REFORM
"Budget reform," Charles Beard wrote during the first
period of budget innovation in the early years of the 20th
century, "bears the imprint of the age in which it origi-
10
nated." This observation has proven to be of a timeless
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quality since the products of budget reform have reflected
the particular conception of the budget function as perceived
at the specific time of its innovation.
Although every budget process includes aspects of
control, management and planning, one function tends to
11predominate. This predominance comes about due to the
inherent competitiveness of the functions; emphasis on
one diminishes use of the others. During each period of
budget reform the control-management-planning balance was
changed to reflect the particular emphasis associated
with the "needs of the time".
The basic product of the first period of budget reform
was emphasis on line item budgeting as an attempt to satisfy
the need for expenditure control. This period of reform
included the years between the passage of the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 and the Hoover Commission report
of 19^9 This line item approach to budgeting derived from
the bureaucratic conditions common to modern government.
These conditions evolve from the desire of government to
prevent financial improprieties and of limiting agency
spending to authorized levels. Due to this concern with
respect to fiduciary responsibility, government budgeting
inevitably "begins with indispensable efforts to prompt
'accountability 1 by preventing public funds from being
stolen, used for unauthorized purposes, or spent at un-
12
controlled rates...". While the control function was
well defined in this line item otientation the management and
planning aspects of the budget were not properly developed.
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The second product of the budget reform movement, per-
formance budgeting,, was found to be as unifunctional as
line item budgeting approach but with a different functional
emphasis. Performance budgeting emphasized the management
side of budgeting with the control and planning aspects of
budgeting being decentralized or dispersed. Performance
*
budgeting had as its principal thrust an attempt to improve
work efficiency by means of activity classifications and
work/cost measurements.
While both line item and performance budgeting were
obviously much too unifunctional to be totally effective,
Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) has a multi-
purpose perspective. While PPB regards planning as the
central budget function, it does not negate the need for
control and management and for informational structures
oriented to these functions. PPB has therefore been found
to be an efficient vehicle to enable policymakers to
evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative expenditure
proposals. The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS) that has evolved from the basic PPB concept is there-
fore the "state of the art" with respect to the optimum
balance of the control -management -planning aspects of budget-
ing that confronted the Federal Government. The following
in depth analysis of PPBS within the Department of Defense/
Department of the Army will demonstrate the comparitive
virtues of such a system.
3k

C. PLANNING - PROGRAMMING - BUDGETING
The system of planning-programming-budgeting concep-
tually relates three factors: a desired outcome (planning),
the structuring of methods of achieving the outcome (pro-
gramming) and the funds available to accomplish the end
result (budgeting) . It is predicated on the dominance
of the planning function and attempts to make government
operations more efficient and effective by improving the
allocation of public resources between competing needs. ^
During 1965, President Lyndon Johnson directed all
departments and agencies of the federal government to
adopt a planning, programming and budgeting system. Dur-
ing the implementation phase of PPBS, Charles L. Schultze,
then Director of the United States Bureau of the Budget,
Ik
announced six goals of programming budgeting:
1. Careful identification and examination of goals
and objectives in each area of government activity.
2. Analysis of the output of a given program in
terms of its objectives.
3. Measurement of total programming costs, not for
just one year but for several years in the future.
h. Formulation of objectives and programs expending
beyond the single year of the annual budget to
long term objectives.
5- Analysis of alternatives to find the most efficient





6. Establishment of analytic procedures to serve as
a systematic part of the budget review process.
As could be expected of any new system within the
Federal government, PPBS met with varying degrees of success
with respect to its implementation. While some departments
and agencies adjusted quite well to the new game inherent
in PPBS, others failed to go beyond a "first step" posture
with respect to PPBS implementation. The Department of
Defense, however, proved to be fertile ground for the growth
of this new approach to budgeting and PPBS has not only
survived but in reality has actually thrived in the DOD
environment
.
D. PPBS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY
Prior to 1961, military planning and financial manage-
ment were being conducted independently. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff and planning agencies of the military depart-
ments conducted military planning while the Comptroller
was responsible for financial management. This system led
to piecemeal resource management with imbalances in the
overall Department of Defense plan.
The inherent problems associated with such a fragmented
system of managing resources brought to light the need to
establish a system to bridge the gap between planning and
budgeting. In the early 1960's, the bridge was referred
to as the programming system but by 1963, the Planning,
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Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) was operating for
the Department of Defense. As stated in Army Regulation 1-1
(Planning, Programming and Budgeting Within the Department
of the Army), "PPBS is the management system employed ... to
establish and maintain. . .capabilities to accomplish roles
and missions and to ensure effective use of resources."
Perhaps at this point it would be helpful to look
closely at PPBS within the Department of the Army by
analysing the separate yet interrelated functions of the
system as outlined in the United States Army Institute of
Administration's Special Text 14—191:
1 . Planning
Planning considers the threat to national security
objectives. Strategies, policies, and force objectives
are developed to cope with that threat. Planning includes
assessing the risk associated with not accomplishing all
the plans
.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) has
responsibility for the Army planning function.
Army long-range planning covers a 10-20 year period;
mid-range planning covers 2-10 years; short-range planning
is for 0-2 years.





Programming is translating the guidance based on
the plans into detailed resource requirements (e.g. forces,
manpower) for a five-year period. Programming takes into
consideration resource constraints.
The major documents in the Army programming phase
are
:
a. Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR) sub-
mitted by selected commands.
b. Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submitted by
each military department.
c. Five-year Defense Program (FYDP) which is a single
Department of Defense management document, up-
dated three times a year, which expresses total
resource requirements displayed in ten broad
program categories.
Programming in the Army is the responsibility of the
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (D, PA&E) Office
of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
3- Budgeting
Budgeting is the short range allocation of the resources,
expressed in detail, to accomplish the mission. It com-
prises budget formulation and budget execution.
a. Budget formulation is the development of detailed
resource requirements to support programs and
objectives. The primary purpose of budget
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formulation is to obtain the resources from
Congress for execution of programs.
b. Budget execution is the allocation, obligation,
expenditure, and reporting of funds in the
accomplishment of the mission.
The primary budget phase document is the Command
Operating Budget Estimate (COBE) . It addresses primarily
the Budget Year (forthcoming fiscal year) and the Program
year (fiscal year following the budget year)
.
Army Staff responsibility for the budgeting phase
lies with the Comptroller of the Army.
Upon analysis of these functions associated with the
Army Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
it becomes apparent that PPBS is not only complex but
also quite an ambitious system as well. There are in fact
thirty-three major planning, programming and budgeting
events talcing place within an approximate 36-month Army
PPBS cycle. This cycle is further compounded by the need
for annual iteration of the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP)
that causes each of the 33 discrete events to occur once
every 12 months.
The above mentioned complexities inherent in the Army
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System make it necessary
to look at PPBS within the Army in various dimensions in
order to acquire a basic familiarity of just what is going
on within the system.
To gain the proper perspective of PPBS within the
Department of the Army it is necessary to examine the discrete
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events associated with the entire system, the critical
players/agencies that influence the system and the time-frame
associated with various events. To this end the following
figures, with clarifying definitions, are designed to give
just such a perspective "by means of tracing the flow of
discrete events throughout the system.
While Figure 2 (Army Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System Cycle) provides the necessary overview of the entire
system the separate functions of PPBS are analyzed in depth
by means of:
Figure 3 (Planning Phase Events - Army PPBS Cycle)
Figure k (Sequencial Interrelations of Principal Pro-
gramming Phase Events by Agency and Month of
Occurrence Within PPBS Cycle)
Figure 5 (Sequencial Interrelationship of Principal
Budgeting Phase Events by Agency and Month
of Occurrence Within PPBS Cycle)
In addition to the above mentioned flow diagrams associat-
ed with PPBS, Annex A (Definitions Applicable to Army PPBS
Cycle) provides the critical definitions of the various
acronyms utilized in the presentation of PPBS within the
U.S. Army. Annex B (PPBS Modifications) is also included
to provide information concerning innovations in the PPBS
Cycle targeted for FY 1980-1984.
Upon analysis of the flow through of the Army PPBS cycle,
a great deal can be learned about the system as well as the































































Figure 4 Sequential Interrelationship of Principle Programing




















































































This chapter has described the Planning, Programming
and Budgeting System and its application by the United
States Army. Emphasis has been on the process that involves
33 discrete events that occur during an approximate 36 month
Army PPBS cycle. "Within the PPBS process, planning events
establish the force basis for assessing defense resource
needs while programming events translate planning into
balanced allocations of forces manpower, and funds for a
5-year period. The budgeting events obtain the budget
authority and funds to carry out Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) approved plans and programs and then provide
19for associated reporting and review.
"
Since the PPB process within the U.S. Army is an evolv-
ing system the concept of PPBS must never be put into a
static perspective. The system described in this chapter
is subject to the changes inherent in a dynamic environment.
Although PPBS has the capacity to respond to various changes
in emphasis and procedures, the basic framework of the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System within the De-
partment of the Army appears to be solidly entrenched as a
valid internal system of resource allocation. Names and
acronyms can and do change as evidenced in Annex 3, but the
fundamental PPB process, which proceeds from the general
to the specific over time, has retained its chief functional
characteristic .. .effective resource allocation.
K$

IV. ZERO -BASE BUDGETING
In the preceding chapters of this endeavor the authors
have concentrated their efforts toward establishing an
appropriate basis from which to explore the current "state
of the art" with respect to the budgeting process for the
Federal government. The historical/macro view of the Federal
budgetary process, the analysis of the budget reform move-
ment and its products and a comprehensive survey of the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) are all
basic to understanding the concepts underlying the latest




This chapter seeks to provide answers to some of the
more common questions concerning this approach to budgeting.
They include
:
- Where did ZBB come from?
- Why the current emphasis on ZBB?
- What are the basic ZBB concepts and processes?
- Will ZBB replace PPBS?
It is hoped that upon completion of this chapter the
reader will have a better perception of just what ZBB is all
about as well as its implications concerning present and
future impacts upon the budget methodology utilized within





Zero-base budgeting (ZBB) is a relatively new methodology.
Developed by Peter Pyhrr at Texas Instruments, Inc. during
1969 f it first gained attention for use in the public sector
when Jimmy Carter, then Governor of Georgia, used it in
preparation of the State of Georgia's budget for Fiscal
Year 1973- During that year, $55 million was cut from
Georgia's budget without a significant decrease in services
20
offered by the state. Due to this apparent success of ZBB
within the public sector, Jimmy Carter repeatedly made the
2 1following pledge during his 1976 presidential campaign:
"Immediately after my inauguaration I will require
zero-base budgeting for all federal departments,
bureaus and boards by executive order."
In February 1977 » President Carter redeemed this pledge
when he issued an executive order to direct the implementation
of zero-base budgeting by all Federal agencies. This
memorandum, which called for the development of a zero-base
budgeting system for Fiscal Year 1979. caused an immediate
demand for more information on the subject of ZBB for virtually
all levels of management within the public sector. Just
what was this new methodology called ZBB and what were the
implications of its utilization upon the present system?
B. THE CONCEPT OF ZERO -BASE BUDGETING
Zero-base budgeting is an approach, not a fixed
procedure or set of forms to be applied uniformly from
^7

one organization to the next. It draws upon a number
of techniques which were developed during the 1960's in
connection with the evolution of the Planning, Programming
and Budgeting System (PPBS). These techniques include:
systems analysis, problem-solving, cost benefit analysis,
and program management
.
Since zero-base budgeting is still somewhat in an
evolutionary stage of development, it is not surprising
that a number of definitions of ZBB are presently in
existence. Upon analysis of the various definitions of
ZBB, two definitions stand out due to both their clarity
and appropriateness in any environment, public or private:
"ZBB is:... an operating, planning and budgeting
process which requires each manager to justify
his entire budget request in detail, and shifts
the burden of proof to each manager to justify
why he should spend any money. This procedure
requires that all activities and operations
be identified in decision packages which will
evaluated and ranked in order of importance
by systematic analysis." 22
"ZBB is a technique which complements and links
the existing planning, budgeting, and review
processes. It identifies alternative and
efficient methods of utilizing limited resources
in the effective attainment of selected benefits.
It is a flexible management approach which provides
a credible rationale for reallocating resources
by focusing on the systematic review and justifi-
cation of the funding and performance levels of
current programs or activities .
"
2 3
Conceptually speaking, ZBB can be viewed as a managerial
approach to budgeting, emphasizing inputs and outputs of
the decision-making process, rather than incremental increases
or decreases from the prior year. The decision-maker is thus
allowed to define and analyze the components of an organization
^8

as interrelated activities, rather than the traditional
approach of vertical slices of an organization.
Following President Carter's executive order to initiate
ZBB within the public sector, the Office of Management and
Budget (0MB) issued 0MB Bulletin 77-9 to provide the
clarification and guidance required to attain the President's
objectives. In this bulletin the concept of ZBB was described
in these terms:
Zero-base budgeting is a management process that
provides for systematic consideration of all pro-
grams and activities in conjunction with the
formulation of budget requests and program planning.
In addition, 0MB' s Bulletin 77-9 stated that the
principal objectives of zero-base budgeting were to:
1. Involve managers at all levels in the budget process;
2. Justify the resource requirements for existing
activities as well as for new activities;
3. Focus the justification on the evaluation of discrete
programs or activities on each decision unit;
k. Establish for all managerial levels in an agency,
objectives against which accomplishments can be
identified and measured;
5. Assess alternatives methods of accomplishing ob-
jectives ;
6. Analyze the probably effects of different budget
amounts or performance levels on the achievement of
objectives; and,
7. Provide a credible rationale for reallocating resources,
especially from old activities to new activities.
49

C. THE PROCESS OF ZBB
In the zero-base approach to budgeting there are four
24
basic steps, as outlined by Peter Phyrr:
1. Identify "decision units".
2. Analyze each decision unit in a "decision package".
3- Evaluate and prioritize all decision packages
in order to develop the appropriations request.
4. Prepare the detailed operating budgets so they
reflect the decision packages approved in the
budget appropriation.
In 0MB Circular No. A-115, dated 5 May 1978, these
four basic steps advocated by Peter Phyrr were expanded
to provide a general framework for establishing a Government-
wide ZBB process. These steps include:
1. Establishment of agency policy and guidelines;
2. Identification of decision units;
3- Identification of objectives for each decision unit;
4. Identification and evaluation of alternative methods
of accomplishing objectives;
5- Analysis of different levels of resource allocation
and performance;
6. Preparation of decision packages;
7. Ranking of decision packages; and,
8. Consolidation process (optional).
0MB Bulletin No. 77-9 provided key definitions of
various terms associated with the ZBB process as they pertain




KEY DEFINITIONS WITHIN THE ZBB PROCESS
Definition of Terms
Decision Unit . The basic program or organizational
entity for which budget requests are prepared and for
which managers make significant decisions on the amount
of spending and the scope or quality of work to be performed,
Decision Package . A brief justification document
that includes the information necessary for managers to
make judgements on program or activity levels and resource
requirements. A series of decision packages is prepared
for each decision unit and cumulatively represents the
total budget request for that unit.
Consolidated Decision Packages . Packages prepared
at higher organizational and program levels that summarize
and supplement information contained in decision packages
received from subordinate units in the agency.
Minimum Level . The level of performance below which
it is not feasible for the decision unit to continue be-
cause no constructive contribution could be made toward
fulfilling its objectives.
Current Level . The level of performance that would
be reflected if activities for the budget year were
carried on at current year service or output levels with-
out major policy changes. A concept, similar to current
services, that nevertheless permits internal realignments
of activities within existing statutory authroizations
.
Enhancement Level . A level above the current level,
where increased output or service levels are consistent
with major objectives and where sufficient benefits are
expected to warrant the serious review of higher authorities
Ranking. The process ty which higher level managers
evaluate and array program or activity levels (as shown
in decision packages) in decreasing order of priority. The
ranking process results in a relative priority assigned to
each decision package in the budget request.
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that are most important in achieving a basic understanding
of the ZBB process. Although some of the phraseology and
semantics associated with the ZBB process may vary from
agency to agency within the Federal government, the basic
procedural steps and definitions promulgated by 0MB are
found throughout the public sector.
D. THE DECISION PACKAGE
The decision package represents the building block
of the zero-base concept and its impact on the entire ZBB
process cannot be overemphasized. In zero-base budgeting,
managers at each level prepare the decision packages. The
decision packages contain analysis of: purpose, cost,
performance, benefits, alternative courses of action, and
consequences of disapproval of program budget requests.
The decision packages therefore represent a brief
justification and request document that includes the
information necessary for managers to make judgements on
program direction and resource requirements
.
Although the decision package concept will be discussed
in a subsequent chapter, it is perhaps beneficial at this
point to illustrate this concept by an example while
simultaneously demonstrating the difference between the
traditional and zero-base approach to budgeting.
EXAMPLE : "The Recreation Services Division (RSD)
at Fort Army has been tasked by the Director of
Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA) to develop
a budget request for the coming fiscal year."
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Upon analysis of the task, the head of RSD determines
that with $75,000 he can just barely accomplish his goals
(minimum level). With $100,000, he can attain the same
level of performance as the previous year (current/basic
level) and with $125,000, he could improve the performance
of RSD (enhanced level).
In a traditional budget environment the budget request
for RSD could be depicted as follows:
Traditional
Budget
While in the ZBB environment this same request could be











Therefore in this particular example the head of RSD
is not forced to submit one budget request for program
funding that could be rejected in its entirety or illogically
vertically sliced (Traditional Budgeting Approach) but rather
provides the DPCA and other top level decision makers the




The priority rankings, like decision packages, are
a key element of the ZBB process. Priority rankings are
utilized to prepare a listing of all decision packages of an
activity in order of decreasing benefit to the overall
organization. The decision maker can thus identify the
benefits to be gained at each level of expenditure and can
also analyze the consequences of not approving additional
decision packages ranked below a given level of expenditure.
Selected decision packages are forwarded to the next higher
budget review level where they compete with decision pack-
ages of other programs and activities. Priority ranked
decision packages also provide decision makers with a
potential starting point to be utilized during the current
fiscal year in identifying activities/programs to be reduced
if expenditure levels change and identifies the expected
consequences of reducing them.
The priority ranking process is therefore a critical
element of any ZBB methodology and in Chapter VI
the actual prioritization process will be demonstrated to
endow the reader with a better understanding and appreciation
of this key element of the zero-base budgeting within the
public sector.
F. COMPARISON OF PPB WITH ZERO -BASE BUDGETING
Before concluding any discussion concerning ZBB and its
application within the public sector it is important to
5^

address the question of the compatability of ZBB methodology
within the PPBS environment. Figure 6 compares and contrasts
the characteristics of PPB and ZBB as a basis for discussion
of the potential interface of ZBB with PPBS.
Analysis of Table 3 reveals that while there are some basic
similarities between ZBB and PPBS, there are also some differ-
ences that must be considered before any constructive inter-
face can ensue. Perhaps the key difference between PPBS
and ZBB lies in the decision making perceptions of the two
concepts; i.e., PPB focuses on top level decision making,
while ZBB focuses on decisions at various operating and
management levels.
It is the contention of Pyhrr that the two systems are
indeed essentially different, as discussed above, but
potentially complementary. He states that: "the top-down
efforts of PPB can be coordinated with the predominately
27bottom-up efforts of zero-base budgeting." This statement
by Pyhrr is not surprising when consideration is given to
the fact that the zero-base concept is primarily designed
to increase effectiveness and efficiency at the lower manage
-
levels, where resources are being consumed. However, top
level guidance is a part of the ZBB process.
ZBB is not a system unto itself but rather is, as the
subheading of Fyhrr's book imples, A Practical Management
Tool for Evaluating; Expenses . Phyrr believes that ZBB
can fill critical gaps in PPBS design and that, "...the




















CHARACTERISTICS OF ZERO -BASE BUDGETING AND
THE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM
A Program-oriented budget
system: budgetary decisions
must be made on the basis
of programs or activities,




must be made on the basis
of programs or activities,






making into a single process.
Quantifies non-dollar costs
and benefits as well as di-







dollar costs and benefits.
Emphasizes incremental




Uses a priority ranking
system.
Requires explicit statements












effectively linked with a micro economic planning and
29budgeting technique" ...with ZBB providing that micro-
economic link.
The potential of ZBB is to serve as the coordinating
link between the macro-world of policy and the micro-
world of operations is best explained by Figure 6 dipicting
the integrated world of PPBS/ZBB.
G. WHAT IS NEW ABOUT ZBB
Perhaps at this point of the discussion on ZBB and the
compatability of PPBS with ZBB there is a desire to ask the
question: "So what else is new?" Such a question is
indeed justified when consideration is given to the fact
that much of this "new system" called ZBB has long existed
within the PPB system utilized by DOD. This same question
caused Anthony to state that "zero-base budgeting is a
31fraud. " J In making such a statement, Anthony maintained
that there was nothing really new about ZBB except that it
would force the complete installation of program budgeting
within the PPBS structure.
"So, even though zero-base budgeting is a fraud, and
even though the good parts of it are not new, ex-
perienced budget people should not let the phrase
make them nauseous. They should disregard the rhetoric
and latch onto the term as a way of accomplishing




As stated previously in this chapter, ZBB is an
approach, not a fixed procedure or set of forms to be
applied uniformly from one organization to the next. ZBB
represents just one of many management tools necessary
for effective financial management. It does not represent
a panacea for all the resource management problems within
the public sector but does provide a powerful technique
for the decision maker at all levels of government to
get the most out of each dollar consumed.
Upon analysis of the objectives of the ZBB approach to
budgeting it is not difficult to visualize the advantages
of such a technique. The very fact that ZBB involves all
levels of management in the budgetary process and forces
the decision maker to do a better job of managing must
be considered a desired benefit to any organizational
structure
.
The disadvantages of ZBB on the other hand appear to
be more in keeping with the learning curve phenomena
associated with any "new" approach attempting to inter-
face with ongoing system. Any new management process will
have an initial effect of increasing the volume of paperwork
and cause apprehension on the part of the decision makers
who feel that their sphere of influence may be threatened.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the implementation of
ZBB has had similar problems within the PPBS environment.
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In conclusion, the authors of this particular endeavor
perceive zero -base budgeting as another management tool to
be utilized in developing an environment for better decisions
to be made at all levels of government. ZBB is not a
replacement for PPBS, but rather a means to improve PPBS
.
33Zero-base budgeting should, therefore, be perceived as:^
1. A short run budgeting tool;
2. A work plan;
3. A device for explicit planning;
k. A consistent method for recording financial data;
5. A forcing device for priorities (reallocation of
financial resources);
6. A control for implementation;
7. A basis for review; and,
8. A criterion for management information.
This modified approach to ZBB can greatly aid any
decision maker in the effective allocation of limited
resources. Such an approach/methodology to zero -base budget-
ing will be explored in depth within Chapters VI and VIII
and it is hoped that the virtures of the process will become
even more self-evident. Prior to this further development
of ZBB, the authors will introduce another potential
budgetary tool and possible complimentary asset to the ZBB
approach. . .The Training Management Control System (TMCS).
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The introduction of Zero Base Budgeting in an
environment of constrained resources demands that OMA Pro-
gram 2 funds to support training "be adequately justified.
This chapter will describe and analyze a new system, the
Training Management Control System (TMCS), which will hope-
fully be a viable tool to aid in this justification process.
2. Relationships With PPBS/ZBB
From the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
comes the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) , the program
structure, the budget guidance and eventual appropriated
level for OMA, Program 2 (General Purpose Forces) Funds.
Given the allocated fund constraints, TMCS should help
identify the impacts of constraints on P2 program elements
to effectively meet a specific unit's objectives plus
provide a tool to utilize resources as efficiently as
possible. It is further thought that TMCS will aid the
lower-level decision maker in planning the training program
and in building a zero-base, unconstrained, budget by cost-
ing and documenting training events which can be related
to the various levels of performance (Decremented, Basic,
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or Enhanced) and further linked to issues/decision packages.
The methodology for using TMCS output in the COBE/ZBB
process will be explored in Chapter 6. Taking the analysis
a step further, Chapter 7 will explore input to output
relationships to identify ways in which training readiness/
effectiveness may be measured and the linkage to costs
established.
B. BACKGROUND
1 . Training; Management Problem
With the ending of the Viet Nam conflict, the sub-
sequent drawdown of forces, tightening of the defense
budget, inflationary pressures and ever-growing scarcity
of resources in an environment of growing demand, the
management of training resources has become critically
important. Since the military budget represents the majority
of non-committed, annual federal funds, Congress has been
attempting to minimize its growth.
Training management includes determining the mix of
what training to conduct, when and where it is to be con-
ducted, allocating the supporting resources (time, funds,
personnel, equipment, ammunition, training areas) required,
and assessing the impact of changes of any of them on the
training program. It is conducted world-wide by all Army
units with a training mission and is decentralized to
Battalion (the primary Division manuever and support force)
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level. The Battalion Commander is the "key" training
manager as he is primarily responsible for determining the
training felt necessary to attain the unit's required read-
iness level. The complexity of this management process is
35
reflected in the following statement \ JJ
training management involves a detailed
analysis of ^-0-60 field training events for a
battalion, using a possibility of 20-^-0 different
types of equipment with different cost factors
and about 70 different types of training ammuni-
tion. Recognizing the fact that each division
has about 20 combat/combat support battalions
or separate companies, the resource allocation
problem to support training is clear. Manual
computation of all of the above factors, both
from an initial training program and from a




Training management as it currently exists in most
of the Army is manual. Very limited capability exists to
either accurately provide such data as the variable costs of
training by particular unit nor optimize the training which
can be conducted within resource constraints. Consequently,
assessing the impact of training program changes and their
related costs is difficult. An excerpt from DA letter,
DAM0
, dated February 1977. signed by Lieutenant General
E. C. Meyer supports this contention:
Training management in divisions, brigades and
battalions in the Army today is a manual process
and as such, only a small portion of all the functions
that should be performed are in fact being performed.
Under current procedures, computing the information
63

for filling out Schedule 40 (see Note 1) of the
FY 79 COBE required 13-6 man years, involving
over 1,000 civilian and military personnel, at
a cost to the government of $2^3,300.00. The
inaccuracies of these manual computations result
in training requirements not being adequately
justified or funded. This is the weakest element
in the Army budget today.
From the advocates of TMCS comes this statement:
"...the current system is grossly inadequate in meeting the
Battalion Commanders' needs from a budgeting and manage-
ment point of view." J Furthermore, the experiences of the
authors has been that very little emphasis was placed at
levels lower than Division on managing the costs of
resources because of these difficulties.
3 . Proposed System - An Overview
Utilizing a minicomputer (IBM 5100),
"TMCS forecasts the cost of field training and
quantifies it in terms of Battalion Field Train-
ing Days (BFTD's), provides a basis for allocation
of resources to support training requirements,
assesses the impact of training alternatives,
and provides the actual cost of field training
when it is completed. The core of TMCS is a
linear programming mathematical model which
determines what training can be conducted within
available training resources, and selects the
training to be conducted on the basis of its
cost effectiveness contribution to training
readiness. "37
The Commander uses TMCS results interactively; that
is, he may modify his priorities and/or reallocate resources
NOTE 1 i Schedule 40 is concerned with the quantification
of training requirements and 0MA, Program 2, mission
dollars to training programs or comparing alternatives
based on cost constraints.
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based on a previous run (training program), continuing
TO
the process until an optimum solution is obtained.




The assumptions identified by the system's designers
and added by the authors are listed in Table 4.
2. System Objectives/Statutory and Other Regulatory
Requirements
The general objectives of TMCS are to provide:
a. The training manager with an automated means
to plan, execute and evaluate the use of his
resources for maximum training benefit.
b. The cost of field training in terms of Battalion
Field Training Days (BFTDs).
c. ZBB input in terms of priced issue areas.
d. A forecast of Ammunition requirements for each
training program.
e. Automated training schedules and training area
scheduling.
Most of these objectives are implicit in existing
Army goals and/or statutory requirements which are in turn
reflected in Army Regulations. A matrix, showing how TMCS
objectives are intended to meet these goals is at Table 5-
40
3 • Interface with External Systems
In addition to the external PPBS/ZBB linkages





Made by TMCS Designers
1. Funds will continue to be constrained and Zero Based
Budgeting will be continued.
2. The Army desires to improve training management to in-
clude projecting accurate cost data.
3. Financial management within the division and separate
brigades will continue.
k. The DA Training Ammunition Management Information
System (TAMIS) will be implemented.
5. The Army will probably not obtain significant increases
in maneuver areas.
6. Unit training will continue to be conducted as outlined
in specific Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP),
Major Command (MACOM) Training Guidance, Division Train-
ing Objectives and unit commander desires and priorities.
Added by the Authors
?. The cost factors utilized will be validated and updated
for changes in Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE),
to include authorized personnel, types of equipment,
ammunition and missions.
8. The economic (cost/benefit) analysis utilized to recommend
the minicomputer system as the most acceptable alternative
was accurate and objective.
9- The system will produce the output that it is designed
for. The principles of reasonable systems design and
implementation, such as top-management and user interest
and involvement, concise documentation, testing in a
real enviornment, training provisions, etc. are
followed. (See Note 2)
NOTE 2: Programs were developed by a systems analyst (with
LP training)
, a BASIC programmer and functional personnel
from both the operations and comptroller areas.
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10. The personnel designated to operate the system will
be available and able to effectively operate the
system without degrading other responsibilities.
11. The equipment and financial resources required to
execute the system will be available.
12. Interservice competition for DOD funds will make accurate
budget forecasting and justification imperative;
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systems: the Committment Accounting for Management of
Unit Supplies (CAMUS) system (see Note 3), the DA Standard
Financial Information System (STANFINS), and the Training
Ammunition Management Information System (TAMIS).
a. CAMUS provides the priced value of unit re-
quisitions for stock funded supplies including
repair parts. A printout of committed funds by
unit and type of equipment, together with monthly
equipment usage reports are submitted by units
to the MACOM Cost Analysis Office and used to
compute equipment operating cost factors. These
reports are analyzed monthly to develop revised
cost factors. These standard cost factors (in
terms of costs per mile, hour or round) provide
input to TMCS to estimate the cost of supporting
a particular training event.
b. STANFINS records the actual obligations, expendi-
tures, and disbursements of funds and should be
coordinated with both TMCS and CAMUS. Programmed
use of funds (TMCS) and committment of funds
(CAMUS) must both be compared to actual usage
to verify that fiduciary responsibilities and
consistency of data recording are taking place.
The value of requisitions in supply back orders
must also be considered in this process.
NOTE 3 ; CAMUS will be the core system for a new system
as yet not implemented; e.g., the Tactical Unit Financial




c . TAMIS is basically intended to aid the Commander
in managing training ammunition. It requires
estimates of annual requirements by type of
ammunition (DOD Identification Code) using a
subsystem called Training Ammunition for Manage-
ment (TAMS). TAMIS then provides Division
allocations for ammunition in terms of an index
value per round. Although the dollars are not
P2 mission funds they are inputed into TMCS so
that the training manager can compare the training
ammunition costs per training event with the
TAMIS allocations for ammunition. Over the
course of time, TMCS will helpfully provide
justification for ammunition requirements and
will, therefore, provide input for TAMIS.
^. Internal TMCS Subsystems
TMCS is composed of nine internal subsystems or
programs on magnetic tape cartridges:
a. MACOM Cost Factor Program (MCFP)
b. Training Management Information Program (TMIP)
c. Battalion Annual Training Program (BATP)
d. Training Schedule Generator (TSG)
e. Battalion Cost Factor Program (BCFP)
f
.
Battalion Decision Model (BDM)
g. Division Decision Model (DDM)
h. Training Ammunition Control Subsystem (TACS)
i. Manuever Area Scheduling System (MASS)
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The TMCS flowchart at Figure 7 illustrates the
relationships of these programs to each other and to the
six external systems discussed previously.
At Annex C, a "brief description of each of these
subsystems, along with some examples of output, is presented.
It is suggested that the reader review this annex to insure
an understanding of some of the conclusions/recommendations
made in this chapter and the ZBB budget methodology proposed
in the following chapter. It should be noted that while
important to overall training management, subsystems d, h,
and i are not concerned with the management of P2 mission
funds
.
5 . Performance Requirements. Operational Support/
Policies^ (See Annex D)
D. EARLY IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
A detailed test plan J including milestones, required
reports/formats and prototype testing is presently being
conducted in live environments at Fort Bragg, North Carolina,
Fort Carson, Colorado and Fort Richardson, Alaska (after
preliminary operational testing at Ft. Carson in 1977). In
an effort to find out what was actually happening at these
test sites, the authors conversed by phone and sent an open-
ended questionnaire (Annex E) to the TMCS project officer,
the OMA, P2 mission budget officer and the Comptroller at
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FIGURE 7 TMCS FLOWCHART
























































each installation. A follow-up trip was taken to Fort
Richardson and Fort Carson to further build on the answers
received. (See Note 4).
The following abstract represents those problems, limita-
tions, and general comments concerning TMCS that were
identified during the course of the authors research:
1. CAMUS/Cost Factor Inputs to TMCS
a. Due to editing shortfalls, CAMUS does not always
commit funds for spare parts and other stock-funded supplies
or in some instances the committments are charged to the
wrong units. Annual estimates ranged from 15-75% of all
requisitions for an average of $2,000 - $10,000 per unit
as falling into a not charged category. Depending on the
degree of error, the validity of the cost factors could be
affected. Such shortfalls have, however, been identified
and it is envisioned that the replacement for CAMUS, the
Tactical Unit Information System (TUFMIS), will not have the
same shortfalls.
b. In that the maintenance personnel and equipment
operators submit the requisitions and usage data reports,
NOTE 4 : Ft. Bragg could provide very little input due to
recent major changes in operating procedures. They were
only given one ISM 5100 system (in October 1978) and had
tried to use it to develop a costed training program for
the entire Division. Due to the limited amount of computer
time allocated to each unit, this did not work and no use-
ful output had been produced. They are now limiting the
TMCS system to a sampling of ten battalions and are in
the process of transitioning to this limited operation.
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TMCS is somewhat at their mercy with respect to the legitimacy
of the cost figures being utilized. For example, some spare
parts are common to more than one type of equipment. When
maintenance personnel order more than one of these parts at
a time, they may simply request the entire quantity on one
prepunched card. This can result in under/overstating parts
usage for certain types of equipment. In addition, the
equipment reports (miles driven, gallons of fuel consummed,
etc.) come from operator log books and are thus dependent
on accurate operator record keeping. The edit procedure
for this record keeping is manual and time consuming. Al-
though not a severe problem, certain discrepencies related
to this function are usually found in almost any type of
maintenance inspection.
c. Limitations on the miles, hours and rounds
cost factors are also seen. The existing cost factors have
been identified by applying correlation analysis. Only those
factors which show a statistically significant relationship
to spare parts and petroleum oils and lubricant costs are
used. For example, the rounds fired through an Ml 6 auto-
matic rifle (5-52 MM) is not considered a cost factor due
to being statistically non- significant . Therefore, actual
costs associated with firing these rounds, such as spare
parts for the weapon, will not be reflected in training
costs. The same holds true for other pieces of field
equipment for which cost factors have not yet been determined.
7^

2 . Garrison vs. Training; Costs Limitations
a. Garrison costs are defined as the cost of owner-
ship of having the unit in the force structure while conduct-
ing no field training (fixed costs).
b. Field training costs are defined as the variable/
incremental costs of conducting combat/combat support/combat
service support field training for all units to which the
BFTD applies. > Presently, field training costs (captured
by TMCS) for combat and combat support units, are composed
of the costs of: aviation gas, aviation/vehicle/other spare
parts, diesel fuel and motor gas. In the case of combat
service support units the costs of POL and spare parts have
been arbitrarily prorated and reported as 50%> garrison
and 50% field training costs. This means that an assumption
has been made for combat and combat support units that no
POL or spare parts are considered to be consummed in
garrison operations. Thus, for these later two types of
units one could simply deduct historically derived fixed
costs from total funds available and the remainder would be
the variable or training funds constraint.
A major limitation of the system is that although
TMCS will automatically allocate garrison costs by element
of expense (based on unit strength input data) , the overall
garrison costs must still be manually estimated.
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3. Augmentation to TMCS
Historically, TMCS has produced a training/garrison
cost relationship of approximately 25/75$- At Ft. Richardson,
they had implimented a decentralized funds control/budgeting
system as early as 1976 (two years before they received TMCS
to test) . The viable manual system they built to assist the
lower level commander, the Training/Garrison Cost Capturing
System
,
divided training costs into direct (obviously
related to training) and indirect costs (indirectly related)
-
such as costs of tentage repair kits, paper plates used in
training and winterization kits, etc.
It also provides for the computation of pure
garrison costs. The results of figures computed via this
system have been compared to TMCS output results with a
favorable correlation to date. TMCS costs have been in
proximity to the direct training costs derived from the
manual system and generally understated when indirect train-
ing costs are added in. In fact, an almost inverse relation-
ship (training/garrison costs) of 75/25$ has resulted.
4. Training Management Limitations
a. Despite the lack of hard output, a Ft. Bragg
study group composed of five staff officers directly involved
in either training or logistics concluded that "the comput-
erized system currently in use is inadequate in that all
training resources can not be accurately projected nor can
the system display conflicts between units in the areas of
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time, ammunition and training areas." To remedy these
shortcomings, they proposed a data-base management system
using a central CPU with a master core of resources and
constraints.
b. Additionally, a recent graduate of the Naval
Postgraduate School concluded the following in his Master's
47
Thesis on TMCS and the Army Training Environment:
(1) TMCS is improperly time constrained; it
does not compare available total time against the desired
total time load. It can produce an output solution which
appears feasible for all constraints while actually being
infeasible in terms of total time.
(2) TMCS is not a management control or train-
ing control system; it is a funds control system.
His conclusions were drawn from the results of
an actual TMCS software test using procedures listed in the
TMCS User's Manual.
In analyzing the software test printouts, the
authors could find only one clue to why the system failed
to evaluate the garrison training inputs. This clue was
that the Battalion Decision Model (EDM) did not recognize
the "Garrison Tng" field entered in the block marked "Type
Training" whereas it did recognize and compute "Field
and Range Training". Perhaps a simple adjustment in a
program key reader could overcome this limitation; or by
recognizing this limitation the operator could identify
what he knows to be garrison training as field training and
77







a. The present programs need debugging to include
an easier method for changing data fields. For example,
cost factors and equipment tables are not stabilized. Chang-
ing them requires re-running all of the tapes up thru the
Division Decision Model (DDM), which entails a time consuming
process.
b. POL costs are expressed in dollars but allocated
to units in gallons; the program needs to do both.
c. The turnover of TMCS personeel at unit level
has created an underutilization of the system as the lower
levels
.
d. There is a need to build other programs, such as
MASS (which is not presently being utilized) which will
require more demands on the already pushed CPU/operator time.
6. Linkage of TMCS to the Budget Process
Indications were that TMCS has been used expensively
as a training management tool but only sparingly for budgeting,
An exact methodology for expanding the role of TMCS as a
budget tool had not been developed to the point of impli-
mentation at any of the test sites and poses many complica-
tions. Plans are being made for using TMCS in future budget
preparations' but no details for implementing these plans
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were available. Some reluctance to rely on TMCS generated
input was noticed, on the part of some of the interviewees.
E. CONCLUSIONS
1. Since TMCS is heavily dependent on CAMUS and cost
factor inputs (with their inherent shortcomings) the
validity of TMCS produced costs can be questionable. How-
ever, the replacement of CAMUS with TUFMIS and the validation
of cost factors over a 12-18 month period should lessen the
fears of "garbage-in, garbage-out."
2. Based on the test results to date, it would seem
that TMCS does a fair to good job of computing and document-
ing direct training costs. The limitations of TMCS in not
being able to compute actual indirect training, and garrison
costs must be recognized. If the Total Cost Equation is
expressed in terms of the TMCS cost factors as:
TC = [(Event duration hours x $/hours) + (event miles
x $/mile) + (event rounds x $/round)J
and the events include just field training events, then
the costed events would be a poor estimate of total OMA
P2 mission costs ranges. However, if one recognizes this
and augments TMCS with a manual cost estimating system for
indirect training and garrison costs then TMCS can emerge
a useful management tool.
Perhaps the terminology "funds control system" does
best fit what TMCS is, but it is still a much faster and
more flexible tool for managing training costs than predecessor
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systems. The need for an automated tool for managing
training funds was obvious and TMCS is a major step in the
right direction in this arena.
3. The authors agree that TMCS "optimizes a manually
picked, training sequence for budget training areas and
field training time constraints "but does not" optimize the
training by providing the best mix of training within all
kg
constraints." It does appear that substantial adjustments
in TMCS software and maybe even some hardware additions are
necessary to make it a more viable training management tool.
k. As will be brought out in the next chapter, the
authors see a substantial role for TMCS in facilitating the
budget formulation process as well as its budget execution
role. To do this successfully, however, will require an
understanding of the problems associated with technology
transfer, the staggering complexity of which is well
developed in a Technology Transfer Process Model , the authors
14.0
of which conclude:
"Awareness then, even firsthand knowledge
of a new and/or innovative idea, is not
sufficient to assure its use. There must
be a willingness and interest or perhaps
more significantly an internal motivation
to utilize a better method, process or
concept.
"
A methodology for linking TMCS outputs with budget formulation
inputs can not be implemented without such a cooperative
effort.
The TMCS computed and costed 3FTD is, in essence, a
time-saving, automatic computation. The concept of the 3FTD
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itself, as a measure of effectiveness, really has no bearing
on whether or not TMCS is a good system. This will be
explored in depth in Chapter 7-
F. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Recognize and eliminate the CAMUS shortcomings
previously discussed when implementing TUFMIS in FY 79/80.
2. Continue to validate present cost factors and look
for new statistically significant cost factors which will
broaden the range of costs accounted for.
3. Adapt a standardized manual system/model for
computing indirect training and garrison costs charged to
P2 mission funds which can augment TMCS in the short-run.
The model built by the 172nd Infantry Brigade (AK) would be
a good starting point .^° Develop an automated system similar
to TMCS to do this over the long-run.
k. Continue to field test TMCS according to the present
plan with the following exceptions/modifications:
a. Fill the TMCS equipment shortages present at
the 82nd Airborne Division, Ft. Bragg, N. C., as soon as
feasible to allow for full-scope testing operations.
b. Where possible make TMCS software adjustments
and/or develop new programs which would:
(1) Account for and print out garrison training
time in the BDM and DDM so that the mix of training which
can be conducted is truly optimum and considers all resource
constraints, particularly maximum time available. Where
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indirect training or garrison costs include costs presently
accounted for by TMCS (for example vehicle use), TMCS should
be adjusted to recognize these costs and print them out
separately.
(2) Allow the frequent equipment table/cost
factor adjustments to be made to but one master program
which would automatically adjust the other subprograms
in the course of a normal iteration.
(3) Expand the training management capabilities
of TMCS by adopting the proposals of the previously re-
ferenced NPS (ORSA program) graduate's thesis.
5- Study the Ft. Bragg study group's proposals for a
modified TMCS system to see if a program can be added to the
present system which will automatically identify resource
conflicts between units.
6. Develop a methodology by which TMCS can be linked
to the budgeting process. (To be attempted in the next
chapter)
. Coordinate the efforts of and educate appropriate





VI. TMCS/ZBB APPLICATION IN COBE FORMULATION
A. INTRODUCTION
In the preceding five chapters the authors have dealt
in depth with various developments that virtually "set the
stage" for current as well as future approaches to budgeting
within the Federal government. The challenges and complex-
ities associated with Federal budgeting make it necessary
for any potential player in the financial management arena to
have a working knowledge of the entire budgetary spectrum
from both a current and a historical perspective. Such
a perspective was the intention of the previous chapters of
this endeavor. Within this sphere, the authors have attempted
to describe and analyze two of the latest management tools
(ZBB and TMCS) available to the budgeting community within
the Department of the Army (DO A)
.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the potential
application of TMCS in conjunction with ZBB within the
current DOA budgetary environment and develop the method-
ology required to attain such an interface. This method-
ological development will be demonstrated within the
framework of a hypothetical organizational unit within the
Department of the Army (the 199th Infantry Brigade). It
is felt that the perspective gained from such a focus of
analysis will not only depict the potential application of
TMCS to the current budgeting environment but will also
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allow for an increased awareness of the complexities in-
herent in budget formulation at lower levels within the
DO A structure.
This process will be further developed as the authors
trace the issue building and ranking process involved with
formulating the Command Operating Budget Estimate (COBE)
at the installation level focusing on OMA Program 2 mission
dollars. Although the scope of this analysis is limited to
P2 mission funds, it should be noted that similar processes
occur in formulating the budget for other OMA programs as
well as the other major appropriations.
While the budget formulation phase will be given the
major emphasis during the course of this chapter, other
areas of budgetary concern will be addressed to include:
1. Discussion of the budget execution phase to include
linkages between budgeting and the accounting system.
2. Discussion of potential impacts of proposed budgetary
procedural changes at the DOA level.
3. Conclusions and recommendations derived from the
analysis of the current budgetary environment.
It should be noted that the authors' are considering
the resources of time, space and dollars to be the inputs
to the TMCS aided ZBB process. The results of the ZBB
process represent an intermediate product of the installation
COBE. In turn, the COBE is formulated to help accomplish
training objectives (outputs) and the final Army Budget which
is designed to help accomplish training/combat readiness
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goals (outcomes). The next chapter will focus on these
input-output relationships in terms of determining valid
measures of effectiveness .
For the reader unfamiliar with some of the acronyms,
terminology and procedures used in this chapter, Annex N
(Army Management Structure (AMS)/COBE Definitions and
Terminology) and the General Glossary at Annex are
provided as guides.
B. 199th INFANTRY BRIGADE
The hypothetical case of the 199th Infantry Birgade will
be utilized to demonstrate a potential application of TMCS
within the zero-base budgeting environment as well as
provide the necessary perspective with respect to the formu-
lation of the Command Operating Budget Estimate (COBE) at
the installation level. In order to accomplish these
objectives it is first necessary to look at the organizational
structure and mission of this hypothetical 199th Infantry
Brigade
.
The 199th Infantry Brigade consists of five major
operational components:
1. The 199th Light Infantry Brigade (combat units)
2. The 333d Aviation Battalion
3- The 1st Battalion, 33d Air Defense Artillery




5. The Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)
augmentation element, which is the staff and
several companies that operate the installation.
The primary missions of the 199th Infantry Brigade are
to
1. Command, train, equip, and support all assigned
and attached units and activities.
2. Command USAR units and supervise and evaluate USAR
National Guard training at Fort Delta.
3- Participate in cold weather and maintain combat
developments
.
4. Operate the Artie Warfare Training Center.
5. Provide support, as directed, to tenant and satellited
DA, DOD, and other Federal Activities.
The 199th Infantry Brigade is physically located at
Fort Delta and the Commanding General commands all units and
staff Directors assigned and attached to the installation
through the Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff. The command
organizational structure is as shown in Figure 8.
In that the directors of the Major Activity Directorates
(MADs) serve as program directors and members of the Program
Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) in the decentralized fund
control process, a brief description of each of their staff
responsibilities follows:^
1. Office of the Director of Plans, Training and
Security (DPTSEC) :
Principal staff responsibility for matters pertaining
to force development, security, training;
, nuclear,
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Office of the Director of Personnel and Community
Activities (DPCA) ;
Principal staff assistant in matters of civilian and
military personnel administration, distribution and
management; maintenance of discipline, law and order;
and various personnel services and community activities.
3 Director of Industrial Operations (DIP) :
Principal staff office for matters pertaining to the
provisioning of supplies, services, maintenance,
petroleum, transportation, miscellaneous logistic
support and formulation of command logistic support
policy.
4. Director of Facilities Engineering (DFAE) :
Plans, directs and coordinates operations pertaining
to maintenance and repair of real property facilities
and other engineering activities and services.
Although not technically a program director, the Comp-
troller is a key player in the funds control process having
staff responsibility for budgeting, audits, finance and
accounting, financial management, accounting and internal
controls, review and analysis, management and industrial
engineering and economic analysis. As will be shown later,
although the DPTSEC is the OMA, P2 mission program director,
such funds will have to be combined with other non-P2 funds
and thus cut across organizational lines cf responsibility
and program element/key accounts when fielding issues in
the ZBB process. It is, therefore, important for the
reader to know the basic functional responsibilities of the
MADs.
The 199th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB), which represents
the combat units of the brigade, is broken down into three
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separate "battalions consisting of five companies each. The
types of companies associated with each battalion include:
1. Headquarters Company (1)
2. Combat Support Company (1)
3. Rifle Companies (3)
What follows is a detailed case analysis approach to
the budget formulation phase, both in the unconstrained and
constrained environments. Although written in a concise,
step-by-step manner, this approach is still intricate and
requires very careful reading for complete comprehension.
Be aware that only one of many programs making up the total
funds involved is used in this methodology which illustrates
the complexities of the aggregate process.
C. METHODOLOGY FOR APPLYING TMCS TO A ZBB APPROACH IN AN
UNCONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT AT COMPANY LEVEL
Since the zero base concept offers significant potential
to increase effectiveness and efficiency at the lower manage-
ment level, where resources are being consumed, it is
appropriate to initially focus attention on the Company level
of management within the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and
demonstrate a potential application of TMCS within a ZBB
environment for OMA, P2 mission type funds. To demonstrate
this application it is necessary to perform a step-by-step
analysis and discussion of the hypothetical yet probable
actions taken by a Rifle Company Commander (A Co.) of 1st.
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Battalion, 99th Infantry, as he goes through the development
of his company's field training program for the coming
fiscal year.
1 . Step I - Guidance
The initial step of this process would entail the
1st Battalion Operations Officer (BN S-3) providing the
Company Commander of A Company (see Figure 9 - Company
Organization and Table 6 - Company Manning and Equipment
Levels) with the time constraints for field training (the
number of Battalion Field Training Days at his disposal)
.
The Company Commander would also be given basic training
guidance derived from higher command and the assessment of
training strengths and shortfalls of A Company by the
Battalion Commander and the 3-3. In addition, the
BN S-3 might allocate or limit the number of flying hours
( if applicable), acre days, training areas and ammunition
the Company Commander had to consider as constraints to his
training program.
For this example the BN S-3 has given the Company
Commander the constraint of: 17 BFTD's and 100,000 Acre
Days using the BFTD computation formula (which is described
in the subsequent chapter) . Seventeen BFTDs would be equiva-
lent to 85, eight to twenty four hour days or 170, four
hour days. Taking into account things such as holidays,
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Armored Personnel Carrier M113 14
Armored Personnel Carrier M106 4
1/4 Ton Trucks 5
2 1/2 Ton Trucks 3
81MM Mortars 3
TOW Anti-Tank Missle Systems 2
Grenade Launchers M203 21
Machinegun M-60 15
Machinegun .50 Cal 21
.45 Cal Pistol 13




2 . Step II - Company Commander's Determination
Upon analysis of the time constraints and training
guidance provided to him by the BN S-3 the Company Commander
would merge this information with a personal judgement of
the training/combat readiness within the Company and develop
a prioritized list of desired field training events for
the coming fiscal year.
During this prioritization process, the Company
might utilize the following convention in order to translate
TMCS procedures to the ZBB process:
PRIORITIES LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE
8.00 thru 9-00 Decremented
7.00 thru 7-99 Basic (Financed)
5-00 thru 6.99 Enhanced
3- Step III - Input to TMCS
At this point the Company Commander is ready to
enter the unconstrained (with respect to funding) training
program into the Training Management Control System (TMCS).
In order to do this the Company Commander must:
a. Identify Any Resource Limitations
In this case, time (BFTDs) and acre days are
considered constraints and therefore all funding areas are





b. Insure All Training Events Are Prioritised
Each event must be assigned a priority from
5.00 to 9.00 in accordance with the above mentioned con-
vention with 9.00 being the highest and 5-00 the lowest.
c. Develop a Resource Utilization for Each Training
Event
The Training Management Information Program
(TMIP) of TMCS prints out a Training Information Worksheet
(see Annex C) for each training event. The Company Commander
would fill in the applicable blanks with the resource inputs.
Each of the annual training events is then aggregated into
the unconstrained training programs via the Battalion Annual
Training Program (BATP) Model with output, similar to the
printout at Appendix 2, Annex C, though appropriate for a
company sized unit.
d. Pricing of Input/Entering of Non-Dollar
Constraints
Using input from the externally developed MACOM
Cost Factor Program and the BATP output as input, the train-
ing program is then costed by the Battalion's Cost Factor
Program (BCFP) and held internally within the BATP program.
The set of resource constraints ($ costs, flying hours, BFTDs)
,
acre days) are then entered into the Battalion Decision Model
(in this case the Company Decision Model)
.
I±. Step IV - Outputs of TMCS
Having input the required information to TMCS the
system provides the Company Commander with the following













These resource limits represent the resource
constraints applicable to the Company Commander's training
program. In this particular example, the training program
is unconstrained except for time (17 BFTD's) and acre days
(100,000) with flying hours being non-applicable for this
particular type unit. The ammunition requirements will
show up on a separate printout provided by the Training
Ammunition Control Subsystem (TACS) program. As these are
not P2 related costs, this portion of the process will not
be further pursued in this case illustration.
EVENT NAMES STATUS BFTD'S
NBC OPTIONAL •50
Ml 6 Z/QUAL OPTIONAL 1.00
COMP L FIRE REQUIRED 1.00
FLD DRIVING OPTIONAL 1.00
TOW QUAL OPTIONAL .01
VEH RECOVER OPTIONAL 1.00
CIV DEF TNG OPTIONAL 1.00
CBT BUA OPTIONAL 1.00
SQD ARTEP T OPTIONAL 1.00
PLT ARTEP T OPTIONAL 1.00
ANTI ARMOR OPTIONAL 1.00
FTX REQUIRED 3.00
PLT ARTEP TR OPTIONAL .50
This output from TMCS represents all the various
training events that were input ^oy the Company Commander as
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well as the status of the event (required by higher Command
or discretionary on the part of the Company) . lit should be
pointed out that this simplified training event mix shown is
for budget process demonstration only, using sample data and
printouts from an actual TMCS run.
|
In addition, the number of Battalion Field Train-
ing Days (BFTD's) required to accomplish each event is
calculated based on the input provided by the Company
Commander.
c. COMMANDER'S PRIORITIES FOR EVENTS
NBC =5-20
Ml 6 Z/QUAL = 8.^0
COMP L FIRE = 8.70
FLD DRIVING = 5-50
TOW QUAL = 8.30
VEH RECOVER = 5 60
CIV DEF TNG = 6.00
CBT BUA = 6.10
SQD ARTEP T =8.00
PLT ARTEP T =7-^0




PLT ARTEP TR = 7-^0
This output reflects the priorities for each
training event as determined by the Company Commander. As
mentioned previously these priorities are set between the
range of 5. 00 (lowest) and 9-00 (highest).
d. Cost Per BFTD (See Table 7)
Table 7 represents the cost per Battalion Field
Training Day (BFTD) for each training event within the train-
ing program desired by the Company Commander. These costs
are broken down by the cost of the various types of resources
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e. Training That Can Be Conducted (See Table 8)
Table 8 reflects the entire training program
requested by the Company Commander and provides the Commander
with all the cost figures, BFTD information and acre days
utilization associated with this particular program of
training events. It also shows what training can be con-
ducted within the limited constraints provided earlier.
5 . Step V - Commanders Utilization of Output
Given the previously discussed outputs from TMCS
the Company Commander now has much of the necessary informa-
tion available to develop a budget request for the desired
training program.
With respect to this particular example, Figure 10
depicts the Company Commander's budget request in support
of his specific field training program.
FIGURE 10 - COMPANY FIELD TRAINING BUDGET
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The above mentioned budget request, when coupled
with the actual outputs of the Training Management Control
System (TMCS), would allow the Company Commander to provide
higher level (the Battalion Commander) with the appropriate
cost information, displayed in Table 9. concerning the
company field training program for the next fiscal year.
As brought out in the preceding chapter, the Elements
of Expense (EOEs) captured by TMCS represent the variable
costs of direct training only. Recognizing the limitations,
the Company Commander will have to provide the Battalion
with estimates of certain indirect training (semi-variable)
costs where possible. As such, this Company (along with
other Companies, separate platoons and staff activities)
represent cost centers and the Battalion a cost distribution
center. Such other EOE's may include portions of travel/TDY
(2100), transportation of things (2200), self-service supply
(2655)i direct exchange (26DX), medical supplies (2660),
etc. and should be distributed to training events. De-
pending on the degree of decentralization in the unit, the
Battalion may determine these costs for the Company based
on non-dollar usage inputs. Garrison costs which can include
portions of the above EOEs and such others as rents (communi-
cations, utilities - 2300), printing (2^00), other services
(2500) or equipment (3100) will generally be captured at
higher levels. A model for a manual system for augmenting
TMCS in these capacities was discussed in Chapter 5 as
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D. HIGHER LEVEL APPLICATION OF TMCS/ZBB METHODOLOGY IN AN
UNCONSTRAINED ENVIORNMENT
Upon receipt and analysis of the field training re-
quests and appropriate TMCS outputs from each Company, the
1st Battalion 99th Infantry would then be required to formulate
its own unconstrained training program. This task would be
accompolished in a similar manner to that utilized in the
previous example except for the consolodation and possible
reprioritization at the discretion of the Battalion Commander.
Additionally, the Battalion Commander and staff must plan
for any support requirements needed from Combat Support and
Combat Service Support Units. Such requirements can be
identified in the remarks section of the TMIP when coordinat-
ing Company programs in preparation for rerunning of the
programs leading up to the 3DM printout. It should be
pointed out that the unconstrained training programs must
first be developed by combat units, followed by combat
support and combat service support units in that order, all
using similar procedures. This is due to the logic of the
support chain where combat support units support combat
units and, in turn, both are supported by combat service
support units.
The unconstrained Battalion training program developed
will have the following characteristics:
1. Based on the aggregate of the Companies and staffs
input. (A battalion level budget clerk performing under the
supervision of the S-3 will probably be needed to compile
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these cost center inputs, which will require a staffing
modification in most units.)
2. Resource limitations of *75 BFTD and 500,000 acre
days (*for this example).
3. Prioritized based on Companies input and possible
Battalion Commander re-prioritization utilizing the pre-
viously discussed convention with respect to levels of
performance which equate to budgeted levels.
The BDM program could also be modified to accept and
printout the words decremented, base or enhanced alongside
the event names under status or next to the commander's
priorities for events. Furthermore, it could be modified
to automatically determine the -category by programming the
convention into the BDM.
As the Battalion Commander and staff plan and develop
the unconstrained training program, TMCS would document the
decisions made and automatically estimate the cost of direct
training at the various levels of performance. This infor-
mation would be compiled and provided to the 199th Light
Infantry Brigade (LIB) in the same format as the Company's
submission to the Battalion to include manually derived
indirect and garrison training costs. The Brigade Commander
would therefore have the following information on the filed
training requirements of the combat battalions:
From the Modified TMCS
1. The unconstrained training program for the Battalion
within the given limitations of time (BFTD's) and
acre days to include support requirements.
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2. The cost per BFTD for each field training event
(the significance of which will be discussed in
the next chapter)
.
3. The priorities given to each field training event
and thus the events that make up the various levels
of performance (Decremented, Basic/Current, and
Enhanced)
.
k. The direct training and some indirect/garrison costs
(where cost factors exist) associated with the
various levels of performance as well as the in-
cremental costs within and "between specific levels
of performance.
From the Manual System
1. Estimated costs by unit/EOE of indirect training by
type of event.
2. Estimated garrison operations and training costs
by unit/EOE; although not usually related to
specific training events these costs are part of P2
mission costs and will have to be eventually related
to decision units/issue areas.
NOTE : Both of these cost categories will have to be
manually added to direct training costs in order to
determine total unconstrained requirements in support
of the training program. As most garrison costs
are fixed they should be included in the decremented
performance level. The indirect training costs, on
the other hand, should be incrementally recorded
(using a Master Code List of possible training events
in such a manner that they can be equated to the




RESOURCE PROJECTION/CONSUMPTION LOG-INDIRECT TRAINING
EVENT EVENT TRANS. OF SELF-SERVICE
UNIT CODE DATA TDY(2100) THINGS (2200) SUPPLY (26SS)





Where 2>k is a company live fire exercise scheduled
by A Co in the previous example with a priority
of 8.7 and a total training cost of $233-97- Here
we are projecting that two TMP (civilian-type)
vehicles will be used to augument company organic
transportation at a cost of $100 and that paper
plates and plastic utencils will be used to serve
lunch at a cost of $25. This $125 should be con-
sidered as necessary to meet a decremented training
requirement and hence added to the $233-97' If
this had equated to an enhanced level (lower priority)
then it should be added to the enhanced level.
The training management limitations of TMCS at this
level were discussed in the preceding chapter and will not
be further amplified here. Some of these problems, however,
if not corrected could also impact on the validity of the
system to manage costs as well. For example, if the time
(BFTD) constraints are invalid, then the resultant costing
of the unconstrained program would liicely become invalid
as well
.
It is important to note at this point that perhpas the
key advantage of utilizing a ZBB approach via TMCS to formulate
the direct field training portion of the P2 Mission budget
(and the manual system to formulate the indirect and garrison
portion)
, lies in the quantified and documented decisions at
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each succeeding organization level that result. As discussed
in Chapter V, prior, to TMCS there was no automated or formal
system to capture the costs associated with direct field
training. The totally manual estimate of such costs was
time consumming and abstract and consequently this process
did not provide the desired fiscal impact for the field train-
ing decisions being formulated.
Another advantage of the TMCS/ZBB approach to field
training "budget formulation is the power of prioritization
of specific field training events. This prioritization not
only provides the parameters of events within certain
levels of performance but also serves to give the decision
maker at all levels the potential to develop alternative
training programs when given the eventual resource constraints
for his particular level of influence.




While the exact timing of the unconstrained training
program development will vary, it must be completed prior
to the COBE. The COBE, consisting of the Command Operating
Budget (COB) and the Command Budget Estimate (CBE) , is the
Command's total budget document. The COB is input to the
apportionment process in the budget year (next immediate
fiscal year). The CBE leads to the President's budget for
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the program year or next succeeding fiscal year (See Note 1),
Considerable significance is attached to the CBE because it
is the only scheduled opportunity the installation commander
has to influence the Army budget for the program year prior
to submission of the DOD Budget to Congress.
At the installation level, the COBE formulation
process generally will take place from late March/early
April to mid/late May. It begins with the MACOM's issuance
of administrative and Budget and Manpower Guidance (BMG).
Next, all feasible budget requirements formulated in the
unconstrained phase are zero -base budgeted. Finally this
leads to a determination of which requirements are financed
or unfinanced.
Most of the remainder of this section traces the
general steps in the COBE formulation using FY 79/80
COBE/ZBB guidance. OMA, P2 mission funds are again used
as the vehicle for this illustration. Potential uses for
TMCS are highlighted where linkage with the Z3B procedures
was possible.
2. The Dynamics of Terminology
As discussed in Chapter IV, the evolutionary aspect
of ZBB implementation within the public sector has resulted
in differences in ZBB terminology from agency to agency and
NOTE 1: Since the COB is based on the previous years
CBE and is developed simultaneously with the current CBE,
the authors will use the acronym COBE in future references
to the overall budget process.
107

from one fiscal year to the next. The following terms
reflect current Army Usage.
a. The decision units used are derived from the
previously existing Army Management Structure (AMS) contained
in AR 37-100-XX. These decisions units, whether actual
organizations or programs are directly tied into the






























As AMS was a product of PPBS, the Army has heeded
0MB' s original guidance that "each decision unit should,
to the extent possible, reflect existing program and organi-
zational structures that have accounting support „52
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Accounting support did exist in AR 37-100, Account/Code
Structure and STANFINS. (See Note 2).
b. Issue Areas ; The major difference between this
current term and the previously utilized decision unit is
that the "issue" crosses subprogram/program element/functional
account and organizational lines. An "issue" can therefore
be defined as: a specific program or task of sufficient
importance to require separate identification and justifi-
cation m the budget formulation process. J Although not
clearly defined in many cases, the issue categories were
given to the installations for the sake of uniformity and
to insure that the important ones were covered. Twenty five
OMA, P2 mission issues were identified. Examples include:
(1) Special Training
(2) Off -Post Training
(3) On-Post Training
c. Another change in terminology concerns the
levels of performance utilized within the ZEB process. This
change in terminology can be displayed by equating the
basic convention, discussed in Chapter IV, to the current
terms being utilized
Chapter IV Terminology FY 1979/80 CCBE Terminology
Minimum Level Decremented Level
Current Level Basic (Financed) Level
Enhanced Level Enhanced Level
NOTE 2: Although beyond the scope of this study, possible
linkage deficiencies of AMS/STANFINS to support PPBZBs
should be a topic of further study.
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The following benchmark rules also applied:
(1) *FY 1979 »*FY 1980
Decremented Level 90?5 of Basic 80?S of Basic
Basic Level ***FAPBS w/adj FAPBS w/adj
Enhanced Level Unlimited Unlimited
*0nly intra-program transfers allowed
**Intra and Inter-program transfers allowed
***F0RSC0M Automated Program Budget System
(2) The decremented level (90%/80%) is only a
constraint at the total appropriation level (OMA total)
.
(3) Only Direct Obligations (DO) will be
decremented.
d. Increment : An increment is, by definition, a
"decision package" (an identifiable increase for an activity,
above the decremented level, based on workload) and should
be constructed to include requirements of equal priority
and possible (feasible) execution.
3- Key Steps - COBE Formulation
The following major stpes, while listed sequentially,
may be performed concurrently in some cases:
a. Step Is Installation Comptroller receives and
analyzes funding and manpower guidance from MACOM,
Since the hypothetical unit belongs to FORSCOM,
this guidance is contained in the FORSCOM Automated Program
Budget System (FAPBS), as modified by adjustments. This
analysis must include a well thought out plan for breaking
out the guidance to program directors to include the de-
drementing logic {%) for each OMA subprogram. This must be
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done properly from the outset due to the synergistic effects
on all following steps; that is, "the decremented level will
be considered as a formulation or base point from which in-
crements involving all resources will be constructed . "-'^
Ideally, the 199th Brigade Commanding General (CG)
should get involved at this stage by giving the Comptroller
the guidance for decrementing each program/reportable account.
In other words, "the determination of the decremented level
is paramount because it is a reflection of the CG *
s
priorities." This procedure would normally be done by
interpreting the CG's guidance/policies on training/other
programs, and making recommendations. The Senior Program
Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC) could also be involved here
in discussing/giving preliminary approval to the decrement-
ed
ing logic before making a recommendation to the CG
.
b. Step 2: The basic level funding guidance and
subprogram decrementing percentages are broken
out to each program director.
In this case the DPTSEC is the P2 program
director. For purposes of illustration a figure of $1^M
for base P2 mission funds and a 90^5 decrement are used. Only
the program year (FY 80) is addressed, although the methodology
can be applied similarly to the budget year (FY 79) . The
fact that the 90?5 decrement percent is above the possible
80?S benchmark, emphasizes that the 199th CG places a
relatively high priority on mission support and training (the
main outcome of P2 mission funds). In turn, his priority




At this point, the dollar guidance is still in
AMS format where decision units are identified but not re-
lated to decision issues. Figure 11 portrays this funds flow
for P2 mission funds, highlighting those decision units in
the unconstrained training program cycle and in the descrip-




















c. Step 3= Segregate the basic guidance by decision
unit and issue; decrement according to the logic
developed in steps 1 and 2.
(1) An Overview . This step requires that the
P2 mission accounts be split out according to applicable
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issues. To do this, the DPTSEC must work jointly with each
of the decision units in an issue building process. Each
decision unit has previously identified its missions/goals
and objectives in developing their unconstrained training
program/budget. These programs are already tied to the
training events felt necessary to accomplish the objectives
of each of the three levels of performance. They have also
been costed by Element of Expense (EOE) . Now the task is to
link them to issues.
(2) Higher vs Lower Level Constraints at the
Basic Level . Prior to issue building, the basic budget
guidance used should be examined. In this hypothetical case,
the DPTSEC allocates $4.5M of its $14M P2 funds total to
the 199th LIB on an Activity Resource Agreement. Although
this basic level is presently determined from historical
budget data, it should be compared to the basic level
determined during the unconstrained planning cycle by the
199th LIB. Recall the methodology used for deriving the
latter was:
Costs Method
Aggregated -\ Direct Training TMCS w/convention
for each of / Indirect Training TMCS/manual combination
the Compan- ^Garrison Costs Manual




These separately derived figures, one by
historical, top-down allocation and the other by bottom-up
prioritization, may be widely divergent. Even so, the DPTSEC
and CG will have gained an insight as to what resources
113

the 199th LIB commander and his subordinate commanders
consider necessary to be at the basic performance level.
If the 199th LIB's desired level greatly exceeds the
historical guidance then the CG has the following options:
1. Consider the program inflated and accept the original
gui danc e
.
2. Direct inter-program transfers, to increase the LIB's
basic level.
3. Request increased basic guidance from the MACOM.
k. Combine options 2 and 3-
Hopefully, the TMCS aided, unconstrained
planning cycle could, over time, help to justify the third
alternative. This is especially true if reliable, valid
measures of effectiveness can be used to validate this
ZBB-based program as necessary for basic performance.
(Discussed in Chapter VII).
(3) Role of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade
(LIB).
(a) Issue Building. In the short run, the
199th LIB must take the $4.5M basic guidance as a total
constraint and break it down by EOE and issues. Firstly,
comes the summing and subtracting out of all garrison (fixed)
costs, and indirect training costs estimates from the total
allocation. These costs must be manually distributed across
EOE's.
Next, the remaining dollars must be
allocated to those EOE's costed by TMCS and entered as
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constraints to the Brigade and Battalion Decision model
programs. Given that the adjustments recommended in Chapter
5 are made, the impacts of unfinanced program requirements
will be readily seen in the availability/shortages of funds
at Brigade level and the training which can/cannot be con-
ducted at the Battalion decision unit level.
The interactive capabilities of TMCS
will then allow the Brigade and Battalion commanders to
redistribure resources where necessary in order to:
1. Balance the training program
2. Fund priority training programs
3. Minimize the impact of budget reductions
4. Optimize the constrained training program
5- Enhance the long-range planning capabilities of
the commander and his staffs
6. Provide a means of program evaluation and control.
The revised decision model program
outputs can then be used as inputs, along with indirect
training and garrison costs to fill in a matrix similar to
the one shown in Table 10. The training events of the
optimized, constrained program must then be related to one
of the three issues used in this example. The total basic
level for each issue is then determined by aggregating the
EOEs making up each event. The events pertaining to a specific
issue are then summed to determine the total basic level for
the issue.
(b) Decrementing Process. At first glance,
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level simply requires multiplying each EOE by 90% and summing
them. However this logic ignores cost-volume behavior, and
assumes equal priority between issues. The task facing
the Brigade Commander's staff is: given a mandatory total
decrement of 90$ ($4.05M), which issues should be decremented
and by how much? To do this requires not a straight line
application of 90$ across the board but rather the identifi-
cation of "least-pain" increments which can be cut.
Prior to looking for increments, all
fixed costs, which by definition are difficult if not im-
possible to decrement, must be identified as remaining
constant. In this example, $70 k of fixed costs exist under
the Special Training (BCT) issue. Next, using the TMCS
(direct training costs) and manual (indirect training) data
generated earlier, the training events making up each issue
at the basic level are examined to determine increments,
their priorities and costs.
To illustrate, the following information
is extracted from the TMCS optimized Battalion Decision
Models, and manual, indirect training cost models:
Issues Training Events Priority *TMCS *Manual Total Costs
#3 1 Bn ARTEP 9 $30,000 $1,250 $31,250
2 Bn ARTEP 9
3 Bn ARTEP 9
#2 1 Bn CPX 7-5 250 - 250
2 Bn CPX 7-5
3 Bn CPX 7-5
1 Bn FTX 8 18,000 750 18,750
2 Bn FTX 8
3 Bn FTX 8
#1 1 BCT Cycle 7 147,500 710,000 357,500
2 BCT Cycle 7
3 BCT Cycle 7
k BCT Cycle 7
*Although not shown - these are broken down by EOE
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Each of these events can be considered
an "increment". Starting with the increment with the lowest
rank, the BCT cycle, the 199th can easily meet their total
decrement requirement of $450,000 by eliminating or reducing
one of these cycles. In our example, the Brigade Commander
decides to do this based on the judgement that this alter-
native has the least impact on his internal training program.
Although not displayed by EOE, the resulting decrementing
figures are at the far right of the matrix at Table 10.
At this stage on the ZBB/COBE formulation
process, the authors see little, if any further uses for
TMCS output. It can, however, aid in the budget execution
phase to be discussed later in this chapter.
(4) DPTSEC Issue Building/Decrementing . Each
of the activity directors under the DPTSEC goes thru a
process similar to the one just described. The DPTSEC then
must aggregate all of the inputs into their own issue building
packages. A matrix must be constructed for each issue similar
to this example:









Units/Prog Ele 1100 1200 2100 Etc 3100 Total Decrement 1*




Total P2 Mission 3500 *2652.5 75
If each decision unit has followed the 90%
total decrement guidance for P2 funds the total of all of their
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decrements by issue will be .90 of $14M or $12. 6M. At this
point the DPTSEC must analyze the decremented figures for
each issue to insure that the total P2 mission program is
properly balanced. For the purpose of continuing our
example, it was decided that one BCT cycle could be decre-
mented at a total reduction of $857,500 in variable costs.
Since the LIB only decrements $450,000 of this amount, it
frees up $407,500 for reprogramming/adjusting other issues
where the funds are deemed to be needed more. *Subtracting
the $407- 5k from $3.05M leaves a total dollar decrement of
$2.6425M for this issue or a 75% decrement.
(5) Installation Issue Building/Decrementing; .
A similar process is carried out by each Program Director
and the appropriate decision units and related funds under
their responsibility.
The results of the aggregate decrement-
ing process must result in a total OMA decremented percent
of S0% at installation level. Based on the original decrement-
ing logic, an overall program balance which would be execut-
able (if the decremented level was actually approved) should






Subprogram Dollar*s x Percent = Dollars
P2 Mission $14.0 M 90% $12.6 M
P2 Base Operations 42.0 84% 34.0
P3 Other Activities *.3 90% 3-5
P7 Supply & Maint 3-7 5W» 1.8
P8 Training, Medical 5-3 83% 4.1
P8 Other 2.5 65% 1.4
P9 Admin 2.5 90% 2.1





OMA TOTAL 80% $60.0 M
d. Step 4: Increments will he Built Above the
Decremented Level for Each Issue and Related
Accounts
( 1 ) Complexities of Issues Crossing Sub-Program/
Key Account/Responsibility Lines . Now that the decremented
levels have been established for each issue by program
element/reportable account, the foundation has been laid
for building the installation budget. This is done by
incrementing up from the decremented level. Here is where
complications concerning the interrelationships between
various subprograms and accounts within an issue come into
play.
Before the increments can be built, the
Comptroller must "crosswalk" or relate the costs of issues,
as applicable, to multiple directorates, program elements
and/or key accounts. Continuing to use the example of the
Special Training (BCT) issue, the Comptroller determines
NOTE: The decremented level for each sub-program/reportable
account is entered on an Issue Detail (Schedule 50b - see
Annex F) which breaks the issue down by program element/key
account, EOE, decremented level and financed level.
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that certain costs related, to Base Operations - Z accounts
(also OMA funds) are incurred in support of this issue as
shown.
Issue: Special Training (BCT Support)
Program Director/ Basic
Program/Ac c o unt s Responsibility Cntr Amount
P2 mission DPTSEC $3-5M (includes
E-laundry & drycleaning DIO 20K .07 fixed)
F-food service " 100K
n
3- recreation services DPCA 30K
L-minor construction DFAE 20K
$3.67M Total
Base
(2) Building Increments . Like the $3-5M, each
of these other accounts had to he broken out into increments
in support of each BCT cycle, their cost behavior determined
and related to EOEs. For purposes of our example, these
are considered expenses which directly vary with the 4 BCT
cycles in the Bde's program. They were derived by cost
estimating relationships based on historical data. For
example, laundry and drycleaning was derived by the
formula: X Men/Cycle x $Y/Man x k Cycles. Thus the total
variable costs of each BCT cycle/increment are:
$857,500 P2 mission
1 nf) nnn







It has been further determined that
$2.6425M was the decremented level for 3 BCT cycles. Adding
in the $42.5k/cycle (from other programs) x 3 = $.1275M,
a total decremented level for this issue is $2.770M. These
figures are then displayed in a manner similar to (see





EOE Level 1 2 3
1100 — _
1200 - - -
2100 - - -
2300 - - -
2500 - - -
2610 - - -
26^M - - -
2640D - - — —
Total 2.770 3-67 ^.57 5-^7
Thus increment 1 represents the basic level
while increment 2 and up shows the enhanced level. This
example concludes with 3 increments which represent 6 BCT
cycles, the most that the DPTSEC/l99th LIB commander feel
could be feasibly supported in one year. A narrative to
support this process is entered on schedule 50C (see example,
Annex F )
.
e. Step 5= The Issues and Increments Will be Ranked
in Order of Priority
(1) General . Even though the decremented level
is not prioritized on the Ranking Schedule submitted to
F0RSC0M (the total decremented level for an appropriation
is entered as a lump sum) it is still a necessity to do this
at the lower level. This process starts at the MAD level
where a priority list is prepared for each applicable issue.
(2) Junior Program Budget Advisory Committee
(PBAC
)
. A senior budget analyst from each Directorate and
the Program Budget Officer (PB0) representing the Comptroller
then convene a Junior PBAC conference to rank each issue.
Using a modified Delphi technique, each member nominates the
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highest priority, discussion follows as to the reasons for
it and a vote is taken. When a majority vote is received on
an issue, the appropriate priority, dollar total and cumula-
tive total is recorded by the PBO, who does not vote unless
to break a tie. If an impasse is reached, the PBO can also
call for more discussion and another vote.
It is important to realize that, after the
first few rounds, it is entirely possible that PBAC members
will consider an increment of one issue as a higher priority
then the decremented level of another. The result could be
that an increment of one issue is financed and a decrement of
another is unfinanced. The only constraint is that total
dollar amount cannot exceed the decremented level:
$75M (basic level for OMA Issues)
x . 90 (decrement percent)
$67. 5M (decremented level)
TOTAL
$ BY
ISSUES EOEs INCREMENTS RANK
3 - 1
1 - 2 Everything above here is at
2 - 3 the decremented level even
k
- 4 though increment 1 of issue 1
1 - 1 5 is a higher priority than the
6 - 6 decremented level of issue 5-
$67.5 M Decremented Level
5 - 73 18
2 - 1 9
^ - 1 10 Financed Level
6 - 1 11
1 - 2 12





ISSUES EOEs INCREMENTS RANK
3 - 2 13
l - 3 14
5 - 1 15
2 - 2 16
2 - 3 17




DA guidance of 103-105$ of
Basic Level; Unfinanced
Requirements Level.
(3) Senior PBAC . The straw-man recommendations
set up by the Junior PBAC are then briefed to the Senior
PBAC consisting of the Directors of each MAD and chaired by
the Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff who is advised by the
Comptroller. They discuss the critical ranking decisions
which are in the margin around the Basic (financed) level
while fine tuning the ranking where necessary. In the
interest of getting the best return for the given dollars,
the Chief of Staff and Comptroller will be especially
cautious to balance the overall program. For example, given
a choice between utilities and fire protection, some balance
is preferred over heating the billets to 72 everyday and









Gamesmanship is also watched for. The most
obvious game is to prioritize a critical issue low, knowing
that a reviewer will be compelled to fund it.
The authors are in complete agreement with
one Comptroller, commenting on the ranking phase, who
stated: 58
"There was much soul-searching during this
phase, but it forced decision makers to fully
understand their programs and to fully examine
the resources in support of them. The ranking
process is perhaps the most powerful aspect of
ZBB . "
f. Step 6: Final Basic (Financed) Level by Account
and Issue is Determined.
The make-up of the Basic (Financed) Budget cannot
be finanlized until the ranking scheme has been approved by
the CG (see example Schedule 51. Annex F) . If the CG sees
something in the unfinane ed arena that he wants financed,
the PBAC will look for a comparable funded dollar program
to trade-off. Once this is completed the ZBB schedules
(Schedules 50a-c
,
51 - see Annex F) and the more traditional
budget schedules can be completed to include an automated
budget submission.
F. BUDGET/TRAINING EXECUTION AND REVIEW PHASE
1
. GENERAL
While the COBE is being formulated, both budget and
training execution is taking place based on the results of
the previous years COB. Beginning with the new Fiscal Year,
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the actual appropriations are distributed through Funding
Authorization Documents (FADs) which are in response to the
COBE submission. The FAD issued to the installation by its
MACOM will include the obligational authority for the entire
annual program plus allotment ceilings by sub -program. The
later gives phasing guidance by quarter which cannot be
exceeded. For example, not more than 20% of the annual
program may be expended in the last two months of the year.
The installation Comptroller in turn breaks down
the FAD to the Program Directors based on their COBE sub-
missions. The PBAC approves the adjusted COBE and, after
approval of the CG it becomes their Operating Program (OPAP.)
for the current year. The Program Directors then give their
decision units quarterly allotments via a Unit Resource
Agreement. These activities can generally reprogram within
accounts as long as these ceilings are not exceeded.
2
. Installation Accounting
The Finance and Accounting Officer (F&AO), under
the direct supervision of the Comptroller, is responsible
for the overall supervision, management, and control of the
financial resources. Accomplishment of this requires close
coordination with the fund managers representing the Program
Directors and Commanders. In particular, compliance with
AR 37-20, the Army's implementing regulation for Revised
Statutes (RS) 3679, the Anti-deficiency Act, must be insured.
As training and other operations are actually con-
ducted, the actual funds committed are reflected in obligations
126

processed by CAMUS and in issues or expenditures and
disbursements processed by STANFINS. Applicable CAMUS
print-outs are made available to fund managers at each level.
STANFINS also produces a variety of daily, weekly and
monthly reports to include Detail Cost Reports, Obligations
by Object Class (EOC) etc. These reports, together with
TMCS estimates of training program costs, must be reconciled
at least monthly. Such reconcilations will aid managers to:
a. Identify deviations in actual costs to budgeted/
programmed costs.
b. Determine the reasons/cuases for such variances.
c. Point out potential problems in the supply,
accounting and/or TMCS systems.
d. Resolve the need for and initiate timely corrective
actions felt necessary to restore effective control.
e. Meet budget review and analysis goals of
efficient and effective use of resources.
3 . Reporting Requirements/Feedback
Although different MACOMs will have slightly varying
requirements, most require a quarterly Status of Operating
Resources Report (RCN-AFCO-2) which provides a summary (for
each appropriations' account) of the next three months
programmed expenditures and the actual obligations of the
preceding three months. The purposes of such reports are
to:58
a. Provide the installation a means for reviewing
and analyzing its actual performance as com-
pared with programmed performance.
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b. Provide an opportunity. to present to the
MACOM any requested program changes due to
reassessed plans, priorities, and require-
ments in light of unforeseen developments
since the COBE submission
The budget execution, and review (BER)
alone will not insure effective utilization of resources.
As will be brought out in the next chapter, incisive evalua-
tion of performance as well as costs must be accomplished
to complete the feedback loop. In the words of another
^9
author,
"Optimizing the power of ZBB at the macro-level...
will occur only by developing an effective report-
ing system that provides both cost and performance
data. Such a system will require strong dedication
to the development of meaningful performance
measures, a feat which has not yet been widely
accomplished. Without such measures any ex-post
facto analysis will be impossible."
G. FUTURE BUDGET DEVELOPMENTS/TRENDS
The President's 1979 budget announced a major effort to
stretch the time horizon of federal budgeting to a multi-
year framework. The planned vehicle to accomplish this is
the Program and Budget Estimate (PABE) which will replace
the CBE portion of the COBE. The letter at Annex G explains
some of the details of changes this new procedure will bring
about, especially in the OMA P2 mission area.
One author commented, quite interestingly, that this
attempt at extending the budget to the outyears "offer
the most telling indication of ZBB ' s limitations. .. for budget
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watchers who have seen a parade of innovations and fashions




VII. PROGRAM EVALUATION/MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
A. INTRODUCTION
1. As was brought out in Chapters III and IV, two
major tasks inherent in both PPB and ZBB are:
a. Identification of goals and objectives
b. Analysis of outputs of given programs (or
program alternatives) in terms of goal/objectives
accomplishment; e.g., program evaluation.
With Chapter V as the technical foundation, Chapter
VI demonstrated how TMCS may help the commander in the
Zero-Base Budgeting process. Thus, conceptually, TMCS will
provide input on which PPB S output can be built and
justified. The process does not end here, however. The
outcome of these budgeted Program 2 mission funds must now
be measured in terms of how effective the program was in
meeting the objectives identified.
2. The purpose of this chapter is to reveal the
complexities of program evaluation and current efforts being
made towards evaluating training programs through measures of
effectiveness.
"More than any other part of the PPB system,
program evaluation can be viewed as the
function that closes the feedback loop in
the program development process of discerning
and articulating a need, developing a program
to alleviate that need, and implementing the
program. Program evaluation measures how well
the program has satisfied the need to which it
was addressed . "61
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The general goal/objective hierarchy will be outlined
followed by discussions of the training environment in which
they are hopefully, achieved. General training cost/effective-
ness concepts will then be outlined followed by the highlights
of proxy measures of effectiveness. Conclusions will be
drawn at the end of each section. Finally, recommendations
pertinent to the PPB S program evaluation concept will be
presented. (See Note 1).
B. GOALS/OBJECTIVES
Since the "benefit in a cost/benefit" analysis is re-
lated to an organization's goals ( and its outcome), there
is no point in attempting such an analysis unless there is
some measure of agreement on what the goals are . Failure
to clarify goals (the "what to do"), obviously makes it
difficult to evaluate alternatives and formulate programs
to achieve these goals (the "how to do") and to measure
the level of this achievement.
At the statutory level, the Army has the following very
broad goal:
"It is the intent of Congress to provide an
Army that is capable .. .with the other Armed
NO TE 1 : It should be understood that the authors are by no
means unaware of the complexity, high level attention and
tremendous resources presently being applied to help solve
the problems addressed in this chapter. We are not proposing
a panacea or "school solution" to this highly technical and
politically sensitive area. We simply want to advise the




Forces, of preserving the peace and security...
of the United States; ... supporting the national
policies; implementing the national objectives,
...and overcoming any nations responsible for
aggressive acts that imperil the peace and
security of the United States. (Title 10,
Sec. 3062, U.S. Code)"
Within the Department of Defense, the Army has these
ongoing, more specific goals: *
1. To determine what forces are required to support
the political objectives of the United States.
2. To procure and support these forces as economically
as possible.
In that the present major defense-related political goal
of our country is based on the premise of mutually assured
destruction, these general goals are translated into goals
similar to that stated by Secretary of Defense Brown in his
Department of Defense Annual Report for FY 1980.
"It remains the case that our wellbeing as a
nation and our character as a people depend on
peace, justice, and order as well as military
strength. To survive, to prosper, to perserve
our traditions, we need political as well as
military allies, trading partners, access to
raw materials We must make every effort
to settle the disputes and remove the tensions
that could lead to conflict and wider inter-
national disorder. We should lose no opportunity
to increase international stability and reduce
military competition through equitable and
verifiable arms control agreements."
At the Secretary/Chief of Staff of the Army level the
goals as reflected in the FY 78-82 Army Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) become: -'




. . . .providing the necessary leadership and train-
ing . .
.
upgrading unit readiness and force deployability
.
(Most likely scenarios are also developed)
.
As defined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Re-
porting , dated 15 June 1978, "the Army's readiness objective
is to provide units capable of performing their Table of
Organization and Equipment (TOE) missions in support of
operational requirements." It is at this point that lower
level (MACOM, DIV, BDE, BN) objectives must be formulated.
These objectives generally are expressed in the form of
training objectives specified through various written and
oral communications such as Training and Readiness Regula-
tions, Training Guidance Circulars and Letters, policy
statements and other directives of the chain-of-command.
Examples of the type of training objectives involved
are shown at Annex H (F0RSC0M Circular 350-8, FORSCQM
Training Readiness Program and 7th Infantry Division and
Fort Ord Circular 350-19, Training Guidance ).
These many training objectives have often been summed up
as "those things which a unit must be able to do in order
to win the first battle of the next war." The scenario's
most often emphasized are those of large scale conventional





1 . Descriptive Model
A recently developed Combat Effectiveness Model sets
the environment in which program evaluation must take place:
"The combat effectiveness of a unit during the first few
weeks of a war, can be considered a function of some
variables combined during peacetime training. Four variables
often considered to be in this function are: Doctrine,
Personnel, Equipment, and Training, i.e,
CE = f (peacetime training) = f(D, P, E, T,...). The
four variables can be viewed as being combined in a flexible
triangle as shown below. The corners are the variables
doctrine, personnel, and equipment. The material connecting
the variables is training.
Stress Av—A Stress:r^
An optimum state of the triangle system will occur when it
is not under stress; the effect of each variable is balanc-
ed. As stresses occur on any of the variables, the triangle
is distorted. The system then seeks an optimum state and
changes occur in the other variables. It can be seen that
contractions, oscillations and breakdowns can happen. Thus,
the quality of a unit's combat effectiveness will vary in
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some manner as the variables are changes. If what causes
stress on the variables can be controlled (or at least
guided), then higher quality combat effectiveness can be
. . j 11 66
achieved.
2. Variables
The training variable itself is made up of many
variables as illustrated in Chapter V by the TMCS inputs of
commander selected training events, priorities and durations.
Some of these variables may well be causes of stress on
training in the Combat Effectiveness Model as follows:
a. Piecemeal proliferation of numerous equipment
items over time.
b. Piecemeal proliferation of maintenance and
training complexity.
c. Tighter money and personnel constraints.
d. Unguided codification of operation requirements.
d. Lack of standardized, management performance in-
spections of headquarters personnel.
e. Training analysts' preoccupation with identifying
key training events.
We point this model out as what the authors feel is
a realistic approach/reference to the training environment
in today's Army; some knowledge about which the comptroller
and other staff personnel concerned with budgeting should
have in order to better understand the relationship between
its output (training readiness) and inputs (costs). To
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the extent that such a model could be formulated through
regression/correlation and/or other techniques and used as
an indicator of performance, it represents "ideal" areas
for development of performance measures. However, the large
degree of interdependence between these variables makes such
a process extremely complex.
D. GENERAL TRAINING COST/EFFECTIVENESS CONCEPTS
As previously alluded, the determination of the method-
ology(s) for measuring the effectiveness of training, hence
of defense, is a complex problem involving a great number
of interdependent variables and much subjectivity. In the
f)Pi
words of Hitch and McKean:
"There is no hope, of course, of measuring the
ultimate 'worth' of defense. It is obviously
impossible to put a generally valid price tag
on the output. The gains from program in-
crements cannot be compared in terms of a
common denominator. But there is hope of
describing the product meaningfully, and some
ways of describing it are more meaningful than
others .
"
In this section, the authors will attempt to analyze some
of the training cost/effectiveness concepts which appear to
be prevalent within the Army.
One general notion of training cost/effectiveness is
that, as more and more training objectives are accomplished
(with the associated costs) and aggregated, the Army comes
closer to meeting both its goals and those at higher levels.
Generally it appears that most commanders feel that there is
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a positive relationship between the accomplishment of
training objectives and the readiness of their unit.
Intuitively, it follows that the more the training, the
more it will cost.
As illustrated by Figure 12, it is difficult to really
know the shapes or rates of change of these relationships.
Most believe that there is an ordered, sequential, yet












accomplished with individual and small unit training as the
basic building blocks upon which other training is based.
However, as suggested by the Combat Effectiveness Model, the
training environment is very dynamic and multidimensional;
turnover requires refresher training, new and more complex
equipment and weapons systems require new/updated training,
combat training must be coordinated with combat support
resources, resources are required for matters such as
administration and maintenance support, etc.
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As in any organization variables such as the background,
personality, leadership/management style, values, preferences
and personal assessments of the leaders at each level of
command will also influence the emphasis placed on these
training objectives and the associated level of effort
required for task completion.
Many of these same variables are identified and analyzed
in depth in the previously referenced Combat Effectiveness
Model as causal to training stress and possible degraded
effectiveness. The reason given for such a potentially
damaging and non-goal congruent enviornment is that, when
viewed synergistic ally , these variables will increase the
time burden on the line unit and may lead to mismanagement
69
of available resources.
Indeed, there are other studies as well which question
the intuitive assumption of a direct, positive, relationship
between training objectives being accomplished and readiness
levels. These notions are amplified in an Available Time
70 71 72Model ' and a Readiness Perishability and Cost Model
summations of which appear in Annex I.
The implications of these concepts and studies for the
financial manager are twofold. Firstly, it will be
extremely difficult, after identifying and costing training
objectives and relating them to ZBB issues, to accurately
measure their impact on program goals by any one means.
Secondly, at some point, inflation adjusted increases in
funds for training can no longer be supported or realistically
justified, unless the training enviornment is changed.
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However, until the inferences of these examinations can
be proven, budgeteers are forced by reality to accept
the prevailing view of more is better and understand the
need for and importance of surrogate or proxy measures of
effectiveness in the PPB S system. To the extent that
such output measures demonstrate a favorable cost/effective-
ness ratio, they will be useful to allocate funds within the
DOA as well as justify the Army's budget to DOD and Congress.
That is, the same effectiveness proxies (once developed
and validated) used at authorization and appropriation
hearings will become comparative statistics both between
and within MACOMS. The Installation Commander, Comptroller
and all other financial managers must understand what is
required in terms of performance to appear favorable. They
must also be able to justify and control budgets by these
measures. Failure to do so will most certainly result in
lower budget allocations.
E. OUTPUT MEASURES - CURRENT AND PROJECTED EFFECTIVENESS
PROXIES
Although some of the training objectives can be directly
measured (such as quantitative results of weapons qualifica-
tions/live fire exercises) and others can be qualitatively
evaluated (such as the results of Army Training and Evalua-
tion Programs (ARTEPs) and Skill Qualification Tests (SQTs),
the spectre of aggregating their results for budget manage-
ment and goal assessment still looms in the foreground.
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Conceptually, the most feasible way of measuring a non-
measurable goal (such as defense by deterrance) is to find
certain results (performance-oriented) and/or process
(workload) surrogates/proxies which can be measured and
costed showing some correlation to the outputs desired.
The Air Force and Navy have attempted to do this by using
Flying Hours and Steaming Days, respectively.
In a letter to the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command,
dated 10 March 1978, the Deputy Cheif of Staff for
Operations and Plans, Leuitenant General E. C. Meyer wrote:
"to prepare persuasive and convincing justification of our
budget needs, we must relate resources to readiness. Of all
the tasks facing us, this is perhaps the most difficult in
73the budget process. v
Given the significance of this challenge, and the critical
importance of understanding both the usefulness and limitations
of proxies, Army operations and financial management
communities are developing/studying certain models and/or
methodologies which they hope will help measure outcomes
regardless of the level of command being considered. The
following ten major approaches to developing proxy measure-
ments are discussed:
1. Battalion Field Training Days (BFTD)
2. Readiness Reporting System
3- Organizational Effectiveness Models
4. Army Research Institute Realtrain Model







Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES \
National Training Center (NTC) Concept
Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO)
General Research Corporation
Army Training Study (ARTS)
1. Battalion Field Training Days (BFTD)
a. Introduction
In an attempt to better justify and defend
funds for training (0MA-P2 mission) , the DOA instituted
the BFTD concept within the FY 79/80 COBE. One BFTD is
defined as:
"Eight to 24 hours of mission-related train-
conducted by a MTOE battalion with sufficient
personnel and equipment to accomplish its
training task outside its assigned billeting,
administrative and logistical areas"... for
durations of less than 8 but more than 2^4-
hours, the following computations apply. 74
Duration of Battalion
















*Company and Platoon field training is recorded proportionately
to the number of like COS in a battalion/platoons in a
company.
Once a minimum number of BFTDs needed to attain
and retain current proficiency was determined and costed, by
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•type of unit, this workload factor would hopefully provide
a standard proxy measure relating monetary resources to
training readiness goals (inputs to outcomes)
.
This process is accomplished in the following
general manner. For those units without TMCS, a Division
Master Training Program is manually developed (after receiving
inputs by all subordinate combat, combat support and combat
service support units) . It is based on the training necessary
to keep the units, and hence the Divisions, at the current level
of training proficiency. As part of this program develop-
ment, BFTDs computation by subordinate units.
The applicable installation budget management
staff (DPT/DPTSEC) then computes the costs of this training
by elements of expense, using basic level funding constraints
and historical cost/training duration data and links these
to the BFTDs.
From the TMCS description in Chapter V, recall
that this manual process of costing and computing BFTDs fund-
ed within the basic or previous years budget level will
be automatically accomplished by TMCS as an output of the
Battalion/Division Decision Model as will the cost per
BFTD. Another feature proported by the developers of TMCS
is the automatic calculation of the percent contribution to
training readiness achieved by conducting the training which
the constraints allow. However, this is based on the
assumption that 100% of training readiness is achieved by
performing all training events regardless of constraints.
14-2

b . BFTD Problem Areas
Due to its ongoing use and relative importance,
the BFTD concept was analyzed in detail revealing four major,
interrelated problem areas which could impact on its validity
as an output measure and thus its use in the budgeting
process
:
(1) Variations in BFTD standards to actual
(2) Arbitrariness in BFTD computations
(3) Problems in costing the BFTD
(4) Zero-Base Budgeting with the BFTD
Although the following discussion only highlights
the key points in each area, a more comprehensive analysis
of each can be found in Annex J.
(1) Variations in BFTD Standards to Actual . As
illustrated in Table 11, variations between the DOA develop-
ed standard and actual reported BFTD (for like units) exist.
In some cases they are wide and in others not.
The cognizance of the Army to a potential
problem with the BFTD standard is reflected in the following
segment of a DOA letter:'^
"Considerable variations in BFTD requirements
(submitted in the FY 79 COBE) within and
between commands were noticed. These varia-
tions were attributed primarily to the
influence of different missions and train-
ing environments faced by units, and the
effort was recognized as the first essential
step in qualifying the amount of training we
need. While refining these data (establish
amount needed in FY 80 to attain and sustain
143
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proficiency in ARTEP and Soldiers Manuals
with the units organic personnel and
equipment) we must devote out efforts to-
ward determining the costs of required
training ..."
(2) Arbitrariness in BFTD Computations . Due
to the broad range of 8-24 hours, the BFTD computation is
subject to manipulations by those wishing to appear more
efficient with the same end effectiveness. For example,
consider the case of two like units who conduct 72 hours of
similar field training and are judged to be equally
proficient. The equitable situation would be for both
units to i.nput TMCS (or manually compute) in terms of the
total 72 hours duration for which 3 BFTDs would be charged
and costed. But suppose unit A inputs its data in terms of
12 hour blocks, while B enters it in a 72 hour block. Unit
A will then appear to have completed 6 BFTDs to B's 3- If
the units are like units, their field training costs would
be close, and therefore, A will look much more efficient
having completed 6 BFTDs for the same cost as B's 3-
(3) Problems of Costing the BFTD . The third
possible problem area concerns the elements of expense which
make up the costs of the BFTD as shown at Annex K. The
authors agree that direct field training costs are made up
of those items listed. However, as discussed in Chapter 5.
certain indirect or semi -variable training costs will exist
which are more related to field training than garrison opera-
tions. Such costs will not be accounted for with the pre-
sent cost factors and TMCS and hence understated.
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(4) Budgeting and Evaluating with the BFTD The
last problem area deals with possible use of BFTDs in the
Zero-base budgeting and program evaluation process. From
the interviews conducted there appears to be concern by
some budgeters that the BFTD may be abused as a tool for
justifying budget increases. It is felt that the trainers/
operations types will try to stack the deck in reporting
higher BFTDs than are actually necessary to stay at the
base level, which will eventually result in a higher standard.
For example, at one post the average cost per mechanized
infantry BFTD was determined to be $6,000 per day and the
number of BFTDs required for FY 79 were set at 76 days. This
resulted in an anticipated total annual cost of $456,000 for
each mechanized infantry battalion. This total when compared
to the average cost of operating a like unit in FY 78
($299,000) represented an annual increase of $157,000 or 52??.
Assuming no major mission changes this represents a substantial
increase even after adjustments for inflation. The alterna-
tives available to the installation commander in dealing with
such an event were discussed in Chapter IV, e.g., re-evalua-
tion of the training program, re -programming, and/or request
more funds.
c. Conclusions about the BFTD
Although it may take some time yet for realistic,
valid BFTD standards to be developed, the concept is probably
here to stay and, at some future date may help to justify
more training funds. As mentioned earlier, the budgeteer
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who fails to realize, understand and apply such a potentially
significant proxy measure to the ZBB process will be per-
forming a dis-service to the Commander. The purpose of such
measures is to help justify more, not less training funds
and they will most likely he used in the evaluation/comparison
mode .
2 . Readiness Reporting; System
The current Army system of reporting unit readiness
is covered in AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting; , dated 15 June
1978, with applicable MACOM and local supplements. In an
attempt to relate the readiness reporting system to the zero
base budgeting process and 3FTDs the instructions at Annex
L were issued to each installation. Basically, units were
required to describe the impact or "level of pain" for each
increment (in which the amount of projected field training
was changed) starting with the decremented level OMA, P2
mission issue area. The effect on Readiness Condition
(REDCON) levels and BFTDs were required to be verbalized on
Schedule 50c for each issue. Theoretically, these impacts
could then be related to the issue costs.
While the results of this attempt to relate costs,
BFTDs and the Readiness Reporting System were not too
7R
successful'
, the effort represents yet another recent area
in the P2 mission funds justification search. As no direct
link or reference to future attempts were made in the new
PPBS procedures outlined at Annex G, it appears that this
14-7

augmentation measure has been dropped for the short run.
Nevertheless, financial managers need to be aware of this
concept in case it is resurrected. Other comments, potential
actions and past studies pertinent to this area are at
Appendix 1 to Annex L .
3 . Three through Ten
As the next eight models/systems/studies concerned
with effectiveness measures have not yet been directly
linked with the budgeting process, they are discussed in
detail in Annex M . It is urged that the financial manager
review this material for possible future reference. The
National Training Center Concept is particularly relevant as
it incorporates or will use Realtrain, ARTEP, and MILES to
evaluate Battalions in a simulated combat environment which
is as close to real battle as possible. Once the criteria
for evaluation are firmly set, it is planned that the test
results will be directly related to the unit's training
program and its costs. A correlation of costs to effectiveness
can then be made and provide program evaluation feedback to
the budgeting process. Although the exact methodologies,
algorythms and procedures for tying the NTC results to budget
actions is yet to be developed, the authors believe strongly
that they eventually will be
.
Additionally, the Army Training Study (ARTS) will be
of significant importance. Through it, the training environ-
ment and, hence the training budget arena are very likely
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to be changed. The ART'S developed Battalion Training Model
(BTM) may be the tool for greatly reducing many of the
current stresses and their dysfunctional impacts on goals.
When combined with a costing model such as TMCS, the result
should be an even better system/tool for ZBB. Furthermore,
PPBS and the entire resource allocation process could be
improved for the Army. Again, the comptroller / financial
manager must keep informed on these highly dynamic
management assets.
F. AWARENESS OF NEED FOR EFFECTIVENESS PROXIES
Currently within the Army structure many major organiza-
tions and subordinate agencies are working in the area of
developing training/combat effectiveness measurements such
as:
1. TRADOC System Analysis Agency (TRASANA)
2. TRADOC Training Development Division (DCSOPS)
3. TRADOC Combat Experiment's Evaluation Command (CDEC)
U,. TRADOC Combined Arms Center (CAC)
5. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) "Resources to Readiness
Model 1"
6. Asst. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ARCSLOG)
"OMNIBUS Model"
7. Asst. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ADCSOPS)
"Automated Budget Resource Management System"
;
"P2 Mission Model"
The fact that such high level resources are being devoted
to the search for valid output measures emphasizes the
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importance that the Army places in this area. Realizing that
nothing short of real fighting will provide a true measure,
effectiveness proxies are essential to the program evaluation
phase of PPB ZB S.
There appears to he considerable overlap in the features
of many of the models being worked on by these various
agencies. It further seems very possible that the strong
points of some of them could fill in the gaps of others and
vice-versa. Too many people appear to be approaching the
problem from too many different perspectives. A pooling of
resources could possibly help to identify the best, standard
system for relating costs and readiness at a savings of
manpower and other costs.
G. RECOMMENDATIONS (See Note)
1. Endorsing the recommendations of the Combat Effective-
ness Model and ARTS methodology, the authors believe that
the present training environment needs to be re-evaluated
and changed
:
a. In order for cost/benefit analysis to work,
training goals must be further clarified. Cer-
tain training events/frequencies (such as live
fire exercises for infantry units) should be
identified as absolutely essential (by type
of unit), evaluation criteria developed, and
locked in concrete as Army-wide standards.
Further proliferation of "key-events" should
be controlled or at least kept to a minimum.
NOTE: Recommendations pertinent to the proposed Battalion
Activity Day (BAD) as a replacement for the Battalion Field





b. The resources needed, to accomplish these objec-
tives/events should be computed and weighed
against all resource constraints, foremost of
which is a reasonable total time assumption,
and their feasibility determined. If within
the feasible constraints, the remaining discre-
tionary resources should be given to the local
commanders
.
c. Sensitivity analysis should then be conducted
to assess the impact of resource changes on
overall training effectiveness at the small
unit level (Battalion and below) as justified
by the results of several measures of effective-
ness. This process should be a proration of
top-down goal clarification/select event
dictation; bottom-up detailed planning and
program formulation; with ranking, controlling
and feedback mechanisms occurring throughout
the system.
2. Given that minimum training standards, resource
requirements and evaluation criteria can be developed and
linked to F2 mission issues, identify a standard range of
days (BFTD) and costs necessary to meet them by type of unit.
Continue to test this concept as one of a number of
multidimentional output measurements; but one which could
be especially pertinent to cost/benefit analysis and zero-
base budgeting. If further testing reveals that the BFTD
is a good proxy, then it should be used to justify budget
levels as long as the training environment allows the marginal
benefits to exceed the marginal costs.
3- Continue to validate and add cost factors in further
developing and refining of a range of costs per BFTD by type
of unit. If the Costs functions developed are not linear,
develop a series of cost curves (cost as dependent, BFTD as
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independent variable) which can be incorporated into a
handbook to provide- commanders with "ballpark" figures for
planning and control.
4. TRADOC should organize and direct a task force
composed of operations, financial management and research
personnel from such organizations as CAC , FORSCOM, USAREUR,
ARI, DETC and DOA. The purpose of this team should be to
study and attempt to integrate the many models designed for
resources management and/or effectiveness measurement into
a single system for training program formulation and evalua-
tion. Such a system would also have to interface with PPB S
and its tools.
5. The financial management communities must play an
active role in the early stages of development and implementa-
tion of measures of training output. They must be able to
interpret these measures, relate them to costs, the Army
Management System program structure, issues/decision packages
and the accounting systems.
Rational resource management decisions will require
critical analysis of such measures and their impacts if
a balanced budget is the desired result. Where proxies are
deemed to be faulty, inflated and/or invalid ploys to in-
crease training funds. (P2 mission) at the expense of other
programs, financial managers must be able to explain why
they are not accepted. They also must be able to counter
with more effecient and/or effective uses for the funds.
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Comptrollers must also be able to play the inevitable
comparability game. Once measures are adopted for general
use, they will surely be used for program justification
and evaluation not only at the DOA/DOD/Congressional level
but within the DOA.
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. VIII . CONCLUSION
A. GENERAL
The preceding seven chapters have served as a multi-
dimensional analysis of the budgeting process as it pertains
to the United States Army. During the course of this study
the authors have attempted to provide the novice financial
manager/comptroller with an overview intended as an aid to
function effectively within the current fiscal environment
of the U.S. Army. As the following overview and concluding
remarks are read, recall that specific, detailed conclusions
and recommendations were made at the end of the preceding
chapters
.
B. OVERVIEW OF AREAS COVERED
In order to provide such a critical perspective, the
authors have presented the reader with summarized information
on various subjects of budgetary concern to include:
1. A macro view of the Federal Budget System (Chapter II]
2. The emergence and utilization of the Planning, Pro-
gramming, Budgeting System (PPBS) within the depart-
ment of Defense/Department of the Army (Chapter III).
3- The evolution and implementation of Zero Base Budget-
ing (ZBB) within the public sector (Chapter IV).
b. The introduction and discussion of the Training
Management Control System (TMCS) as a new budget/
funds management tool that can be utilized to justify




The development of a methodology, applying the
interface of TMCS and ZBB , to be utilized in the bud-
get formulation, execution, and review phases of the
budgeting process for OMA, P2 mission funds (Chapter
VI).
A discussion of the cruciality of budgetary performance
feedbacks to include potential effectiveness measures
which might be utilized to relate certain levels
of OMA funding to specific levels of training/combat
readiness (Chapter VII).
C. KEY CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
While the authors drew conclusions and made recommenda-
tions throughout the course of this thesis report, the re-
mainder of this particular chapter will briefly highlight
the key aspects of each of the preceding chapters to aid the
reader in grasping the critical information and concepts
presented
.
1 . The Federal Budget System
Federal budgeting in general sets forth specific
actions proposed and the estimated cost of their implementa-
tion to accomplish the mission. The system utilized to
accomplish the budgeting function for the Federal government
is both complex and ever-changing but the potential Army
financial manager/comptroller must possess a working know-
ledge of the entire budget spectrum.
To provide the reader with the necessary perspective
of the Federal Budget System, the authors conducted a macro
analysis from which the following key findings emerged:
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a. Based on both a historical and current perspec-
tive, the Federal Budget System is constantly in an evolu-
tionary state with respect to procedures and methodology
associated with the budgetary process.
b. The Congressional Committee System and specifi-
cally the standing committees represent a powerful force
within the budgetary process particularly in fiscal policy
making and priority setting.
c. The President, along with various staff members,
are currently talcing a central role in the development and
presentation of the budget. Specifically, the Office of
Management and Budget (0MB) has evolved into a major player
in the budgetary process. The agency-by-agency examination
by 0MB of proposed programs and ongoing activities are
critical aspects in the determination of both the size of
the Federal budget as well as the actual funding levels for
each specific agency.
Therefore, the Federal Budget System represents the
critical budgetary arena for the Department of Defense/
Department of the Army. The Army financial manager/comptroller
must be aware of this budgetary environment and understand
that the manner in which defense needs fare among all other
competing resource claims eventually results from the
priorities developed through the interaction of executive-
branch agencies, the President and Congress within the
political framework of the Federal Budget System.
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2. Planning, Programming and Budgeting; System (PP3S)
PPBS is the internal system used to obtain and manage
DOD resources. Within Chapter III the evolution of PPBS
is discussed along with the basic function of the system.
Upon analysis of the information presented concerning PPBS,
the reader should be cognizant of the following key aspects
of the system:
a. The system of Planning-Programming -Budgeting
relates three factors:
(1) A desired outcome (Planning).
(2) The structuring of methods of achieving
the outcome (Programming)
.
(3) The funds available to accomplish the end
result (Budgeting)
.
b. PPBS attempts to force government operations to
be more efficient and effective by improving the allocation
of public resources between competing needs.
c. An understanding of the Army PPBS cycle and the
sequential interrelationships of events within each phase
of the cycle is critical for the following specific reasons:
(1) The timing of the various events within the
PPBS cycle impacts on all resource managers
regardless to their level of involvement.
(2) The entire flow of the Army PPBS Cycle (as
illustrated in Figures 2 through 5i Chapter
III) must be comprehended by any participant
in the budgetary process in order to fully




(3) A working knowledge of the actions taken by
the various agencies within the Army PPBS
Cycle is important for any Army financial
manager/comptroller. Such knowledge allows
for the anticipation of requirements and
prior planning necessary to function in an
optimum manner.
(4) Upon analysis of the PPB process within the
Army, it should be apparent that the system
can never be viewed in a static perspective.
There are constant changes within the system
that result in shifts in emphasis and
procedural modifications but the basic
framework of the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System within the Army retains
its chief functional characteristic ... effective
resource allocation.
3- Zero Base Budgeting
In Chapter IV the authors presented an analysis of
the latest budgetary "tool" within the financial management
community Zero Base Budgeting (ZBB). During the course
of this analysis the evolution of ZBB was discussed as well
as the basic ZBB concpets and processes.
In addition the authors attempted to answer the key
question surrounding the ZBB implementation upon the Army's
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PPBS-oriented budgetary environment ... "Will ZBB replace,
compliment or hinder PPBS?"
In answering this critical question the authors com-
pared the characteristics of both ZBB and PPBS and found
some basic similarities but also a key difference. This
difference concerned the decision making perceptions of the
two concepts; PPB focuses on top level decision making, while
ZBB focuses on decisions at various operating and management
levels.
In dealing with this critical difference, the authors
agree with the contention that while the two concepts are
essentially different they are potentially complimentary.
Top level guidance is a part of the ZBB process and the
zero base approach has the potential to fill a critical gap
in the PPB process and should not be viewed as a system unto
itself.
ZBB represents just one of many management tools
necessary for effective financial management. It is a
potentially powerful technique which can enable the decision
maker at all levels of management to get the most out of
each dollar consumed.
ZBB does not pose a threat to PPBS but should be
perceived as a means to improve the present system. In
many ways ZBB simply forces the manager to do what he should




4. The Training Management Control System (TMCS)
In Chapter V the authors introduced and discussed
the Training Management Control System (TMCS). During the
course of this analysis the authors explained the basic
system, identified some problem areas within the current
configuration of TMCS and made recommendations to improve
the validity of the system's output.
In addition, the potential of TMCS to serve as a
viable tool to justify the funds required to support Army
training was discussed. This potential of TMCS to serve as
a budgetary tool is a key aspect of the system since the
evolution of ZBB in an environment of constrained resources
demands justification for every dollar consumed including
training dollars
.
It is the contention of the authors that, if the
needed improvements (as advocated in Chapter V) are made to
the present TMCS configuration, the operational and financial
management community within the Army will have a much needed
budgetary tool. This tool will allow for more accurate
quantitative justification of training dollars (OMA, P2
mission funds)
.
5. TMCS/ZBB Application in CQBE Formulation
Chapter VI explored the potential application of
TMCS in conjuction with ZBB in the development of a method-
ology to aid in the formulation of a portion of the Army
budgeting process. In the course of this methodological
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development the authors focused attention upon those procedures
necessary to optimize the benefits of TMCS/ZBB interface in
the formulation of the training budget (OMA, P2 mission
funds) for a hypothetical separate Brigade within the
Development of the Army structure.
The application of TMCS/ZBB in the budget formulation
process was initially demonstrated at the lower management
level (company sized unit) and developed to encompass the
actions required at the higher levels of management within
the framework of the authors' vehicle for analysis ... the
199th Infantry Brigade.
This analysis included tracing the issue building
and ranking process involved in putting together the Command
Operating Budget Estimate (COBE) focusing on OMA, P2 mission
dollars. Although the scope of this discussion was limited
to P2 mission funds, the procedures applied are similar to
those that could be used in formulating the budget for other
OMA programs as well as various major appropriations.
Although the budget formulation phase of the budget-
ing process was given the major emphasis in Chapter VI,
the budget execution and review phases were also discussed
to include linkages between budgeting and the accounting
system.
In general, the overall intention of Chapter VI was
to:
a. Present a potential application of TMCS/
ZBB in the development of a budgetary
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methodology to be utilized to enhance the
Army's effort in justifying the training
budget (P2 mission dollars)
.
b. Increase the readers awareness of the
complexities inherent in budget formulation,
execution and review at lower levels within
the Department of the Army (DOA) structure.
c. Provide the reader with a glimpse of potential
future sophistications within the DOA
budgetary process.
6 . Program Evaluation/Measures of Effectiveness
The final link in the budgetary system, program
evaluation and the output measures which aid in completing
the feedback loop were the topics of Chapter VII. After first
outlining a hierarchy of current Army goals, the complexities
of the training environment were addressed. As training
programs and budget formulation, execution and evaluation
must take place within this environment, it is imperative
that the potential financial manager understand its implica-
tions for PPBZB S.
Because no measure of output short of war/battle can
provide a "true" measure of effectiveness, proxies of
effectiveness must be developed. The Army is working hard
on developing such proxies for use in justifying its OMA
P2 mission, training budget.
162

Several of the more key measures under development,
the Battalion Field Training Day (BFTD), Readiness Reporting
System, National Training Center Concept, Army Training
Study (ARTS) and others were analyzed. The purpose of
doing so were:
a. To bring about an awareness of current develop-
ments in performance measures.
b. To illucidate the importance of such proxies
being related to programs and their costs in order to:
(1) Justify training funds
(2) Compare the effectiveness of programs
(Both of these being applied both between
DOA and DOD and within DOA) .
c
.
To substantiate the role which the comptroller/
financial manager must play in developing, critically testing
and implementing these proxies in order to better advise




The research effort involved in the development of this
thesis report presented the opportunity for a critical look
at the Army's budgetary environment. During the course of
this analysis, it was virtually impossible not to form
opinions and perform subjective evaluations of the budgetary
process and its tools.
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The conclusions drawn and recommendations made throughout
the previous seven chapters are the main products of the
research but do not represent the total benefits derived
from the study. An additional key windfall is the "bottom-
line" contention that the Army Financial Management community
is generally moving in a positive direction in efforts to
enhance the PPBS process at all levels.
Especially encouraging were improvements in the follow-
ing areas of budgetary concern:
1. PPBS in the Army has retained chief functional
characteristic intended by its creators; "more effective
re so urc e management .
"
2. The initial fears of major changes associated with
ZBB implementation have dissipated and the positive aspects
of ZBB complimenting PPBS have emerged.
3- The development of the Training Management Control
System (TMCS) to help cost, plan the use of, and justify P2
mission training dollars is a much needed step in the
reinforcement of a, heretofore, very weak area.
4. A great deal of "soul-searching" work is being per-
formed in an attempt to improve the Army's ability to measure
training effectiveness and to relate levels of effectiveness
to costs.
As the Army budgeting process continues to evolve and
future sophistications ensue, members of the financial
management community must be supportive, responsive and
mentally equipped to deal with changes which can enhance
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performance. This does not entail projecting each new
innovation as a panacea for all shortcomings, but rather
maintaining a positive, alert perspective in order to properly
evaluate the merits of the innovation(s) over time.
The development of ZBB and TMCS is an excellent
example of current innovations that should be given the
benefit of a fair trial and cooperative effort. The financial
management community must therefore analyze the potential
contributions of ZBB and TMCS in terms of the incremental
advantages afforded by such instruments as a means to better





DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO ARMY PPBS CYCLE
(ABE) ARMY BUDGET ESTIMATES
Coordinated Army Budget Estimates (ABE) constitute
the Army budget submission to OSD. They are in accord
with the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) as modified
by the Amended Program Decision Memorandum (APDM) and,
in addition, conform with specific budget guidance forma-
lized in the Budget Estimates Guidance (BEG). The emergent
budget covers the prior year, the current year, (the
fiscal year immediately preceding the budget year) , the
budget year, and, for authorization estimates, the budget
year plus 1
.
(ACP) ARMY CAPABILITIES PLAN
The Army issues the Army Capabilities Plan (ACP) to
provide mobilization and operational planning guidance to
Army Staff agencies, MACOMs, and Army component commands
of unified commands for the employment and support of
Army forces in the short-range period. It reflects specific
tasks and capabilities attainable within existing programs
and budget limitations. The ACP uses the planning assump-
tions of, and implements, the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan (JSCP)
(AFG) ARMY FORCE GUIDANCE
The Army force Guidance (AFG) provides guidance to the
major Army commands (MACOMS) and the Army Staff agencies.
It guides both planning and programming and helps link
these two phases of the PPBS.
(APDM) AMENDED PROGRAM DECISION MEMORANDUM
Following receipt of the Army reclama and after the
major issues meeting, the Secretary of Defense publishes an
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Amended Program Decision Memorandum (APDM) . Provided to
the Army in late August or early September, the document
approves the POM with the specific changes identified in
the PDM, as amended in consideration of the Army reclama.
Next, the Secretary reports to the President on the status
of the overall program and after the President's review
revises the APDM as required. As specifically and finally
amended, the APDM enables the Secretary to supplement
earlier budget instructions. Specifically, in a separate
communication to the Army, he transmits control totals
for TOA and instructions for using the decremented, basic,
and enhanced programs of the POM to develop a final FYDP
and, at the same time, to construct budget estimates for
the forthcoming budget submission.
(APPGM) ARMY PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM
The Army Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum
(APPGM) serves as the primary guidance document for deve-
loping the program proposed each year in the Army Program
Objective Memorandum (POM). The APPGM incorporates OSD
guidance and expands on Army program aspects. Reflecting
the Decision Package Sets (DPS) on which the President's
budget is based and allocating projected appropriation
levels, the APPGM provides specific policy and resource
constraints together with administrative instructions
for preparing the Army program and POM. More precisely,
the APPGM announces the basic assumptions and presents
planning guidance for structuring the force and programming
its material and logistics support requirements. It
narrates policy themes and establishes priorities for
allocating resources. It schedules major POM development
actions and prints an index of POM topics together with
administrative instructions for their preparation.
Also, it assigns Staff agencies responsibilities for
preparing the topics and provides guidance in terms of
the thrust and substance of issues to be addressed. The
APPGM expresses fiscal guidance as outyear extensions of
prior-year amounts given in the President's budget (for
POM 1980 - 1984, for example, it extends the FY 1978 column
of the FY 1979 budget)
.
(ASA) ARMY STRATEGIC APPRAISAL
Developed by the Strategic Studies Institute at the
Army War College, the Army Strategic Appraisal— rather
than an approved Army document—constitutes a think-piece
that proposes alternative solutions. The document presents
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an unconstrained view of mid-range trends and addresses
strategy and force -planning issues. The major commands
and Army Staff consider the issues it identifies for
possible inclusion in the PPBS and in forming Army positions
when responding to joint and DOD papers.
(BEG) BUDGET ESTIMATES GUIDANCE
Following approval of the Program Objective Memoran-
dum (POM), OSD prepares Budget Estimates Guidance (BEG)
applying to the submission of the Army budget. The BEG
explains new requirements initiated by Congress, any
requirements imposed by either OMB or OSD, and identifies
any supplemental request to be submitted for the current
budget year together with items to be considered in the
request
.
(BER) BUDGET EXECUTION REVIEW
Prior to the fiscal year budget, the major commands
submit a for Budget Execution Review (BER) at mid-fiscal
year, which reflects 4 or more months of actual perfor-
mance towards approved program objectives. Purpose is
to provide in depth analysis to insure that all actions
required for program accomplishment are taken.
(CG) CONSOLIDATED GUIDANCE
A primary guidance document that provides central
policy and direction for the current PPBS cycle. New,
beginning with the FY 1980-1984- cycle, the CG superseded
several documents formerly published at various stages of
program development. The event has thus merged previously
incremental program and fiscal guidance into a single
authoritative statement. Substantively, the Consolodated
Guidance (CG) articulates rationale for the defense
program and identifies fundamental issues. The SECDEF
uses the document, however, not only to inform but also
to promote dialogue between OSD and the services and
with the President. The document covers policy; military
strategic concepts and objectives; planning and programming
guidance; force levels; and manpower, support, and fiscal
guidance. Specific in nature, it addresses such major
areas of interest as strategic offensive capabilities,
tactical air warfare, theater nuclear forces, and logistics,
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(COBE) COMMAND OPERATING BUDGET ESTIMATE
The Army commands formulate command requirements for
the budget year and about 1 July submit the requirements
to HQDA as the Command Operating Budget Estimate (COBE)
.
The input provides appropriation directors with detail
essential in developing and evaluating their budget
estimates. The submission not only supports the formula-
tion and justification of the Army Budget Estimates (ABE)
but also furnishes the commands the opportunity to inform
the Army Staff of any foreseeable change in previously
projected program requirements for the upcoming fiscal
year. The information helps appropriation directors to
construct apportionment requests forwarded to OSD-OMB
before the 15 September OSD-budget submit. (See Annex B)
(DG) DEFENSE GUIDANCE
See Consolidated Guidance (CG)
(DPS) DECISION PACKAGE SET
A feature of zero-base budgeting, Decision Package
Sets (DPS) replaced Program/Budget Decisions (PBD)
beginning with the FY 1979 budget. A DPS is a series of
justification documents (decision packages) prepared for
a defined program or organizational entity (decision
unit) that represents its total budget request. The pro-
ducts of the OSD-OMB review of Army Budget Estimates (ABE)
are scores of Decision Package Sets (DPS) returned by
OSD either approving or revising specific programs. The
returned DPSs channel through the Director of the Army
Budget who assigns action to appropriate staff agencies
who, in turn, coordinate with appropriation directors to
determine if appeal is warranted. Each successful appeal
results in a revised DPS to document final OSD decisions on
affected portions of the budget. During December the SA
and CSA meet with the SECDEF to discuss those major issues
who decisions limit capabilities to execute Army programs.
Decisions of the SECDEF and President resulting from this
major budget issues meeting appear as revisions to previously
issued DPSs. For the handling of major program issues, see
the discussion for the Issue Paper Cycle.
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(FYDP) FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM
The Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) and its separately-
published procurement and RDTE annexes constitute the
official summary of programs approved by the Secretary
of Defense. The FYDP specifies force levels in terms of
major mission programs and support objectives and projects.
It also lists corresponding total obligational authority
and manpower. For each category, it records totals by
prior fiscal year, current fiscal year, budget year, and
succeeding fiscal years--7 succeeding years for force
levels and k for TOA and manpower. The FYDP serves as the
controlling internal working document of the DOD PPBS,
periodically recording its major outputs--proposed programs
and budget estimates.
(JCS) JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
(JFM) JOINT FORCE MEMORANDUM
The Joint Force Memorandum (JFM), published in the
latter part of April, constitutes part of the programming
phase. Although part of the JSPS , the JFM receives input
from the PPGM issued in February, and it and the Program
Objective Memornadums (POM) provide each other reciprocal
input
.
JFM provides JCS recommendations on the fiscally
constrained force levels and support programs that will
require trade-off decisions by program managers during
the current year.
(JIEP) JOINT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FOR PLANNING
The Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP),
which focuses on the short and mid-range periods, con-
tains global and regional appraisals including estimates
of the external and internal threats to countries of
significance to the United States and estimates of the
Warsaw Pact and Asian Communist military forces. The
JIEP provides the principal intelligence basis for the




(JLREID) JOINT LONG-RANGE ESTIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT
The Joint Long-Range Estimative Intelligence Document
(JLREID) summarizes factors and trends affecting world
power relationships in the long-range planning period,
including an intelligence estimate of the likelihood and
capabilities of important foreign nations to undertake
courses of action which could materially affect the national
interests of the United States. The JLREID provides the
principal intelligence basis for the JLRSS and the long-
range period of the JRDOD. (See Annex B).
(JLRSS) JOINT LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC STUDY
The Joint Long-Range Strategic Study (JLRSS) is a
source document that addresses the strategic implications
of worldwide and national economic, political, social,
technical, and military trands. It deals with national
objectives, policies, and military constraints and relates
these to world and regional trends. As a source document,
it is intended to stimulate more sharply focused strategic
studies and to be more useful in developing military
policies, plans, and programs having long-range implications
(See Annex B)
.
(JRDOD) JOINT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES DOCUMENT
The JRDOD advises the Secretary of Defense on the
composition and priorities of the DOD R&D program. An
authoritative statement of significant military R&D ob-
jectives, the document emphasizes those parts of the DOD
R&D program that are of national military importance and
that consume significant portions of the budget. The
objectives proposed by the JRDOD derive from the JLFEID
and JIEP and also the strategy, capabilities, and force
recommendations given in the JSOP Volumes I and II. The
JRDOD is a multi-year document but is reviewed at least
annually, concurrently with JSOP VOL II. (See Annex B).
(JSCP) JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN
The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides
JCS guidance to the commanders of the unified and specified
commands and the Chiefs of the military services. It
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bears on the accomplishment of military tasks based on
projected military capabilities, estimates of the threat
during the short-range period, and current guidance of the
SECDEF. The JSCP specifically assigns the commanders of
unified and specified commands responsibility for preparing
contingency plans. (See Annex B).
(JSOP) JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN
The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) provides
the advise of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President
and the Secretary of Defense on the military strategy and
force objectives for attaining the national security objective
of the United States. In addition to recommendations
on major forces, it includes the rationale supporting
the forces and assessment of associated risks, costs, and
manpower estimates, and other supporting data. The JSOP
is published in two volumes: Volume I--Military Strategy
and Force Planning Guidance; Volume II--Analyses and Force
Tabulations and Annexes. (See Annex B)
.
(MACOM) MAJOR COMMAND
(OSD) OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PAPPGM) PRELIMINARY ARMY PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING
GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM
The Preliminary Army Planning and Programming
Guidance Memorandum (PAPPGM) is normally issued in late
December. It is an early version of the mid-Fedruary
Army Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum (APPGM),
which constitutes the primary guidance document for
developing the program proposed each year in the Army
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) . The Director of
Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE) , OCSA, begins
preparing the PAPPGM each summer as the POM nears final
approval. By late September DPAE circulates a draft
to the Staff and major commands, receiving their comments
in October. DPAE then develops a tentative Staff position
for the PAPPGM incorporating the comments of the Staff
and commands and also the latest in OSD guidance. The
tentative position goes to the Program Guidance and Re-
view Committee (PGRC). On approval by the PGRC , the DPAE
issues the PAPPGM as the formal guide for initial POM
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preparation. See also the Army Planning and Programming
Guidance Memorandum (APPGM)
.
(PARR) PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND RESOURCE REVIEW
Selected major commands provide analyses of their
requirements in the planning and programming phases,
primarily through Program Analysis and Resource Review
(PARR). PARRs submitted by the major commands present
their resource requirements, which constitute an important
substantive basis for preparing the Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) . The PARR furnishes information appli-
calbe to the budget year, 1st program year, and last k-
program years
.
(PBG) PROGRAM AND BUDGET GUIDANCE
The Program and Budget Guidance (PBG) is a two-
volume publication (three volumes for FORSCOM and USAREUR).
It contains information regarding the availability of
dollar and manpower resources and provides guidance to
major commands for preparing Program Analysis and Re-
source Reviews (PARR) and Command Operating Budget Es-
timates (COBE) . Volume I goes to all major commands and
operating agencies. It provides general guidance and
expresses HQDA views on various programs, and it identifies
programs requiring emphasis in command PARR and COBE
submissions. Volume II is published separately for each
command. Each of the separate publications provides
summary data, resource trails, and manpower and fiscal
constraints applicable to a particular command. (For
FORSCOM and USAREUR, Folume II chapters on manpower and
force structure are published as a Volume III). The
PBG receives three distributions annually that correspond
in October to the Army Budget Estimate (ABE), in January
to the President's budget, and in May to the Program
Objective Memorandum (POM).
(PCM) PROGRAM CONTINUITY MEMORANDUM
The POM refers to a number of ongoing actions whose
resource implications remain uncertain at the time of
publication. The Program Continuity Memorandum (PCM),
issued in mid-June by the VCSA, documents residual actions
On the one hand, the PCM bridges the gap between the
current POM and, on the other, the Army Budget Estimates
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(ABE) submitted in September and the POM published the
following May. Paralleling the APPGM-POM format, the
PCM identifies the specific actions to be taken and assigns
primary and secondary responsibilities to the staff and
major commands for reporting the September budget estimates
and for developing the next year's POM.
(PDM) PROGRAM DECISION MEMORANDUM
The Secretary of Defense issues a Program Decision
Memorandum (PDM) approving the POM with tentative specific
changes. The Army staff reviews the PDM, determines which
decisions the Army should reclama, identifying those that
warrant the personal attention of the Chief of Staff or
Secretary of the Army. These latter decisions fall into
the "major issues" category and result in a meeting be-
tween the Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff, and the
Secretary of Defense for a personal discussion of the
issues. Also, see Amended Program Decision Memorandum
(APDM)
.
(POM) PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM
The Program Objective Memorandum (POM) formally
transmits to OSD the Army proposals for resource alloca-
tion in consonance with program guidance. The POM de-
scribes all aspects of Army programs to increase the
operational readiness of the total Army. It highlights
forces, manpower, and material acquisition. It also
addresses the equipment distribution and logistics support
required to meet the strategy and objectives specified
by the Secretary of Defense.
(PPGM) PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM
The Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum
(PPGM) published in February formally initiates the
programming phase. The PPGM gives initial specific
guidance, particularly the fiscal constraints, applicable
to preparation of the POM program. Its content develops
in part from a consideration of the Defense Guidance and
JSOP Vol II
. The content develops also froma consideration
of service and JCS comments on the TPPGM as well as of
other events that have occurred during the preceding
months, including preparation of the President's budget
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in December. The PPGM, which reflects the Decision
Package Sets (DPS) of December, provides a basis for
completing the Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) and preparing
the Army Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum
(APPGM) . (See Annex B)
.
(TPPGM) TENTATIVE PLANNING AND PROARAMMING GUIDANCE
MEMORANDUM





Beginning with the FY 1980-1984 cycle, there will be
some changes in documents, schedules, and approaches in the
PPBS designed to benefit from Presidential involvement in
the PPB process and also better to articulate DOD guidance
before POM preparation. Some of the key changes associated
with this PPBS modification include:
1. The development of Consolidated Guidance (CG) by
the Secretary of Defense which consolidates in one
place DG, the PPGM, and the TPPGM, all of which it
supercedes
.
2. The replacement of the Joint Forces Memorandum (JFM)
with a Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM)
which provides JCS advice to the Secretary of De-
fense for his review of the POMs.
3. The replacement of the JSOP I and II with a Joint
Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) that will provide
comprehensive recommendations by the JCS and will
include much the same information provided previously





MACOM COST FACTOR PROGRAM (MCFF) :
Using inputs generated by CAMUS and the equipment
utilization data reported by units over the past 12
months, develops and maintains cost factors by installa-
tion, unit, and type of equipment, expressed in dollars
per mile/hour/or round. Provisions are made to identify
cost factors that appear to vary excessively compared to
similar installations/units/equipment and to update the
tapes as new or revised cost factors are developed.
TRAINING MANAGEMENT INFORMATION PROGRAM (TMIP) :
Prints out a blank Training Information Worksheet.
Tailored for each type of Battalion for preparing train-
ing event input (see Appendix 1). Authorized equipment
and type of training ammunition is printed out along
with spaces for the input of the following data:
a. Commander's priority for the training event
b. Duration of the event
c. Estimates of personnel (nos.) and equipment
(density and use) required
d. Range/Manuever area desired and size
e. Training ammo requirements (by DODIC)
f. Non-equipment related costs (other costs)
BATTALION ANNUAL TRAINING PROGRAM (BATP) :
Tape and hard copy printout (see Appendix 2) using
TMIP input. Of central importance to the budgeting pro-
cess here is the computation of Battalion Field Training
Days (BFTDs), a measure of output which hopefully can
be related to both a certain level of costs and effective-
ness. This concept is analyzed fully in Chapter 7. Also
of critical concern is the necessity to update the BATP
with actual resources used once the programmed training
is conducted. This is essential to determine the
variance between programmed and actual resource consump-
tion and subsequent impacts on future training.
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k. TRAINING SCHEDULE GENERATOR (TSG) :
Uses latest BATP tape as input; designed to eliminate
the administrative typing workload. By entering other
training schedule data such as uniform, instructor,
training location and aids, etc., the training schedule
is automatically printed and recorded on the training
schedule tape. The TSG can also be rerun as the BATP
is changed.
5. BATTALION COST FACTOR PROGRAM (BCFP) :
Utilizes input from three of the previous programs
(MCFP, TMIP, BATP) to cost each field/range training
event by applying the appropriate cost factors to the
types of equipment, density and usage inputed. The
output is a period BATP tape.
6. BATTALION DECISION MODEL (BDM) :
Inputs to this model includes the priced Battalion
Annual Training Program (BATP) tape and a set of re-
source constraints used during the field training; e.g.:
a. Spare parts (other than aviation)
b. Aviation spare parts








g. Training Days (BFTDs)
h. Acre Days
Using a linear programming technique BDM then pro-
duces a printout (see Appendix 3) which (proportedly)
illustrates: 35
1. What training can be conducted within the
constraints
.
2. Total resources consumed for all events, by type
of resource, for training that can be accomplished.
3- Field training that cannot be conducted in the
Battalion Annual Training Program by training event and
the resources required to accomplish each of these events
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4. Unused resources by type/dollar amount.
7. DIVISION DECISION MODEL (DDM) :
DDM represents the culmination of this building pro-
cess. It is run after the optimization of Battalion
Annual Training Programs by rerunning the Battalion De-
cision Model. As presently envisioned, the DDM will3°
(see example Appendix 4):
a. Reprice the battalion level optimum field train-
ing solutions using division level cost factors, which
include maintenance battalion costs.
b. Prorate garrison maintenance and garrison train-
ing (TDY, DX, Central Issue Facility, and^Self-Service
Supply Center) on the basis of authorized strength to
each battalion/separate company in the division.
c
.
Provide AVGAS and aviation spare parts dollars
required to accomplish individual proficiency flying
in aviation units.
d. Provide dollar/gallon requirements by unit for
MOGAS, AVGAS, and Diesel to support garrison maintenance
and garrison training requirements.
d. Provide programmed allocations of funds to
battalions/separate Companies in categories that can be
related to commitments and actual resources consumed as
recorded in CAMUS and STANFINS respectively.
f. Provide all data element requirements to complete
Schedule 40 (Quantification of Program 2 Mission Dollars)
of the Command Operating Budget Estimate (COBE) for the
installation under Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) procedures.
g. Determines division level impact of resource
changes on field training considerations for the
battalions
.
h. Summarizes the total number of Battalion Field
Training Days, the total number of acre/days, and the
total amount of dollars used for field training, by
battalion.
i. Summarizes the total variable (field training)
and fixed (garrison) cost by battalion.
8. TRAINING AMMUNITION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM (TACS) ;
Develops division requirements based on the finalized
Battalion Annual Training Programs (BATPs) and training
events schedules to be conducted. In addition to being
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an allocation tool, TACS will price the ammunition by
index value and keep a running record of the ammunition
used by type and unit.
MANUEVER AREA SCHEDULING SYSTEM (MASS) :
Requires inputs of training locations available by
Julian date and the BATP tape (containing events that can
be conducted and location preferences) . MASS will then
provide
:
1. A training area assignment schedule, by month or
quarter, by Julian date, for each battalion.
2. Automatic consideration of some ranges/training
areas being closed when others are being used for cer-
tain training events.
3- Capability to modify training area assignments
and identify impact on other battalion training programs.
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SUPPORT/POLICIES, AND TESTING CONCEPTS)
1. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS :
a. The dynamic training environment dictates that
TMCS be interactive and flexible, allowing for changes
in constraints, requirements and priorities and the
documenting of "what if" question results. Once the
Battalion Commander can see what his budget guidance
will/will not buy him he can begin a trade-off process
of changing the inputs and evaluating the alternatives
in light of their impact on his previously developed
training program. As the actual training is conducted,
he must review this process to determine where his unit
stands when compared to projected costs. At the Brigade
and higher level, the optimization process will be con-
tinued to reallocate any unused resources between
battalions thus permitting additional training to be
scheduled.
b. Responsiveness, 1-3 hours for the complete
optimization program, is another requirement as are
routinized backup capabilities for data security.
c. Although not designed to operate in a combat
zone, TMCS is expected to play a major role during
mobilization.
d. Combat, Combat Support and Service Support
Battalions will utilize the system.
2. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT/POLICIES :
a. TMCS equipment will be located at Brigades 5-3
and Division G-3 (training) levels, 1-IBM 5100 at each.
b. The equipment operates on standard current, is




The principle operators will be training
operations NCO ' s at each level. As these personnel
generally have no formal computer training nor is any
required, the system must be simple to operate and
understand and, in fact is tutorial in nature. A de-
tailed "soldier-proof" operator's manual has been
written to support this policy. 38
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d. Built-in simplicity also includes the provisions
for minimizing errors thru well designed editing programs,




(QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO TMCS TEST UNITS
DOCUMENTS REQUESTED :
1. Copies of pertinent memos, decision papers, DF's, LIOs'
etc. concerning TMCS.
2. Copies of TMCS test printouts (output) to date.
3. Copy of Division Reg(s) outlining required annual
training; Cdr's Training Guidance, etc., (can be ex-
tracts of appropriate pages)
.
4. Copy of FY 79 Division COBE and/or other command
guidance on the budget procedures/process presently
in effect (particularly as pertaining to OMA funds;
Sched 50s and 40)
.
5. Any non-confidential command policies, regs, LOIs 1 ,
etc. dealing with the commander's evaluation on the
training portion of Unit Readiness Reports DA 2715' s).
NOTE ; If any of the following questions are answered in
the documents provided above, please indicate the page
number and question number on the front of the document
and disregard the question unless you feel further comments
are necessary - Thank You.
1. Briefly describe the way in which the training budget
is presently developed in the Division to include
which staff/agencies are involved and how.
2. Is TMCS envisioned to be used in the budgeting process
and how? (For example-formulation and justification of
ZBB decision packages, use in the incrementation
process, etc. and how.)
3- How is TMCS presently used within the Division and
what are the future plans for its use?
4. What problems do you have or foresee with TMCS and why?
5- What reporting requirements does TMCS require? (A copy
of the latest report would be appreciated.)
6. What interface does TMCS have with the Division Comp-
troller and/or Command Management Staff? (Names, phone
numbers of POC would be helpful.)
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7- Are Battalion Field Training Days a good measure of
training effectiveness? If so, how; if not, what would
you suggest as a better measure of training output
and why? Could it be tied into TMCS and how?
8. How are budget constraints for individual units
determined at Division Training?
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ANNEX F (ZBB/COBE SCHEDULES)
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ANNEX G (FUTURE BUDGET DEVELOPMENTS)
Annex G (Future Budget Chancer-PARR/PABE)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADOUARTERS. UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMANO
FORT MCPHERSON. GEORGIA 30330
9 January 1979
AFOP-TAT
SUBJECT: FORSCOM FY 81-85 PARR/PABE
Commanders, FORSCOM Installations
Commanders, TRADOC Installations
1. HQDA is currently revising the planning, programming and
budgeting procedures which will extend the budget estimate to
the outyears. Currently, only the current and budget years
are addressed. The vehicle to accomplish this is the Program
and Budget Estimate (PABE) . The PA3E will supplement the Pro-
gram Analysis and Resource Review (PARR) and replace the
estimate portion of the Command Operating Budget Estimate
(COBE) . It will become the primary vehicle for estimating
resource (dollars/manpower) requirements for the outyears,
i.e., FY 81-85. A follow-on document entitled Command
Operating Budget (COB) will be used to request and justify
the current and budget years.
2. HQ, FORSCOM must define what is being bought with the
undecremented funds provided by DA. Priorities, workload,
and quantification data must be included.
3. This letter provides instructions for preparation of the
initial input to OM*V Program 2 Mission Training Issues of the
FORSCOM FY 81-85 Program and Budget Estimate (PABE)
.
4. The PABE, unlike the PARR in years past, will require
field input. The PABE requires that training issue dollars
be displayed by type unit (Program Element) , fiscal year,
and workload to include numbers of 3FTD, flying hours, FTX's,
and EDRE's. A display of alements of expense is not required.
Although the PABE does not require the amount of data required
in the old Command Operating Budget Estimate (COEE) , the degree
of detail required for the training issues is such that the






SUBJECT: FORSCOM FY 81-85 PARR/PABE
5. The attached matrix (Incl 1) provides the revised training
issues that will be used for the FY 81-85 PABE. These issue
titles replace the issues used in previous years (on and off-
post training/ special training, etc.). Addressees are requested
to apply the current FY 79 AFP (P2 Mission) and workload factors
to each of the new issues on the matrix for FY 1979. This infor-
mation will be further staff developed using the new issue titles
by HQ FORSCOM to satisfy the requirements for the FY 81-85 PABE.
One matrix is to be prepared for each division, separate brigade
and separate battalion. An example matrix is provided at Incl 2.
6
.
Input should be addressed to AFOP-PO and is required MLT
26 Jan 79.
7. HQ, FORSCOM points of contact are LTC Imes, AV 588-3494




















1. Attain/Maintain Bn Proficiency i |
in Soldiers Manual/Level 1 ARTEP | $11,250 [ 1S41 | 4000










Proficiency (70% of issue cost) i $7,875 , 1078 i 3000 ! n/a
b. 3n Proficiency (100% of
...
' '
issue cost) i S3, 375 J 463 | 1000 | 25 Bn FTX
2. Conduct Deployability
j $3,472.5 ! 471 j 1000 ! 23 bn EDREEmployabilxty Training for j j ! i i, sty
High Priority Forces j
; j
i ; ?" FIL
a. Conduct static load [. !
!
'
exercises for each sep > $65 '66 I o * n/adep/plt/co and bn s ! ' j j
b. Conduct at least one EDRE ! i ! j
for each sep det/plt/co and bn ! $632.5
J
us j soo j 23 EDRE
c. Conduct Bn CALFEX j j
i i i!




e. Bn TF rotation to JWC ] ! ' '
i $ 400 ! 40 Jo J 1 BN
f. Bn TF rotation to AK } j [
(RBOT)













DOLLARS j BFTD ; FH [ CPX/FTX/EDRE
J ill ITERATIONS
g. Bde TF rotation to Ft Drum ' n ' ' «
h. Bde TF rotation to Ft Irwin ! »,,.,, ! , ' ;
(NTC) j
$166°
! 120 j 250 j l Bde
i. Conduct Bde EDRE/Off-post FTXj Q \ \ {
j. Participate in Bde JTX/JRX
J $71S
j
nQ ! ;sq J
^ ^





1. Participate in Div JTX/JRX | |
J
3. Conduct C&C/Sustainment j
i J 4 DivffX
Training
j $334 j 35 ! S00 | 3 3de FTX
a. Bde CPX ' t ,n ! , | '
b. Div/Corps CPX




| $264 j 48 | 200 | 3






UNIT: 11th. Inf fliv (M)
PROGRAM ELEMENT: 202611
INSTALLATION : Ft Apache
FY 79
P2M ISSUES j DOLLARS ! BFTD ! FH | CPX/FTX/EDRE
i j \ j ITERATIONS







! ! 1 CO FTX
a. Indiv/unit training at
| $60 " ! 4 ! o ! i rnNWTC i i i , L LU
b. Unit amphib training '
' '
c. Conduct Unit Exchange j
;
! '
with Foreign Countries ' <
d. Contingency mission ' ",
training ! J148 ! 27 ! \ H\
5. Support Other Army ' i !
Activities { $946 j 172 j 1000 j na
a. ROTC Summer Camp
j $660 | UQ
|
600 ! ma
b. Service Schools j j
c. Other TRADOC f j j
\
d. Aff iliation/Roundout i $66 i 12 ! 200 ! NA










1 DOLLARS ! BFTD FH CPX/FTX/EDRE
ITERATIONS







ANNEX H (TRAINING OBJECTIVES IMPLEMENTING DOCUMENTS)





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, CSITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND
Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330
Expires 26 April 1978
Training
•FORSCOM TRAISISG READINESS PROGRAM
a. To establish goals, objectives, and standards to be used co Identify training requirements
and to develop training programs -or FORSCCM units.
b. To provide training guidance chat viLI assist commanders la appraising unit training
status.
c. To assist co anders In managing unit training programs and training assets.
d. To assise commanders In Identifying those areas affecting training where additional resources
tre needed.
2. REFERENCE: AR 220-1 -with FORSCOM Supplement i, Unit Readiness Reporting.
3. APPLICABILITY.
a. This - ircular applies to all readiness reporting units of the Active Component and Is
general training policy guidance for the Reserve Components.
b. The training events and standards outlined by this circular provide a guide for the evalu-
ation and management of mission related training. Monitoring these cvencs will enable che commander
to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of past training and co assess future training needs.
4. BACKGROUND.
a. Over che years, changes In the training environment have acted co make Che training of
units more difficult (e.g., higher costs, greater maintenance requirements, and increased personnel
turnover)
.
and chere has seen la expanding need for unit commanders co consider ilffereoz factors
in arriving at their evaluation of cralning readiness.
b. Sonuniformlry of subjectivity in training iaca reoorced co chis and higher headquarters
has caused an inconsistency in che ability Co assess a unit's capability to accomplish its wartime
mission. This circular :j designed co establish measurement criteria which will assist unit com-
manders in making their assessments and co contribute in some measure CO a consistency of evaluations.
5. DEFINITIONS.
a. Operating Strength. The assigned personnel strength of units, except chose personnel
"In transit,." The term "assigned strength" is synonymous with operating strength for readiness
reporting purposes.
b. Qualified. Per cralning indicators chat address individual crew qualifications, qualified
Is defined as meeting che standards of proficiency outlined 111 AR 350-**, soldier manuaLs, field
manuals, and ARTEP.
c. Authorised/Designated Crews. For Indicators chat address crew weapons qualification/
familiarization, the term designated crews applies when che TOE/MTOE does ,iot identify specific
crev members* In chose Instances, -rcug will b« designated by che unit commander. An authorized
crew is one identified by T0E/MT0E.







d. Mission Essential, for Indlcacors :hac address mission essential items of equipment,
alssion essential Is defined as equipment, which when missing or Inoperable, prevents mission
accomplishment . Determination of mission essentiality Is to be made by the unit commander.
6. DIVISIOH AND SEPARATE BRIGADE TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS.
a. Appendix A Identifies mission related training readiness Indicators and suggests the
minimum frequency with which these events will be accomplished and the standards or quallncation
to t>e maintained routinely.
b. These indicators have been validated through field testing and will assist corananders in
achieving a more objective/ realistic evaluation of unit training status.
c. Training readiness indicators within Appendix A apply to all battalions of divisions,
separate brigades, and armored cavalry regiments (ACR). The iaclosures to Appendix A identify
mission related training readiness indicators by type unit.
7. SEPARATE BATTALIONS. Appendix 3 (to be published).
3. COMMANDER'S TRAINING READINESS CONSIDERATIONS. See Appendix C.
9. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES. Commanders may use this circular to assist in determining their










L. Individual Training Considerations
a. Individual weapons qual/fan
b. NBC proficiency testing
c. Successful completion of the ?CPT
2. Crew/Section Training Considerations
a. 7.62oa machine gun qual/fam
b. .30 cal machine gun qual/fam
c. PM service performed
d. Percent of time assigned mainte-
nance personnel nave 3pent performing
MOS related duties.




90Z of operating strength
90Z of operating strength
902 of operating strength
90S of authorized/designated crews
(gunner and asst gunner)
80Z of authorized/designated crevs
(gunner and asst gunner)
10Z or leas overdue
.Above 60Z of maintenance personnel
performing MOS related duties.
SOZ of operaclng strength













NOTE 1: To be considered fully combat ready, jnits must accomplish the training events outlined ibove
within the frequencies indicated.
NOTE 2: Minimum requirement is to be Interpreted is the percent at operating strength on any given
day which has accomplished the training event specified. Thus today, 90* of the men assigned muiit
have qualified with their individual weapon within the past /ear.










(1) Conduce a night reconnaissance
patrol IAW ARTEP training and evaluation
standards.
(2) Conduct a screening mission CAW
ARTEP training and evaluation standards.
(3) Conduce a route and area
reconnaissance mission LAW ARTEP
training and evaluation standards.
(4) Conduct a rear area security
mission IAW ARTEP training and
evaluation standards.
d. Heavy Mortar (4-2"") Platoon.
Provide Indirect fire support LAW
ARTEP training and evaluation standards.
e. 81mm Mortar Platoon. Provide
Indirect fire support IAW ARTEP crainlng
and evaluation standards.
I. Antitank Platoon. Provide anti-
tank fire support (REALTRAi:i) UW ARTE?
training and evaluation standards.
MINIMUM REQUIREMENT
At iOI operating strength
At 802 operating strength
At 80Z operating strength
At 30Z operating strength
At 30Z operating strength
At 80S operating strength









NOTE 1: This tnclosure Is applicable to Infantry ind mechanized infantry units Training events
will be accomplished in accordance with Level 1, .ARTEP training and evaluation standards in aRTZP
7-15, 7-45, and 71-2 tor AC units and appropriate level tor RC units.
NOTE 2: Live fire events for TOW, ORACON, and REDEYE systems are required only subject co missile
availability. Crevs/teams not ablfl :o conduct a live fire due to missile shortages will qualify/
familiarize on the appropriate simulator/ trainer at the frequency specified.
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1. Crew/Section Training Considerations.
a. 81mm mortar qualification (live






- Live fire exercise
- Gunner's test and pneumatic





is i.j i; conducted
b. 4.2" mortar qualification (live
fire exercise or gunner's test and
pneumatic trainer/SABOT 3ubcallber
device)
c. 90mm recollless rifle/DRACON
qualification/ f ami liar izat Ion (live
fire exercises or subcaliber
device/LET).
All creva
- Live fire exercise
- Gunners test and pneumatic
tralner/SABOT subcaliber device
All crews










d. 106mm recollless rifle/TOU
qualification/ familiarization




- Live fire exercises





e. Mechanized/scout '/ehicle crews
(M113/KLU/M151). Participated in
a -50 caL/M60 machine ;un live fire
•ixerclse LAW AftTEP training, and
evaluation standards.
f. REDEYE Section.
U) REDEYE qualification fit- 76
traefcing head trainer).
All crews





(2) Provide air defense support
LAW ARTE? training and evaluation
•tandards.
Semiannually
g. Ground surveillance Jadar
Section. Provide ground surveillance
support LAW ARTEP training *nd evalu-
ation standards.
Semiannually
2. Platoon Training Considerations.
s. Communications Platoon. Support
tactical operations LAW ARTEP training
and evaluation standards.
At 30Z operating strength Quarterly
b. Rifle Platoons.
(1) Conduct aovement :o contact/
hasty attack LAW ARTEP training and
evaluation standards.
All platoons at 30Z
operating itrength
Semiannual ly
(2) Conduce active defense LAW
ARTEP training and evaluation standards.
(3) Conduce deliberate attack. LAW
ARTEP training and evaluation standards.
All platoons at 30X operating
trength
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(READINESS TO OBJECTIVES AND COST MODELS)
70
1. The Available Time Model is built on the formula:
RAT = AT - CT
(Remaining Available Time = Available Time - Committed Time)
This model was applied to a simulated, current environment
for a mechanized infantry company using actual required
training data and the assumption of three alternative mixes
of available time per week per man, e.g.:
40/20 - 40 hours daylight/20 nighttime
40/12 - 40 hours daylight/12 nighttime
40/ 4-40 hours daylight/ 4 nighttime
The results of the simulation expressed in terms of
71percentages of committed time were as follows:
40/20 mix - 35-51%
40/12 mix - 95-95%
40/ 4 mix -108.06^
The hypothesis of this study is that, depending on the
available time assumptions, the Army could be very close to
not having enough time to insure high combat effectiveness
and of having barely enough time to maintain minimum combat
effectiveness standards at the small unit (company) level.
This relationship is expressed graphically in Figure 13





























Relating this premise to Figure 12, Chapter VII, it could
very well be that the positive relationship of training
objective completion to training readiness will not continue
ad-infinitum and that, at some point, Diminishing Marginal
Returns to Sclae will enter and Marginal Benefits will no
longer exceed or equal Marginal Costs.
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2. A Readiness Perishability and Cost Model helps to further
explain this concept:
"Another readiness/cost concept which has been
of great concern at Department of the Army level
concerns the incremental costs of readiness. Speci-
fically, current readiness becomes a budget issue
that must be balanced against otherprogram needs.
For example, assuming a fixed level of resources,
the Army could reduce the readiness of a fixed force
structure to provide for the research, development and
testing of future equipment and forces, or the
Army could cut its force structure. It appears
that retaining as large a structure as possible,
but at reduced readiness has often been the preferred
alternative. There are two reasons why it may be
218

better to reduce readiness and retain structure.
First, maximum readiness is highly perishable. A
unit can attain maximum readiness and six months
later the trained expertise and peak maintenance
levels have ebbed away unless a continuous intensive
infusion of training and maintenance is maintained.
(See Figure 14). But units can be maintained at a
moderate level much more economically, and brought
to full readiness when needed.
FIGURE 14
READINESS PERISHABILITY AND COST
PERISHABILITY READINESS RATING INCREASING
INCREMENTAL COST





50% Resource Fill —L —
TIME COST
Secondly, the incremental costs of attaining the
highest readiness levels increase sharply as the
maximum levels are approached. For example, for this
reason we see few large scale, full unit exercises
although they are necessary to achieve maximum
readiness. Figure 14 illustrates this relationship;
note the shape of the readiness/dollar curve, illu-
strating this tendency to increased incremental
cost. Other factors contributing to this increased
incremental cost include the wasteful tendency to
continuous cannibalization to maximize the amount
of operational equipment, the expensive and in-
efficient increased parts and supplies inventories
necessary at the unit level, "uploaded" ammunition
tending to environmental deterioration, markedly in-
creased training costs, especially for ammunition and
fuel, and wear and tear on combat equipment by hard
training. As the projected energy crisis deepens,
this aspect of incremental readiness cost will tend
to become an even more significant factor.
219

For these reasons, Department of the Army is
concerned with maintaining some units at a high
level of readiness for instant deployment and others
at a reduced level in order to maximize the use of
limited resources. Maintaining every unit of the
Active Army and Reserve Components at a peak of
combat readiness would absorb financial resources that
are needed to buy tomorrow's readiness, i.e., research,





A. VARIATIONS IN BFTD "STANDARDS" TO ACTUAL
One of the inherent problems of top level decision
makers is to review the vast range and mix of possible
training objectives (the "what to do") and, through judgement
prioritize them. In many cases, this process slips another
level or two and key events (the "how to do") are identified
as well. This process, influenced by the stresses mentioned
in Chapter VII, is proliferated at each major command level.
As brought out in the Available Time Model
,
(Annex I)
resource constrained commanders at the lower end of this
process may end up with very little choice or control over
the training events actually scheduled.
In fact, "to avoid being criticized for not executing
required training events, a unit leader is in fact motivated
to train in as many key events as he has available time to
conduct. This situation leads a unit into conducting
• • 79
minimum level proficiency training."
Thus, in an attempt to insure goal congruence, the
lower level manager/leader is motivated to "sub-optimize",
which may prove ultimately non-congruent. "Achieving the
surrogate (key training events) should not be permitted
to become more important than achieving the objective."
221

The BFTD standards which come out of such an environment
could, then, be poor ones by which to formulate budgets and
evaluate performance.
It is generally felt that the commander is the most
capable of assessing which training events should be
accomplished (how to meet the objectives), as he is in the
best position to consider such humanistic issues such as
the capabilities of subordinates, past-training and
personnel turnover. To illustrate, the following is a
quote from a letter written by the CG, 4th Infantry Division
to the CG, FORSCOM, in response to the August 1977, TMCS
test at Ft. Carson:
"The system (TMCS) represents a major breakthrough
in training management and exceeds ixs original
purpose of identifying training costs. Its simple
but effective way of helping the battalion
commander plan his training program and providing
him an analysis of that program was met
enthusiastically by my commanders. An aspect
which they were particularly fond of was that
the product developed is a commander's program
and reflects their judgement as the best: training
for their unit ,
"
Unfortunately, the training discretion exercised by the
Commander does not enhance the 3FTD concept. To build the
BFTD on non-standard training event input would cause the
BFTD to be either a poor standard for measuring training
objective outcomes or cause the BFTD to be invalid due to
the variance between like units.
222

B. ARTITRARINESS IN BFTD COMPUTATIONS
Similar cost manipulations could be brought about by
the variance in "sufficient personnel and. equipment." If
Unit A has 70$ of his personnel/equipment present for
training while B has 90$, A will again appear more
efficient. A proposal has been made to change the name
and definition of a BFTD to that of a Battalion Day which
is defined as 8 to 24 hours of activity conducted by an
MOTE Battalion. The words "sufficient personnel and
equipment" have been left out of this new definition.
C. PROBLEMS OF COSTING THE BFTD
If indirect training costs were added to the direct
field costs, a lower, more realistic ratio of garrison to
field training costs and a higher cost/BFTD would result.
Provided this cost figure does not exceed a standard ceiling,
it could then be used to justify more training funds; for
example
:
Assuming: Standard cost per BFTD for Unit = $5000
Standard number of annual BFTDs = 75
Old Garrison/ New Garrison/
Training; Cost Ratio Training; Cost Ratio
75/25 5W50
Total One
Day Costs: $10,000 $10,000
Garrison Costs: -7, 500 - 5,000




Additionally, certain training events, such as
Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises, Equipment
Serviceability Criteria and Motor Stables which could be
construed as garrison training, involve field training
elements of expense, such as diesel and MOGAS, spare
parts, and equipment. In order for TMCS to account for
these resources they must be entered as field/range training
or the programs must be adapted to recognize them.
The Battalion Day proposal will help in these areas
by not constraining the resources used (to include time) to
those used strictly to support mission training. Instead,
resources used during "periods of activity" will have to be
accounted for.
For example, garrison guard duty, a mandatory requirement,
requires certain vehicle and fuel resources, the costs of
which TMCS could compute. This would eliminate any un-
necessary manual computations while utilizing mostly existing
technology.
The problem cf manually costing such garrison costs
as civilian pay, TDY, transportation, etc. was addressed in
Chapter VII. Other costs not associated with BFTDs such as
Field Training Transportation (using non-organic equipment),
special costs, Missle Test Firing Costs, etc. seem reasonable
in definition, scope and ability to be isolated. In those
cases where field training cost factors are present in




D. BUDGETING AND EVALUATING WITH THE BFTD
As reflected in Schedule 50b (Issue Detail) (see Annex
F for example) costed BFTDs are related to OMA P2 mission
issue areas at the Enhanced and Basic (Financial Levels).
The total BFTDs shown at the Basic Level of Schedule 50b
are intended to agree with the Funded BFTDs shown in column 2
of Schedule 40 (Quantification Data - P2 Mission) (see Annex
K for example). Other criteria for the completion of these
81
schedules are:
Training to support existing unit readiness
status/condition or REDCON level should be funded
within the incremented level to preclude impacts
on unit REDCON.
Total dollars displayed in Schedule 40 will
equal the total P2 mission dollars contained in
the Basic (Financial Level, column of schedule
50a (Issue Overview) (see Annex K for example).
Total BFTD requirements will be reflected by
funded and unfunded BFTD. Funded BFTD are those
which can be accomplished within the funds pro-
vided in the budget guidance and command priorities.
Unfunded BFTD are those which cannot be accomplished
due to the lack of P2 mission resources. The
total of funded and unfunded BFTD should equal
the total BFTD requirement for a type unit. Un-
funded BFTD is the only item shown on Schedule 40
that is not at the Basic Financed Level.
As it turned out, using actual FY 79 schedules submitted
by three F0RSC0M units, BFTDs could not be crosswalked from
summary data on the Schedule 40 ' s to issue data on the
Schedule 50' s. Indications from talks with personnel in
the Program and Budget Office, ADC0PS, Dept. of the Army
were that insufficient data was provided from reporting
MAC0MS to do this at their levels as well.
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In effect this means that it was difficult if not impossible
to clearly see the impacts of training program funding alter-
natives on issues. If this cannot be done, then the usefulness
of BFTD costs/benefits ratio is also open to serious question.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Adopt the Battalion Activity Day (BAD) as a replace-
ment for the BFTD in both name and definition but change the
computation to that under the column marked new in Table 12.
While the BAD days computation will be more difficult,
the disparity between the marginal hours and marginal days
reported is not as great when viewed in terms of the
traditional 24 hour day. Thus, these computations are felt
to be less subject to inflation by manipulation. Spot or
edit checks of original program inputs to the training
actually conducted should also be made.
2. The Battalion Activity Day should be aggregated from
all time resources needed, including those devoted to garri-
son training and duties. TMCS should be adopted to
recognize them, weigh them against the total time constraint
when considering what training can be conducted and print
out results in terms of field training, range training,
garrison training and garrison duties.
3. Where semi -variable elements of expense (indirect
training) are funded from P2 mission dollars and TMCS cost
factors exist for them, TMCS should be modified to compute
226

such cost. These costs should be printed out corresponding
to one of the above mentioned categories (garrison training,
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ANNEX K (SCHEDULE 40 - OMA - QUANTIFICATION OF
TRAINING AND PROGRAM 2 MISSION DOLLARS)
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(2) Preparation Instructions .
(a) Column 1 - Subordinate Units.
1 Units at Inclosure IX will be reported on Schedule 40 and used to
compute this column. Issues such as JOTC, environmental training, off-
post training, ALICE, etc., will not be used. Funds associated with
that type of issue will be distributed to units.
2_ Major elements such as separate brigades/groups/regiments , schools
and other special activities will be separately identified by unit
designation. All nondivisional/separate brigade/regiment units will be
listed individually.
3 List, directly under their parent headquarters, all subordinate
units down to and including MTOE battalions, or their equivalents, and
TDA activities or agencies which are funded by P2 Mission dollars. Costs
will not be rolled up above battalion level except as permitted below.
£ Funds for units and activities which do not meet the criteria





5 Headquarters companies tor brigade size uiuts and higher echelons
will
_
be displayed separately. Battalion headquarters costs will be
Included in the battalion totals.
6 Similar types of battalion size units may be aggregated under named
divi7ion, separate brigade, regiment or group. The number of units in
the aggregation will be denoted in parentheses after the type unit.
7 All Combat Supuort battalion size units other than field and air
defense artillery, aviation, signal and engineer units may be aggregated
into a category called other combat support under the division, separate
brigade, regiment or group they support. The number of such units should
be displayed as described in subparagraph (2) (a)3_ above (See AR 310-2S).
8 All combat service support units will be identified and aggregated
functionally (e.g., finance, adjutant general, transportation, oronance
quartermaster, medical), under the division, separate brigade, regiment
or group they support. The number of such units should be displayed as
described in subparagraph (2) (a)6 above, (See Aft 310- 2S) .
(b) Column 2 - Battalion Field Training Days (BFTD) Data concerning
BFTD' s to be entered in Column 2 will be reported for the following units
ana developed as follows:
2_ Headquarters at levels above battalion.










Field Artillery - by type missile system or caliber, further
identified as self propelled or towed.
Air Defense Artillery - by NIKE, HAWK, or Chapparral/Vulcan.
Engineer - Combat and Combat Heavy will be separately identified.
S L gna
1
Other Combat Support (List individually)
Combat Service Support (Categorized by function)
(NOTE: Nondivisional/separate brigade/regiment units will be
listed individually)
3 Units which perform school support missions will be separately
identified but listed with their appropriate parent organization.







a BFTD are computed for aviation units based on the hours committed
to support of another unit which is conducting field training. Aircraft
need not log eight flying hours to count a whole field training day so
long as the unit (or element thereof) is committed for eight hours to a
unit performing field training.
b BFTD are also computed for aviation units when they perform
field training as a separate unit (not support of another unit). Air-
craft need not log eight flying hours in this instance to count a com-
plete training day so long as the unit (or element thereof) conducts
eight hours of field training.
c Costs associated with other than BFTD, to include the costs
associated with individual proficiency flying, will be considered as
Garrison Operations and Training or Operational Requirements costs
(depending on the unit mission) and no BFTD will be associated with
those costs.
d In order to track the flying hours shown in other sections of the
COBE~into Schedule 40 the number of aircraft flying hours and dollars
associated with the flying hour program will be shown in parentheses
behind the dollars associated with aviation units (to include those
aggregated into headquarters units) i.i columns 3 through 10 of Schedule
40. The total of aircraft flying hours and flying hour dollars shown in
column 10 will agree with the total of P2M Schedule SO concerned with
flying hours and with the flying hour schedule.
(c) Column 3 - Garrison Operations and Training Cost*.
1 Garrison operations and training costs are defined as the P2M
costs incurred by units, which are not concurrently performing on-site
24-hour operations, to exist every day of the year in a garrison
environment (billeting, administrative and logistical area)
. Garrison
costs will continue to be incurred while a unit is away from garrison
and should be viewed as the cost of ownership of having the unit in the
force structure while conducting no field training. A separation of
Carrison and Field Training cost is at Table 40-1.
2 The total resources for which this definition applies will be
entered in column 3 opposite the type unit listed in column 1. If units
are aggregated by type, the total of required resources for all units
contained in the aggregation will be listed. Garrison operations and
training costs equate to fixed costs as defined at Table 40-1.-
(d) Column 4 - Field Training Transportation.
1_ Field Training Transportation is defined as the cost of moving a






2 The purpose of this column is to identify the differing costs of
transporting units to training areas and to preclude them from distorting
the costs of training for similar type units.
3 An example of the type costs displayed in this column is the air
transport charge to move a FORSCOM unit to Ft Irwin.
4 Costs charged to JCS exercise funds will not be shown in this
column.
5 Costs incurred by transportation units in the performance of
thci7 mission will not be displayed in this column.
6 Transportation associated with moving a unit to a missile firing
test will be displayed in column 8.
7 BFTD are not associated with costs in this column.
(e) Column 5 - rield Training,. Cflfit*.
1 Field training costs are defined as the incremental costs of con-
ducting combat/combat support/combat service support field training for
units to which the definition of BFTD in subparagraph (2Hb) applies.
2 The field training costs as defined in paragraph 1 above will be
entered in column 5 opposite the type unit listed in column 1. If units
are aggregated bv type, the sum total of required resources for all units
contained in the aggregation will be listed.
(f) Column 6 - Operational Requirement Casi*.
1 Operational requirement costs are defined as those P2M costs
generated by units performing 24-hour, operationally required missions
(e.g., NISJ: batteries).
2_ The total P2M resources required for units for which this defini-
tion applies will be entered in column 6 opposite the type unit listed in
column 1. If units are aggregated by typo, the sum total of required
resources for all units contained in the aggregation will be shown.
3^ Support missions such as school support and peacetime support of
the Army are not considered operational in nature for this schedule and
will not be included in this column.
4_ BFTD are not associated with costs shown in this column.





1 Special costs arc defined as unique commodities or activities
that~have an identifiable l'2M miit cost, the expenditure tor which will
not he continuous (e.g., force structure activation one-time costs,
those commodities or activities which will he included in some other
appropriate column(s) after initial issue expenditure.)
2 The total resources required for units for which this definition
applies will be entered in column 7 opposite the type unit listed in
column t. If units are aggregated by type, the sum total of required
resources for all units contained in the aggregation will be shown.
3 BFTD are not associated with costs shown in this column,
(h) Column 8 - Missile Test Firing Costs.
1 Missile test firing costs are defined as the P2M costs associated
with~Air Defense or Field Artillery organizations performing a missile
test firing of their primary weapon system required by the JCS, a unified
command, NATO, liQDA or MACOM. REDEYE and anti-armor missile systems are
specifically excluded from this category.
2 The total P2M resources required for units for which this defini-
tion applies will be entered in column 3 opposite the type unit listed in
column 1. If units are aggregated by type, the sum total of required
resources for all units contained in the aggregation will be shown.
i_ BFTU are not associated with costs shown in this column.
(i) Column 9 - JCS Exercises Costs will be developed by this 1IQ.
Installations will not fill in this column.
(j) Column 10 - Total Costs.
1_ Column 10 contains the total P2M resources required by the type
unit listed in column 1 and is the sua of columns 5 through 9.
2 All P2M resource requirements must appear in one or more of the
applicable costs columns and the total of. all. column 10 costs for all
types of units in the command must be equal to the total P2M funding level
shown in the Basic Level, Command COBE submission.*
(3) Reporting at Incremented Levels (Above and Below 3asic Level).
(a) Since Schedule 40 is being prepared at only Basi c leve l funding.
the impact of reduced funding and the benefits accruing from increased
funding must be expressed and prioritized.
(b) .As part of the overall COBE submission, FORSCOM commands will be
preparing a Schedule 50 in which issues will be described and the impact





will provide a description of the training which will be gained or lost
and a projection of the impacts on training.
(c) It is reeogni;ed that the dollar/BFTD ratio for certain similar
units may vary widely for valid reasons such as participation in a major
test (e.g., Division Restructuring Study), extraordinarily high trans-
portation costs associated with moving to a training area, or similar
reasons. Commands are encouraged to place footnotes on Schedule 40 to
explain the cause of apparent aberations in unit BFTD or dollar require-
ments or accomplishments.
(4) Reporting Impacts on Training Proficiency . (See Inclosure XI)
(5) POC at HQ F0RSC0M are:
(a) Training (BFTD), LTC Danner, AUTOVON 588-3011.
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All except for JCS





Only off post. JCS
shown in JCS columns
All (except show as a
memo on Schedule 40)
All except JCS
All except JCS
All except JCS 1/
All except JCS 1/
All
1/ POL and Spare Parts cost for Combat Service Support units will




ANNEX L (RELATING READINESS REPORTING/BFTDs TO ZBB)
ANNEX I
-(RELATING READINESS REPORSING/BFTDs to ZBB )
LNCLOSURli XI
(NSTItUCTIONS I'OR USU OK MATRIX OH TRAINING TASKS/UVENTS
L. Training programs must be fully justified, to include all training
that is funded and training which must be eliminated due to lack of funds.
At this point in the instructions, Schedules 50a, b and c should be
familiar to the trainers and operators at installations and division
level. Schedule 50b shows a breakout by increments of the Installation
Training Costs. Schedule 50c provides an opportunity to express the
impact or "level of pain" starting with the decremented level and
progressing through each increment. (See example below)
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Annex L (cont . )
J. Historical ly, MACUMs have neglected CO provide adequate costs or
explanations and justifications for training programs. The traditional •
impact statement such as - "If Fort Apache doesn't receive the entire
funds for training as requested, readiness will be impaired, " etc.,
will not be sufficient in these days of constrained budgets. Impacts
have to be more specific, forceful, and convincing. FORSCOM Action
Officers must be able to determine and explain what training is being
conducted at the installation. Accordingly, installations must pre-
pare each COBE Issue so that FORSCOM and L)A will fully understand what
can and cannot be accomplished with the funds at each incremented level
as well as within the decremented level. Of special concern are those
training activities funded out of the decremented level which are not
necessarily a separate Issue topic. It is imperative that the on-po3t
and off-post training Issues pick up and identify programs which com-
pete for the training dollar (ARTLPs, individual training events, school
support, ROTC summer camp, etc.).
3. Note that the examples in the next paragraph outline impacts in
terms of training proficiency that are beyond unit readiness [REDCONs)
as defined in AR 220-1. Unit readiness is that essential personnel/
equipment fill, equipment serviceability and unit training to achieve
ALO and move to the gate of the installation. Training to support unit
readiness (AR 220-1) should be funded within the decremented level to
preclude impacts on unit REDCON. •
4. Although each installation will have to create its own impact state-
ments, a list of example "levels of pain" is provided, which can be
massaged and expanded:
a. At (the decremented level; Increment * 1 ; Increment *4, etc.)
Fort Apache units will be capable, at best, of sustaining individual
proficiency to Soldier's Manual standards. Unit operations and unit
leadership training is sorely lacking. Units will be REDCON
.
Only % BFTD requirements are funded.
b. At (the decremented level; Increment "1; Increment *4, etc.)
Fort Apache units will be capable, at best, of sustaining individual
proficiency and up to squad level proficiency in ARTEP tasks. Larger
unit training and platoon and company leadership training is lacking.
Only % of the required BFTDs are being funded. Units will be
limited to REDCON
.
c. At (the decremented level; Increment <1; Increment "4, etc.)
Fort Apache units are individually trained and unit trained to \RTEP
standards up through company level. There is no proven ability to
operate in battalion and larger units. Only % of required BFTDs





J. At (the decremented level; Increment » i . Increment 04, etc.)
I'OVt Apache units are tr.uneJ u|> to battalion level and maintain Soldier's
Manual and ARTE!' proficiency. Combined Arms Training has been conducted
and Combat Support and Combat Service Support operations have been
included. As far as personnel, logistics and training are concerned,
AR 220-1 standards can be met. However, Fort Apache cannot and has not
conducted deployment training (loading, off load, etc.) at this level of
funding; nor have brigade and higher level exercises been conducted.
Basically, Port Apache is qualified to operate battaiion sue units on
the installation. It docs not possess a proven capability to move out
of the garrison and implement contingency plans. The situation is viewed
as being on the threshold of training proficiency but not quite there due
to funds shortfall. BFTDs are lequired to reach this level of
training. REDCQN 1 can be maintained but the unit has not trained in
deployment and environments similar to its intended area of employment
on contingencies.
e. At (the decremented level; Increment *1; Increment »4, etc.)
battalions and brigades have demonstrated the capability to conduct
combined arms exercises at home station. (Although no off-post exercises
have been conducted, pre-development training (load-out etc.) may have
been conducted. If so, the commander's judgment may be required to
determine his subjective level of training proficiency.)
f. At (the decremented level; Increment *1; Increment *4; etc.)
Fort Apache will be able to develop the capability to alert, assemble,
deploy, and employ its brigades to conduct operations on unfamiliar
terrain in an off-post area. Proficiency at brigade level and below can
be sustained. BFTDs are required to reach this level of proficiency.
g. At (the decremented level; Increment *1; Increment »4; etc.)
Fort Apache unit will possess the capability to operate in all types of
environments, anywhere in the world. It can react to its primary and
alternate contingency plans. The division possesses the proficiency to
participate in joint operations and interoperability training. All units
have conducted or demonstrated capabilities in Emergency Deployment
Readiness Exercises (EDREs) and FTXs away from home station. Funding
levels below this amount will prevent (one or more) units from being
totally ready. (This statement would properly support a funded level




provides for the funding to send the (one)
brigade to the NTC. This training will provide deployment training,
experience in POMCUS type procedures, operations in unfamiliar terrain, and
experience in desert operations. NTC training supports this unit's pri-
mary and secondary contingency missions. Without this training, one-third
of the division (the brigade) will not .have demonstrated a capability to




I.. hi general, tin- assumption lb that .ill battalions arc .it leasi .it a
level of training proficiency where they are conducting battalion exer-
cises on-post which only makes tliera partially ready. Off-post training
(deployment and employment on unfamiliar terrain) will be required to
refine their capability to perform their combat mission. Special training
will further refine and sharpen deployment and employment readiness.
Since much of the readiness training can be conducted on post, and on-post
training is critical to individual and unit bkill development, it is
logical that the decrement level should not cut too deeply into the base
(by choice). Accordingly, it is expected most installations will elimi-
nate the more advanced training activities (special trainingj in reaching
a decremented level and then identify the restoration of the cut through
a series of increments.
b. Instructions for use of Table X I - 1 , a matrix of Training Tasks/Events:
a. The training matrix in Table X I - 1 was developed from the Commander's
"Training Guidelines" letter, FCR 350-X, FCR 52S-2 and Chapter 4 of the
COBU instructions, to provide a representative list of training tasks for
use in budget preparation. The list of training tasks supports the Army's
training philosophy that battalion level on-post training (ARTEP) pro-
ficiency has priority for resources and is the basis upon which other
training is built.
b. Execution of training is truly not incremental as the list sug-
gests, but if required to set a priority between ARTEP level training and
special training (NWTC, JOTC, etc) we would train first to obtain profi-
ciency at battalion. After a unit is fully trained at battalion level,
more sophisticated training is necessary to totally prepare the unit for
deployment and operations in a variety of terrain and climatic conditions.
Normally, this specialised training (Ft Drum, Ft Irwin, etc.) is geared to
prepare units for contingency missions and to demonstrate capabilities to
operate at the combined/ joint levels (JCS Exercises to include REFORGER)
.
The list of training tasks suggests a relative order for building (or
decrementing) a training program.
c. The list is not intended to bo directive. It is realized that
the commander is the training manager and his evaluation of his state of
training, to include training requirements, will prevail. The list is a
guide for decrementing/enhancing training programs, is a checklist of
training programs/activities available to the commanders (schedules and
funds permitting), and provides a framework upon which impacts on training
proficiency can be explained in consistent terms from battalion to instal-
lation.
d. A separate matrix must be completed by each installation having
P2 Mission funds for IY 79 and FY 80. Completed training matrices (FY 79
and 80) will be submitted to UQ F0RSC0M (ATTN: AFOP-PO) in five (5)
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Appendix 1 to Annex L
(Additional Comments/Studies of Relating Readiness
Reporting/BFTDs to ZBB
)
A. GENERAL COMMENT - READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM
While the output measurement for training portions of
the Unit Status Report are subjectively determined (based
on the commander's judgement and therefore qualitative in-
dicators of effectiveness/readiness) ; the equipment on
hand, equipment status and personnel readiness data are
based on both quantitative and qualitative factors. As
brought out in a recent study ' this system has weaknesses
but for purposes of analysis, the authors will assume that
the current system is not all inherently bad:
"Performance has both a quantity and quality
dimension. .. the total absence of quality measures
in management control systems may lead to a
detrimented emphasis on quantity. "83
"A judgement made by a qualified person is usually
a better measure of the quality of performance than
any objective measure because humans incorporate
in their judgement the effect of circumstances
and nuances of performance that no set of
objectives measures can take into account. 34
B. OTHER STUDY RESULTS
1. A high level working conference, convened in 1978,
had this to say about relating costs, BFTDs and the readiness
no
system: '
"Additional BFTD will be required to gain and
sustain proficiency in operations above the
battalion level, deployablity, employability on
241

unfamiliar terrain, and in operations with
services or nations. It should be noted, however,
that these figures cannot be derived with the
precision of straight arithmetic. Training away
from home station, for example, may include
many of the activities which would be performed
at home station if facilities were available.
By the same token, participation in a JCS
exercise may automatically satisfy require-
ments for deployability training and division
level operations.
The current definition of training readiness is
incomplete. It does not consistently reflect the
training at echelons above the battalion, on
unfamiliar terrain, or in joint and combined
environments which is necessary for a unit to
reach its goal of peacetime readiness. These
are the same type activities which have been
most difficult to justify and defend in the
budget process."
Subsequently they proposed greatly expanding the REDCON
ratings and relating them to specific echelons of training
and percent of basic BFTD requirements as shown at Appendix 2.
2. Readiness costing using multiple regression analysis
to develop Cost Estimating Relationships (CER) which relate
OMA P2 mission costs of Army Divisions to readiness has also
been studied. D A CER was derived in terms of five explanatory
variables; personnel strength, personnel turnover, level of
training, equipment servicability and theatre of operations.
The results indicated that the CER was statistically
significant and could be used in estimating OMA mission
36funds required to meet specific readiness requirements.
Limitations of the CER included being restricted to division
size units and an inability to estimate incremental costs.
2^2

Although concluding that the technique itself was
valid, futrue development of a more comprehensive model
(one which included all OMA costs associated with readiness
and a comprehensive review of the readiness definitions,
criteria and reporting system) was recommended.
3. Using data pertaining to recruit and other school
type training, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has
also developed OMA CERS (using similar correlation/regression




APPENDIX 2 (METHODOLOGY FOR EXPANDING
REDCON LEVELS) TO ANNEX L
!
Appendix 2 (Methodology for Expanding- RSDCOf,' Levels) to Annex L
Projected Division and Separate Brigade/Regimenc
. Training Readiness Levels
R.-14: Subordinate units will be capable of sustaining individual proficiency
to Soldier's Manual standards. At least 107., but less than 307., of basic
BFTD requirements for ail organic units can be funded.
R-13: Subordinate units will be capable of sustaining individual proficiency
and up to squad/section/crew proficiency in ARTEP tasks. At least 307., but
less than 507., of basic BFTD requirements for all organic units can be funded.
R-12: Subordinate units will be capable of sustaining individual proficiency
and up to platoon proficiency in ARTE? tasks. At least 50%, but less than
707., of basic BFTD requirements for all organic units can be funded.
R-ll: Subordinate units will be capable of sustaining individual proficiency
and. up to company-, prof iciency in ARTE? tasks. At least 707., but not all,
basi'" 3FTD requirements for organic units can be funded.
R-10: Subordinate units will be capable of sustaining individual proficiency
to Soldier's Manual standards. Collective proficiency in ARTEP tasks will
be sustained at battalion level and below. Combined arms training will be
conducted, but-training with appropriate combat support and combat service
support elements will be limited. (Note: All basic 3FTD requirements for
organic units can be- funded. Attainment of this level is a prerequisite
for all following R- levels.)
R-9: Battalions and separate companies will be capable of conducting com-
bined arms training with appropriate support elements at home station, but
brigade and higher level exercises will not be possible. (Note: See R-7,
below, if facilities prevent battalion level training at home station.)
R-8: Capability to provide effective command and control and to sustain
itself in field operations at home station will be demonstrated by all
brigades of the division or by the separate brigade/regiment. (Note: R-S,
below, if facilities prevent brigade level training at home station.)
R-7: Capabilities to deploy and conduct operations on unfamiliar terrain
away from home station will be demonstrated by at least one battalion of
the division or separate brigade/regiment. (Note: Applies to all battalions
if facilities prevent battalion level training at home station.)
R-6: Capabilities to deploy and conduct operations on unfamiliar terrain
away from home station will be demonstrated by az least one brigade of the
division or by the separate brigade/regiment. (Notei Applies to all
2hk

Appendix 2 to Annex L (cont.)
brigades of the division if facilities prevent brigade level training at
ho.T.e station.)
R-i: Proficiency at brigade level and below can be sustained. The division-
will also be capable of conducting a division level e.xercise at heme station
to demonstrate its capabilities for providing effective command and control
and for self -sus tainnent in a field environment. (Note: This level does
not apply to separate brigades/regiments.)
P.-A: Proficiency at brigade level and below can be sustained. The division
will also be capable of deploying and conducting a division level exercise
etiay from home station to demonstrate its capabilities for providing effec-
tive command and control and for self-sus tainment in a field environment on
unfamiliar terrain. (Note: This level does not apply co separate brigades/
regiments.)
R-3: Division or separate brigade/regiment proficiency can be sustained.
Proficiency in joint operations and interoperability will be demonstrated by
at 1-east one battalion of the division or separate brigade/regi.-nent.
R-2: Division or separate brigade/regiment proficiency can be sustained.
Proficiency in joint operations and interoperability will be demonstrated
by at least one brigade of the division or by the separate brigade/regiment.
R-l: Division proficiency can be sustained, to include participation in
joint operations and interoperability training. (Note: This level does not
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A. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS MODELS
The U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Training
Center, Ft. Ord, a TRADOC unit, began an Organizational
Effectiveness (OE) Training Program in July 1975; since then
132 Organizational Effectiveness Training Officers (OESDs)
have been graduated from this program and are now assigned
00
to 58 Army installations worldwide. Phase IV of the
overall program is now ongoing and encompasses determining
the OE effort necessary in a particular organization to
assist the commander in changing the organization to increase
89
readiness and combat effectiveness.
Their methodology calls for a comprehensive sampling
of OE practice at various points in time and a computation
of an information base using a logic based computer model
which has, as its interactive components, the existing
organizational climate, the OE process and the OESO
Inputs to this model include policies, guidance, con-
cepts and doctrine with outputs being such historical opera-
tional measures as re-enlistment rates and number of soldiers
absent without offical leave. Although the later measures
are still in the development stage, they are looking at
such criteria as maximizing uses of resources, goal
accomplishment and problem solving. Many of these effective
2^-7

output criteria are related to the training environment
variables previously discribed and may someday be backwardly
linked to budget inputs and resource management decisions.
B. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE - REALTRAIN MODEL
The U.S. Army research Institute for the Behavioral
and Social Sciences (ARI) have also done extensive work in
the realm of developing measures of effectiveness. Perhaps
the most significant contribution has been the development,
testing and validation (with help from various TRADOC
agencies) of REALTRAIN, an engagement simulation training
system for squad thru battalion-sized units.
REALTRAIN has provided small unit commanders with the
capability to conduct two-sided, free-play tactical exercises
with credible casualty assessment, weapon signature effects
90
and a high degree of tactical realism. Although REALTRAIN
is a performance-oriented training method, it provides
quantitative validity to many of the evaluation criteria
prescribed in the Army Training and Evaluation Programs
(ARTEPS)
.
C. ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAMS (ARTEP)
"The ARTEP is a training and evaluation program
that provides critical combat training objectives
to units. It is a revoluntionary change in
training philosophy that integrates both training
and evaluation, with a focus on what should be




ARTEPS have or will be written for each type of battalion
and unit and some manuever headquarters for various readiness
levels. Utilized properly, ARTEPS could help to reduce the
problems associated with key event overloads by outlining
key training objectives (in terms of tasks, conditions and
standards) for unit trainers.
D. MULTIPLE INTEGRATED LASER ENGAGEMENT SYSTEM (MILES)
In an effort to reduce the need for numerous controllers,
add further realism and even more accurate casualty assess-
ment, the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES)
is a further advance in technology. MILES is due to be
tested at Ft. Polk, La., during FY 80 evaluating a Battalion
Task Force under the ARTEP concept. It will be integrated
with certain battle simulation techniques such as the
CATTS (Combined Armed Tactical Training Simulator) and
criterion measures will be fully validated.
E. NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER (NTC)
Long range plans (FY 81-84) call for the establishment
of a National Training Center (NTC). Combat battalions will
be rotated thru the NTC on a 12-18 month interval for
evaluation under the most realistic battle enviomment
possible. MILES assessment techniques and other instrumenta-
tion transparent to the players would be used to objectively
evaluate each unit based on expanded ARTEP criterion. This
249

evaluation would provide the ultimate feedback measure of
combat readiness/training effectiveness short of actual
warfare. Once the NTC begins operations, unit results can
then be compared to the unit's training program/costs/budget/
BFTDs, etc. in the hopes of statistically establishing
causal relationships between well trained units and the
resources consumed. As mentioned in Chapter VII, this
concept will involve the last three models mentioned,
REALTRAIN, ARTEP , and MILES and could represent a significant
breakthrough in program evaluation/relating readiness to
cost
.
F. HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (HumRRO)
Other studies of effectiveness have been conducted by
civilian organizations under contract to ARI and other
government agencies. One such study conducted by a member
of the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO)
92
concluded: y
"Competence represents capability of the organi-
zation and is different from the sum of individual
capabilities. Process performance involves organi-
zational responses and the quality of any single
response event is determined by the entire network
of antecedent relationships and responses. This
suggests that Organizational Competence can best
be improved by efforts that focus upon developing
the organization as a system, that is team training
of all key personnel together, rather than skill
development with isolated individuals.
The processes that occur within organizations
have been neglected when, in fact, they appear to
be critical determinants of effectiveness. The con-
ceputal framework embodied in Organizational
250

Competence appears to provide one production
means for overcoming this limitation in both
research and application."
Given the time and the resource constrained training
environment previously described, this study suggests that
high level planners/goal setters should look at the possibility
of emphasis on more unit level and less individual level
required training for operational units. While it is true
that collective multiple-objective training is currently
emphasized as a way of doing both, the stresses on training
are also increased. Some tradeoff of individual to system
type training is suggested. This study could impact on the
budget process by influencing the make-up of the unconstrain-
ed training programs.
G. GENERAL RESEARCH CORPORATION
Another report, by the General Research Corporation
presented a methodology for developing objective training
status criteria/performance standards as measures of
training proficiency ... these standards were actually derived
for tank battalions and specified so thax resource require-
91
ments associated with each could be developed. J ARTEPS
(as augmented by mission analysis), Unit Status Report
procedures, and the building block approach were analyzed




H. ARMY TRAINING STUDY (ARTS)
Although the 1977-78, TRADOC formulated ARTS study
results were being briefed to the Army Chief of Staff at
the time of this writing and were not available for release,
the basic concepts behind the study are worthy of mention.
A contributing factor to the ART'S results not being released
was a recent leak of information to the media which
described the Army to be in a very poor state of training
(see Appendix I).
Using magnitude estimation scaling techniques with a
large world-wide survey of carefully selected and experienced
leaders, general agreement was found on what training is
required to meet both individual and collective competence
in units. ARTS then developed a Battalion Training Model
(BTM) which simulates the battalion training environment and
demonstrates where training readiness is most sensitive to
small changes in the environment. This model currently
lacks a current costing methodology. It would appear that a
system combining these features with both TMCS and the feed-
back from the NTC assessment and/or current ARTEP evaluations
could overcome the shortcomings of each when viewed separately,
ARTS is being further sophisticated by using a relatively
new goal programming: process whereby multiple, incommensurate
and sometimes conflicting goals/objectives are formulated
into the objective functions. Stacked LP programs are then
run in an attempt to minimize the deviations from those goals
based on a priority factor assigned to each goal.
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"One of the most appealing characteristics of
goal programming is that the model is not limited
by the necessity for an accurate quantification of
the relationship among the variables in cardinal
numbers. Instead, management need establish only
upper or lower limits for their goals and rank:
them in an ordinal sequence. This is appealing
because it is often infeasible to obtain accurate
information on the cost or value of a goal. "9^
Hopefully, this technique will help to reduce the
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Army Times OCTOBER 1 6. 197a 1
' An Independent Newspaper Serving Army People
STUDY CITES SHORTCOMINGS
Training Seen a Shambles
By JAY FINEGAN
Timas Stall Writo*
WASHINGTON — A massive new Armv study ha:,
found thai soldier training, particularly in the com-
bat arms, is in serious disarray.
The studv, obtained by Army Times, says many
troops have trouble learning how to operate the
increasingly complicated weapons in the U.S. arse-
nal.
It also says many soldiers forget how to do com-
plex skills "virtually immediately" after learning
them.
"I think the study points out that one of the critical
proble-is of low-quality personnel is their lack of
ability w retain training," said Rep. Robin Beard ( R-
Tenn.), a member of the House Armed Services
Committee who has seen the report.
"But the study is more an attack on the quality of
training," Beard told Army Times. "As we're getting
lower and lower mental category people, training
should be exceptional, but we're going in the opposite
direction. By the Army's own study, the training is
unacceptable. The poor quality of troops will cause
nightmares for combat readiness."
After this report. Beard said, the Army "better be
prepared to lay it on the line" with Congress i about
the quality of today's Army). "There'll be no more
playing games," he said.
The Army officer who did the study discovered
that soldiers in observed units were more than three
times as likely to have medical problems on training
days than on nontraining days and four times as
(See TRAINERS, Page 21)
Trainers, Sf^denfs Fcuzid
m&lDiQ to m^am Lessors
(Continued From Page 1)
likely to have personal needs that take them away
from training.
Poor training is evident, the study says. Results of
the first Skill Qualification Test for infantrymen
were "dismal." The SQT required arming and firing
Claymore mines, light antitank weapons and M-60
maehineguns, alung with three other routine infantry
tasks.
Only io percent of the troops in the test scored 60 or
better — the minimum score for verifying compe-
tence. N'ot one soldier scored above NO — the cutoff
score for promotion qualification.
"In spile of the poor scoring on the test, 95 percent
of the soldiers said the test was fair and valid," the
study says.
Supervisors are also reported unable to often
retain training. At Ford Ord. Calif., the study team
found that many N'COs could not perform some of the
tasks they were required to leach their men. "Dis-
cussions with battalion commanders both in Europe
and in the U.^. indicate that this is not an unusual
situation," the report says
The study was not optimistic about the future.
"Recruiting will lie come more difficult, weapons
will become more complex, resources will become
more constrained, and the Army's training mission
cither will remain basically unchanged or will be-
come more difficult," it says.
It notes the rising problem of matching highly
technical weapons — designed by some of the na-
tion's brightest engineers and scientists — with
ordinary soldiers — whose menial ability is usually
average or below.awagc.
"How do we train these soldiers in the sophisticat-
ed skills required lo operate technically advanced
equipment?" the study asks. "Whether the training
problems of today's Army can be solved remains to
be seen."
Nonetheless, today's volunteer force has a crucial
mission, the report says. Even though t his is peace-
time, the Army must be ready for immediate in-
volvement in a furious first battle of the next war,
which could in fact turn out to be tiie last battle as
well."
The study says that 'he Army has no way of ex-
plaining how its training budget relates to readiness.
Such a failure, il *ays. leaves the Army vulnerable to
budget cuts when Congress looks for places to save
money.
Among the more serious charges irf the report is
that readiness evaluations are often "inflated" or
manipulated by commanders ^ager to build better
military records than their competitors. This situa-
tion is "1 perfect example of a self-inflicted wound
by the Army," the study says
Phony readiness reports make it impossible for the
Army's leaders to know Ihc force's capabilities, say
Pentagon observers. No one knows the extent of this
problem.
The siudy is now being staffed at the Training and
Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va. An Army
spokesman said it will undergo further staffing at
Department of the Army before Ihe Army Chief of
Staff is briefed on it in December.
"If it's approved, it will be released," the spokes-





ARMY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE/COBE DEFINITIONS,
AND TERMINOLOGY
ALLOCATION . An allocation is an authorization issued by the
Comptroller of the Army to operating agencies for purposes
of financing operations at subordinate echelons by means of
suballocation or allotment.
APPROPRIATION . An authorization by an act of Congress to
incur obligations for specified purposes and to make subse-
quent payments thereof out of the Treasury of the United
States. Appropriations are classified as being annual,
multiple-year, or no-year, depending on the period of time
that is available for obligation purposes.
THE ARMY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE (AMS) . The official frame-
work for interrelating programming, budgeting, accounting,
and manpower control through a standard classification of
Army activities and functions. Through this means, the AMS
satisifes the requirements of PL 3^-863 which directs actions
to achieve:
1. "Consistency in accounting and budget classifications,
2. Synchronization between these classifications and
organizational structure,
3. Support of budget justification by information on
performance and program costs."
BUDGET. A planned program for a fiscal period in terms of
estimated costs, obligations, and expenditures.
BUDGET AND MANPOWER GUIDANCE (BMG) . A document issued by a
higher headquarters to its subordinate commands to provide
information and guidance pertaining to missions, resources
(manpower, material, and funds for a specific fiscal year)
,
objectives, policies, limitations and related matters upon
which the subordinate commands can base their programmed
course of action for the fiscal year(s) concerned. (Also
referred to as Program Budget Guidance (PBG) when the
guidance comes from HQDA to the MACOMs).
BUDGETARY CONTROL . The financial control and management of
a unit or function in accordance with an approved operating
program and budget with a view of keeping obligations,
expenditures, and costs within the limitations thereof,
taking advantage of whatever fund flexibility exists without
exceeding the limitations imposed by the annual funding
program and/or the quarterly authority or obligation (i.e.,
allocation or allotment advice).
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BUDGET EXECUTION . The implementation and administration of
the approved operating "budget during the budget year; accom-
plishment of the mission within available resources without
creating overobligations and/or over expenditures.
BUDGET EXECUTION REVIEW (BER) . Process by which the funds
required to carry out and complete the programmed objectives
and workload for the rest of the current year are determined
and forwarded to higher headquarters as the operating program
and budget. In addition to cost estimates, the obligational
requirements are also indicated by appropriation and budget
program. Budgeting, also includes the management and fund
control of resources received as a result of the operating
program and budget. Submitted to higher headquarters
udring mid-year of the current year.
COMMAND BUDGET ESTIMATE (CBE) . A documented course of action
for the program year based on Department of the Army pre-
liminary program and budget guidance. It is used by DA as
input to the President's Budget.
COMMAND OPERATING BUDGET (COB) . A command's documented
course of action for a fiscal year in terms of what is to
be accomplished, by whom, and with what resources.
COMMAND OPERATING BUDGET ESTIMATE (COBE) . A command's total
budget document which contains the CBE for the program year
and the COB for the budget year.
COMMAND OPERATING PROGRAM (COP) . A statement of the planned
application of the resources programmed for availability
toward the accomplishment of the assigned missions, goals,
and workloads of that command. Included as a part of the
program are all the resources programmed for allocation: men,
money, material, and facilities.
COMMITMENT . A firm administrative reservation of funds based
upon firm procurement directives, orders, requisitions, or
requests that authorizes the creation of an obligation without
further recourse to the official responsible for certifying
the availability of funds.
COST FACTORS . The average cost, based upon experience,
required to operate a particular type of equipment (per
mile, per hour or round).
DECREMENT . A listing prepared by installations and activities
to facilitate funding reductions that are received after
approval of the initial operating program. Items or activities
or portions thereof, that are already included within the
funded operating program are listed in inverse priority, i.e.,
lesser priority first. The total list of decrement actions
normally represents 5 to 10 percent of the total funded
program. The list reflects the order of those activities re-
quirements that would be deleted first if funds were withdrawn.
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DIRECT FUNDS . Obligation authority contained within the
approved operating budget immediately available for a
specific time and purpose. Direct funds are obligated for
expenses directly attributable to installation operating
expenses, cush as civilian pay, utilities, and contracts.
DIRECTORATE . An integral component of a HQDA staff agency,
major command headquarters staff office, or installation
headquarters that has primary responsibility for staff
coordination and management of assigned functions. Respon-
sibilities, accompanied by commensurate authority to act for
the activity head or commander, normally include policy
development, staff coordination, establishment of controls,
and review of effectiveness of operations.
ELEMENTS OF EXPENSE . A four-position classification code
representing the different types of services, goods, and
other items being procured or consumed according to their
nature rather than purpose. (Example: Civilian Pay is 1100),
FINANCED REQUIREMENT . A requirement included within an
operating program that has been recognized and subsequently
funded by a higher authority.
FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM (FYDP) . A Department of Defense
management tool whereby the planning and execution of
military activities is expressed in terms of missions and
objectives (output) as opposed to funds provided (input).
These programs are developed on a five-year (or longer)
future projection basis taking into consideration existing
resources, war plans, and the anticipated funds available
from Congress to carry out programs. These programs are
the basis used in the apportionment request by DOD.
FUND AUTHORIZATION DOCUMENT . The approved annual financial
allotment of funds by major program which serves as the
authority for the command to incur obligations.
FUNDS . Accounting units established for segregating revenues
and assets in accordance with law and for assuring that
revenues and other assets are applied only to financial
transactions for which they are appropriated or otherwise
authorized. Funds are of different types and designed for
different purposes.
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES . (Program 2), the General Purpose
Forces Program of the OMA, provides for the mission support
of the active Army Combat Forces and the requisite combat
support and combat service support units. These resources
directly affect the ability to train tactical units and to
maintain the combat readiness of Army forces both deployed
and those in the United States with deployment contingency
missions. This portion of the appropriation provides for
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the supplies and equipment necessary to conduct unit train-
ing, maintain equipment in a high state of readiness, con-
duct joint exercises and support the combat development
programs required to sharpen the combat capabilities of our
forces
.
INCREMENT . By definition, a "decision package." An identifi-
able increase for an activity, above the decremented level,
based on workload, or other specific requirements.
INSTALLATION . 1. A group of facilities, located in the
same vicinity, that support particular functions. 2. Land
and improvements permanently affixed thereto that are under
the control of the Department of the Army and used by
Army organizations. Where installations are located con-
tiguously, the combined property is designated as an installa-
tion and the separate functions are designated as activities
of that installation.
ISSUE . A specific program or task of sufficient importance
to require separate identification and justification in the
budget formulation process.
JUNIOR PBAC . A committee within an organization normally
composed of the major activity budget analysts, and chaired
by the organizations budget officer. It meets to review and
resolve minor resource allocation matters, and to make
recommendations on major financial and resource allocation
proglems for consideration by the regular Program Budget
Advisory Committee.
OBLIGATION . Amounts of orders placed, contracts awarded,
services rendered, and similar transactions during a given
period requiring future payments.
OPERATING BUDGET . The component of the operating program
that details the financial plans in terms of costs (funded
and unfunded) and obligations in support of the operating
program for the budget year. At each level the operating
budget provides a financial plan to support the activities
and functions for which the commander is responsible.
OPERATING PROGRAM . A program prepared by each Army command,
agency, and installation that lists the annual objectives to
be obtained, relating the objectives to available resources
(manpower, material, and money).
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY, 1979 (OMA) . For the opera-
tion and maintenance of all organizational equipment and
facilities of the Army, procurement of requisite equipment
and supplies, production of audiovisual instructional
materials and training aids, operation of service-wide
and establishment-wide activities; medical activities;
operation of depots, schools, training (including cost of
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training civilian employees in the program from which the
salaries are payable), recruiting, and programs related to
the operation and maintenance of the Army. Also includes
welfare and morale, information, education, and religious
activities, and expenses of courts, hoards, and commissions.
OUTLAYS. The amount of checks issued, interest accrued on
the public debt, or other payments made (including advances
to others), net of refunds and reimbursements. (The terms
"expenditure" and "net disbursement" are frequently used
interchangeably with the term "outlay.")
PROGRAM BALANCE . The condition wherein approved program
objectives and schedules are in consonance with resources
and established priorities.
PROGRAM BUDGET ADVISORY COMMITTEE (PBAC) . A committee within
an organization normally composed of senior representatives
of the staff who are responsible for developing, reviewing,
and making recommendations on all financial matters relating
to the operations of the command.
PROGRAM ELEMENT . An integrated activity; a combination of
personnel, equipment, and facilities, which together con-
stitute an identifiable military capability or support
activity. Program elements are the basic structural units
of the FYDP.
xREPROGRAMMING . The redevelopment of one or more activities
or major activities comprising the installation program,
including schedules and suppprting budget execution plans.
These changes would be caused by major policy changes and
budgetary decisions significantly affecting one or more of
the major activities.
UNFINANCED REQUIREMENT . Items or activities (requirements)
considered necessary by the installation for mission
accomplishment or mission support, but which go unfunded






AMS - Army Management Structure
ARTEP - Army Training and Evaluation Program
AVGAS - Aviation Gasoline
AVSPARES - Aviation Spare Parts
BASOPS - Base Operating Information System
BCFP - Battalion Cost Factor Program
Bde - Brigade
BDM - Battalion Decision Model
BER - Budget Execution Review
BFTD's - Battalion Field Training Days
BMG - Budget and Manpower Guidance
Bn - Battalion
CAMUS - Commitment Accounting for Management of Unit Supplies
CBE - Command Budget Estimate
COB - Command Operating Budget
COBE - Command Operating Budget Estimates
DCSOPS - Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
DCSCOMPT - Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller
DDM - Division Decision Model
Div - Division
DOA - Department of Army
DX - Direct Exchange
EDRE - Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise
EOE - Element of Expense
FORSCOM - Forces Command
FTX - Field Training Exercise
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FY - Fiscal Year
HQDA - Headquarters, Department of the Army
MACOM - Major Army Command
MASS - Maneuver Area Scheduling Subsystem
MCFP - MACOM Cost Factor Program
MOGAS - Motor Gas (gasoline)
OMA - Operations and Maintenace, Army
P2 - Program 2 (Mission)
PBG - Program Budget Guidance
PARR - Program Analysis and Review
POL - Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants
PPBS - Planning, Programming, Budgeting System
STANFINS - Standard Financial Information System
TACS - Training Ammunition Control Subsystem
TAMIS - Training Ammunition Management Information System
TDY - Temporary Duty
TMCS - Training Management Control System
TMIP - Training Management Information Program
TOA - Table of Organization and Allowance
TOE - Table of Organization and Equipment
TRADOC - Training and Doctrine Command
TSG - Training Schedule Generator
TUFMIS - Tactical Unit Financial Management Information System
UIC - Unit Identification Code
WSDC - Weapon System Designator Code
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